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ABSTRACT
Abuaitah, Giovani Rimon, Ph.D., Department of Computer Science and Engineering,
Wright State University, 2013. Anomalies in Sensor Network Deployments: Analysis,
Modeling, and Detection.
A sensor network serves as a vital source for collecting raw sensory data. Sensor data
are later processed, analyzed, visualized, and reasoned over with the help of several deci-
sion making tools. A decision making process can be disastrously misled by a small portion
of anomalous sensor readings. Therefore, there has been a vast demand for mechanisms
that identify and then eliminate such anomalies in order to ensure the quality, integrity,
and/or trustworthiness of the raw sensory data before they can even be interpreted.
Prior to identifying anomalies, it is essential to understand the various anomalous be-
haviors prevalent in a sensor network deployment. Therefore, we begin this work by pro-
viding a comprehensive study of anomalies that exist in a sensor network deployment, or
are likely to exist in future deployments. After this thorough systematic analysis, we iden-
tify those anomalies that, in fact, hinder the quality and/or trustworthiness of the collected
sensor data.
One approach towards the reduction of the negative impact of misleading sensor read-
iv
ings is to perform off-line analysis after storing a large amount of sensor data into a cen-
tralized database. To this end, in this work, we propose an off-line abnormal node detec-
tion mechanism rooted in machine learning and data mining. Our proposed mechanism
achieves high detection accuracy with low false positives. The major disadvantage of a
centralized architecture is the tremendous amount of energy wasted while communicating
the sensor readings. Therefore, we further propose an on-line distributed anomaly detec-
tion framework that is capable of accurately and rapidly identifying data-centric anomalies
in-network, while at the same time maintaining a low energy profile. Unlike previous ap-
proaches, our proposed framework utilizes a very small amount of data memory through
on-line extraction of few statistical features over the sensor data stream. In addition, previ-
ous detection mechanisms leverage sensor datasets obtained from an earlier deployment or
use synthetic data to test their effectiveness. Our framework, on the other hand, has been
entirely implemented in TinyOS as a prototype readily deployable into existing sensor net-
works, alongside other essential protocols such as sensor data collection protocols. An ad-
vantage of our system is the fact that it relies on supervised learning. Supervised machine
learning algorithms usually achieve higher accuracy than their unsupervised counterparts
given a highly representative common ground truth. Thus, in this work, we also design
highly expressive anomaly models that may be leveraged to inject anomalous readings into
existing sensor network deployments. In order to do so, we have developed a tool called
SNMiner which enables us not only to inject anomalies into a network of sensors, but also
to extract important statistical features and evaluate the accuracy of a number of supervised
machine learning algorithms.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Over the last decade, real-life deployments of sensor networks have grown in numbers for
various applications. Most of these deployments have helped decision makers better under-
stand their targeted environments by analyzing the data collected from a large number of
unattended sensors. A typical deployment of a wireless sensor network (WSN) consists of
several tens or hundreds of low-power low-cost tiny devices equipped with sensor boards
capable of measuring several phenomena. These devices, usually called sensor motes, are
also equipped with wireless communication modules that enable them to communicate
with each others. Table 1.1 shows the characteristics of some sensor platforms (i.e. motes)
popularly used in sensor network deployments. Two types of communication paradigms
are possible: (a) a simplified single-hop communication where every sensor mote commu-
nicates directly with a base station. A base station is a more powerful node which may
further process and then relay messages towards a connected PC, and (b) a more complex
multi-hop communication paradigm that involves forwarding messages from sensing nodes
to the base station with the help of other intermediate sensor nodes in the network (see Fig-
ure 1.1). The base station node is sometimes called the “sink” while other nodes in the
network are referred to as “source nodes.”
1
Table 1.1: Popular Commercial Sensor Platforms
Name Image Manufacturer Processor
Program/Flash
Memory
Data
Memory
External
Flash
Radio Frequency
Battery
Type
OS/VM
Prog.
Languages
TelosB
MEMSIC
8MHz TI MSP430 48Kbytes 10Kbytes 1Mbyte 2.4GHz
2x AA
TinyOS nesC
MICA2
ATmega128L
128Kbytes
4K bytes
512Kbytes
868/916 MHz
MICAz
2.4GHz
IRIS
8MHz 8bit
ATmega1281
8Kbytes
TinyOS,
MoteRunner VM
nesC,
Java/C#
XM1000 advanticsys
8MHz TI
MSP430f2618
116Kbytes
1Mbyte TinyOS, Contiki nesC, C
Tmote Sky Sentilla 8MHz TI MSP430 48Kbytes 10Kbytes
SunSPOT ORACLE
400MHz 32bit Atmel
AT91SAM9G20
8Mbytes 1Mbyte -
Li-Ion
Recharge-
able
Squawk VM Java ME
Waspmote Libelium 8MHz ATmega1281 128Kbytes
8Kbytes +
4Kbytes
2Gbytes
SD Card
868/900MHz,
2.4GHz
Auxiliary
Recharge-
able
None C++
Imote2
MEMSIC
(Intel-
licensed)
13-416MHz PXA271
XScale
32Mbytes
256Kbytes
+
32Mbytes
-
2.4GHz
3x AAA /
Li-Lon
TinyOS nesC
iSense
Core
Module 3
Coalesenses
4-32MHz 32bit RISC
Controller
512Kbytes
Shared
128Kbytes
Shared
-
Pluggable
Resources
iSense Firmware C++
TinyNode Shockfish TI MSP430 48Kbytes 10Kbytes 512Kbytes
433 MHz,
868MHz, 915 MHz
Pluggable
Resources
TinyOS nesC
One of the very first successful deployments of sensor networks took place at the Great
Duck Island [123]. Researchers used data collected from environmental and occupancy
sensors laid inside nests (burrows) to better understand the micro-climate surrounding
seabirds, observe weather conditions during the breeding season, and measure the occu-
pancy period of seabirds during incubation. The quality and accuracy of the collected sen-
sor data was a major concern. To achieve higher fidelity in the data, appropriate packaging
was necessary to protect the sensors from harsh environmental conditions. Without pack-
aging, batteries may rapidly discharge or sensors may totally fail due to their exposure to
chemicals such as carbon dioxide. The latter conditions can result in sensor faults that may
highly degrade the quality of the sensor data. Even with the existence of appropriate pack-
aging, sensors might still experience natural unknown faults or calibration drifts impacting
the confidence in the generated sensor readings. As another example of an early success of
sensor networks is the Redwood Forest deployment [126]. In this deployment, 33 sensor
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Figure 1.1: A typical multi-hop sensor network deployment. Intermediate sensor motes are
expected to report their own readings, as well as forwarding readings received from other
motes towards the base station via communication links.
motes where placed at different heights of a 67-meter tree. Researchers collected tem-
perature readings, relative humidity readings, and readings of solar radiation levels using
Photo-synthetically Active Radiation (PAR) sensors to help better analyze the ecological
conditions of a tree in the forest. The redwood forest deployment stressed the necessity of
designing mechanisms to detect and correct sensor faults in a sensor network due to battery
discharges and other possible causes regardless of perfect packaging and pre-deployment
calibration.
Sensor networks are also susceptible to malicious threats if deployed in a hostile en-
vironment. A malicious threat can vary from a simple passive eavesdropping attack to a
total compromise of a sensor node. Sensor nodes, once compromised, can inject falsified
readings into the network. Any inconsistent1 or malicious data behavior as a result from
a security threat can degrade the trustworthiness, integrity, and/or accuracy of the sensor
1Previous research refers to inconsistent sensor readings that are far from the true value as outliers, anoma-
lous, abnormal, faulty or malicious data. We will use all these terms interchangeably unless clearly stated in
this dissertation.
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data. The rise of the “Internet of Things” [6] has made WSNs even more appealing to
the Internet community by connecting standalone sensor networks deployed in different
geographical locations to the Internet and making sensor data accessible to authorized in-
dividuals over the Web [1, 40, 50]. The level of confidence in publicly accessible sensors
is still uncertain and there is a huge demand for data cleaning tools to filter out anomalous
sensor readings.
To this end, researchers have proposed several approaches to detect inconsistencies and
abnormal behaviors that can degrade the accuracy of the sensor data. Among those, ap-
proaches rooted in the fields of machine learning and data mining proved to be effective.
As part of this dissertation proposal, we explore a number of these techniques, their level
of effectiveness, and their weaknesses. After that, we propose two new machine learning,
i.e., boosting, based mechanisms for anomaly detection in sensor networks which can iden-
tify both sensor data faults as well as compromised data behaviors. The major difference
between the two proposed mechanisms is that the first detection mechanism is performed
at the base station (centralized) whereas, in the second mechanism, the actual detection
runs at the sensor level (online). The latter avoids communicating the large number of
anomalous readings to the base station, and hence saving a tremendous amount of energy
which is highly proportional to the communication cost. Furthermore, we design a toolkit
that allows us to model anomalies and abnormal behaviors in a sensor network. Usually,
researchers need to test the accuracy/effectiveness of their proposed anomaly detection al-
gorithms. Anomaly models that are highly expressive are desirable due to the difficulty of
obtaining a common ground truth necessary to evaluate against. In addition, with super-
vised detection algorithms, it is essential to label anomalies according to their type. Highly
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representative anomaly models may be injected to eliminate labeling errors during the la-
beling process, or reduce tedious and error-prone efforts imposed by simple visual inspec-
tions of the original dataset. The developed toolkit is also capable of extracting interesting
statistical features and evaluating a number of supervised machine learning algorithms.
1.1 Motivations
This dissertation is driven by five major motives. First of all, a typical sensor network
deployment is highly susceptible to various numbers of anomalous behaviors. Prior to de-
signing a detection or preventive mechanism, it is very crucial to understand the frequency
and characteristics of such behaviors. Once achieving a comprehensive study and analysis
of anomalies prevalent in a sensor network deployment, researchers may focus on a spe-
cific type of anomalous behaviors or rather design a generalized mechanism for detecting a
good number of these anomalies. A number of researchers have identified the existence of
such behaviors over the last decade and have designed detection and/or preventive mech-
anisms addressing different types of anomalies. The fact that there is a large number of
such proposed mechanisms imposes possible ambiguity of what is, indeed, being detected.
We break this ambiguity by providing a taxonomy of anomalies prevalent in sensor net-
work deployments and their corresponding detection mechanisms. Second, observing the
anomalous behaviors prevalent in a number of successful sensor network deployments to
date, has motivated us to re-think the existing mechanisms for ensuring the quality of the
collected sensor data. There is a prompt need for anomaly detection mechanisms that iden-
tify highly frequent sensor data faults towards avoiding quality degradation in the collected
sensor data. Third, experimenting with a network of a few sensors at our lab has demon-
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strated the feasibility of simulating compromise behaviors in a sensor network with very
little effort. A node, once compromised, can emit falsified readings, alter other nodes’ read-
ings, or launch a security attack of any kind. This may render sensor data untrustworthy
and unusable by application end-users who seek meaningful rather trustworthy inferences.
Thus, there is also a high demand for anomaly detection mechanisms that can identify and
eliminate compromise data behaviors to avoid lack of trust in the collected sensor data
and/or data integrity vulnerabilities. Fourth, given the fact that sensor nodes are resource-
constrained largely because of the lack of a continuous energy source and the small size
of data and program memory spaces, it is crucial to design detection algorithms that take
into account such characteristics if such mechanisms are to be deployed at the sensor level.
Last, there is a lack of sensor network tools which facilitate the modeling of faults and
malicious behaviors in a real-world sensor network deployment. The combination of ar-
tificially injected but highly expressive anomalies coupled with real sensor data provide a
more realistic sensor network model compared to purely synthetic datasets or publicly ac-
cessible anomaly-free datasets. This drives us to develop a GUI tool, we call SNMiner, for
that purpose. The development of SNMiner was also indirectly influenced by the lack of a
standalone platform for rapid experimentation and evaluation of a machine learning based
detection model under examination.
1.2 Thesis Objectives and Contributions
The ultimate objectives of this dissertation are summarized here: (i) Improving sensor data
acquisition schemes in order to enhance the quality of the collected sensor data in the pres-
ence of various anomalies; (ii) Providing a self-organizing sensor network that takes pro-
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active measures in case of fault/compromise detection excluding erroneous sensor readings
from calculations; (iii) Facilitating the machine learning process by building a responsive
sensor network platform willing to train itself in the face of sensor faults and/or malicious
behaviors; (iv) Achieving all of the above while maintaining an energy consumption of the
sensor nodes nearly commensurate with that without employing any sort of quality assur-
ance measures.
Our major contributions are summarized as follows. First, we put together a compre-
hensive study of anomalies prevalent in current and futuristic sensor network deployments.
There has been similar studies and surveys in the literature regarding anomalies in sensor
networks. However, to the best of our knowledge, up to this moment none has provided
a rather complete view of the nature of anomalous behaviors and none has intensively an-
alyzed each of these behaviors. Second, we survey the literature in an attempt to provide
a taxonomy of machine learning based anomaly detection techniques in sensor networks.
We then propose a centralized data-centric anomaly detection technique borrowing from
the field of machine learning and data mining. The technique employs a supervised en-
semble learning algorithm called Adaptive Boosting (AdaBoost [35]) which relies on a
combination of base classifiers to reduce the classification error and hence improving the
accuracy of the ensemble classifier. We have shown that the technique yields a low number
of false positives while being able to detect a large number of data-centric anomalies in a
sensor network deployment. We further propose an on-line data-centric anomaly detection
framework for sensor networks. This framework takes into consideration the high energy
consumed by communicating sensor readings all the way to the base station. It solves this
issue by running the detection at every sensor node in the network. It also employs an
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online feature extraction mechanism whereby simple statistical features are extracted on
the fly, and therefore, sensor readings do not need to be stored in memory. As an essen-
tial part to every supervised machine learning algorithm, sensor data need to be labeled in
advance. However, labeling data by itself is tedious as it usually requires visual inspection
of every single original data point. Therefore, as a better alternative, we design highly ex-
pressive anomaly models that represent measurement faults in existing real-world sensor
datasets, possible events, as well as compromise data behaviors common in hostile deploy-
ments. Anomaly modeling/injection, feature extraction, and algorithm accuracy evaluation,
all were implemented under a unified toolkit called SNMiner.
1.3 Thesis Organization
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. The next chapter emphasizes the need
for an anomaly detection mechanism by laying down a number of existing sensor net-
work deployments and identifying instances of anomalies prevalent in such deployments.
Chapter 3 provides a taxonomy of anomalies prevalent in sensor network deployments.
Corresponding detection mechanisms are also being discussed. In Chapter 4, we design
data-centric anomaly models which are highly representative of sensor data faults, compro-
mise data behaviors, as well as possible events. Chapter 5 begins by surveying a number
of existing machine learning based data-centric anomaly detection schemes for sensor net-
works. In the same chapter, we propose a novel data-centric anomaly detection framework
also rooted in machine learning which is capable of detecting both measurement faults as
well as compromise data behaviors with low false positives. An online version of the later
is proposed in Chapter 6. At the end of the same chapter, we present the design goals of the
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SNMiner toolkit which was used frequently during this work. Finally, Chapter 7 concludes
the dissertation.
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Chapter 2
Prevalence of Anomalies In Real World
Deployments: The Need For Detection
Mechanisms
Sensor network deployments have enabled automated data collection at a finer granularity
compared to human-centric sparse deployments of traditional telemetric data loggers, driv-
ing scientists or application administrators to draw better conclusions from the collected
sensor data. However, this fine granularity cannot be achieved in the presence of failing
nodes, frequent network failures, and/or potentially malicious network behaviors. More-
over, given a perfect and secure network with long-lived sensor nodes, finer-grained data
samples may still not guarantee the quality of reasoning during the decision making process
unless the sensor dataset is fault-free. Unlike traditional devices, wireless sensor motes are
resource-constrained battery-powered devices equipped with few on-board sensors which
are susceptible to failures, and batteries cannot always be reliably recharged. Over the
years, sensor network deployments have materialized a large number of monitoring and
event-detection applications. Examples include monitoring weather conditions [122, 126],
habitat monitoring and wildlife tracking [5,119,122], monitoring of health conditions, flood
detection [50], fire detection [75], volcano monitoring [131], structural health monitor-
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ing [61], monitoring the micro-climate inside greenhouses [4], monitoring voltage usages
at the micro-grid [22], monitoring water quality [106], measuring the quality of perish-
able food and medicine [10], and tracing and verification of goods at different phases of
the supply chain [10]. Researchers and decision makers have observed several anomalous
patterns ranging from functional failures to pervasive sensing faults in most of these de-
ployments. In this chapter, we discuss a few of these deployments to emphasize the need
for an anomaly detection mechanism. Towards the end of the chapter, Table 2.1 compares
the existing deployments we discuss here while Table 2.2 summarizes the different obser-
vations sought in such deployments which revealed a number of anomalies.
2.1 Great Duck Island (GDI)
2.1.1 Overview
The GDI project [122] serves as one of the earliest proof-of-concept sensor network deploy-
ments. The main purpose of this deployment was to help ecologists study the distribution
and abundance of Leach’s Storm Petrels (a type of seabird species) at the Great Duck Island,
Maine. The system deploys a multi-tier architecture (Figure 2.1) where one or more sensor
patches are located at the lowest tier and the higher tier forms a transit network of gateways
connecting the sensor patches to the remote base station(s). Each sensor patch is comprised
of burrow motes equipped with temperature, humidity, and non-contact infrared tempera-
ture sensors to monitor the occupancy of nesting burrows, and weather motes to measure
the surface micro-climate using temperature, humidity, and pressure sensors. There were
two types of deployments for sensor patches (with incremental installments): a single hop
network of 49 Mica2Dot [118] motes running TinyOS [124] each of which samples read-
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Figure 2.1: Great Duck Island (GDI) deployment.
ings every 5 minutes, and a multi-hop network of 98 motes with data sampled every 20
minutes. In addition, a verification network of in-burrow cameras was also deployed to
obtain ground truth for occupancy verification by collecting 15-second movies every 15
minutes. The deployment operated over 115 days during the summer and autumn of 2003
and covered an ellipsoidal area of 221 by 71 squared meters. To protect the electronics from
severe environmental conditions such as flooding or rain, the internal structure of motes was
entirely covered with O-rings and conformal coatings. On-board sensors, however, needed
to be exposed to the outside world to preserve their sensing capabilities.
2.1.2 Observations
Data Yield
Data yield is the ratio between the number of data points successfully delivered to the
base station and the expected number of data points generated by all nodes in the network.
During the multi-hop deployment, several failures (anomalies) were spotted that resulted
in a low data yield. For instance, five burrow motes stopped reporting only after 5 days of
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the deployment. This was due to rapid depletion of their batteries. Another example was
the failure of gateways or the transit network accounting for a sensor data yield of merely
28%. In addition, the GDI deployment indicated that adequate packaging and efficient
mote placement is essential: only 78 motes were recovered out of 150 devices as some
were moved by animals and most of the recovered motes had their antennas removed or
shortened by animals, eventually causing the node to fail to report its readings.
Measurement Faults
The GDI multi-hop deployment and an earlier deployment of a single hop network in the
year 2002 [122], in which sensor motes also measured ambient light levels and sensor
readings were sampled every 70 seconds, revealed that sensors may frequently malfunc-
tion and provide erroneous or abnormal measurements due to various reasons discussed in
Chapter 3. For example, during the 2002 deployment, about half of the temperature and
humidity sensors reported faulty readings. This was mostly due to water contacts result-
ing in short circuits. A faulty temperature reading manifested itself in a persistent reading
of 0◦C, whereas an anomalous humidity reading was either higher than 150% (out-lier)
or very small. The temperature sensor most often never recovered while humidity sensors
which reported high spikes recovered after they dried up. Humidity sensors with very small
values were also correlated with permanent node outages: 55% of motes exhibiting this be-
havior failed within 2 days [123]. In addition, wet sensors in general caused the battery
level to drop drastically. Light sensors, on the other hand, reported reliable readings most
of the time with the few exceptions when there was a spike usually correlated with tempera-
ture/humidity faults. Both deployments—single and multi-hop—showed that the operating
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voltage threshold is 2.7V when using 2-AA alkaline batteries while using a lithium battery
maintained a constant voltage, and sensor calibration, although time consuming, is essen-
tial before deployment. Some of these facts have motivated researchers to design new mote
architecture [96] which is more solid in face of sensor failures (e.g., cuts the power line
to the failed humidity sensor when detected) and lasts longer (e.g., the operating voltage
threshold is 1.8V).
2.2 Redwood Forests
2.2.1 Overview
A multi-hop network of Mica2Dot TinyOS-powered sensor motes [126] have replaced tra-
ditional data loggers in the redwood forests of Sonoma, California. Motes were attached to
the west side of a 70-meter tall redwood tree at approximately 2-meter spacing. Each mote
was equipped with temperature, humidity, and two PAR sensors (photo-diodes) to mea-
sure the micro-climate surrounding the tree. The network operated over 44 days during
the Spring of 2004 and collected readings at a sampling rate of 5 minutes. The collected
data helped biologists draw conclusions regarding the moving gradients inside the structure
of the tree due to variations of the different phenomena over the tree volume. Packaging
included a white skirt cover to protect the internal electronics from water and wind but
still exposed the sensors to the environment to preserve their sensing capabilities. To be
able to access the data from the outside world, a Stargate [121] gateway was placed at the
bottom of the tree which stored sensor readings received over the multi-hop network into a
TASK [11] database server.
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2.2.2 Observations
Data Yield
The entire network collected only 49% of the total sampled data points. Network and node
failures were the underlying reasons behind such a low yield. The gateway node suffered
outages at the beginning of the deployment while five nodes stopped reporting during the
second week. Researchers of the Redwood Forests deployment emphasized the need for
network monitoring tools that can detect and report an abnormal behavior once it occurs.
Measurement Faults
By analyzing the data, researchers have found several anomalous readings. For example,
some sensor motes running on a low battery produced erroneous readings where others
reported readings outside of the normal range (e.g., humidity readings above 100 %RH).
The latter is an example of a clipping fault as will discuss in Chapter 3. Since battery
failures accounted for most of the anomalies, a simple anomaly detection and filtration
algorithm was applied. Sensor readings, reported when the mote’s voltage was outside the
range 2.4V-3.0V, were deleted. In addition, humans were involved to remove motes which
reported unexpected readings. This deployment has shown that physical installation (e.g.,
orientation) of sensor motes is very critical and calibration is inadequate to improve the
fidelity of the data and other techniques are needed. A time consuming calibration of the
humidity and temperature sensors resulted in only slight improvements.
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Figure 2.2: Intel Berkeley Research Lab (IBRL) deployment [11].
2.3 Intel Berkeley Research Lab (IBRL)
2.3.1 Overview
Researchers at the Intel Berkeley Research Laboratory (IBRL) deployed an indoor net-
work of 54 Mica2 and Mica2Dot motes in March 2004 [11]. Every 30 seconds, motes
collected temperature, relative humidity, light, voltage, and topology information. The in-
tention behind this deployment, which lasted for about 30 days (720 hours), was to verify
the capability of the Tiny Application Sensor Kit (TASK) services in keeping the network
alive over extended periods of time, and to provide the sensor network community with
a publicly accessible sensor dataset allowing developers and other researchers to experi-
ment with. The dataset acts as a benchmark to evaluate and compare anomaly detection
algorithms against each others. The deployed motes formed the multi-hop network shown
in Figure 2.2. The base station is the node with ID 0 and the farthest nodes at the upper
left corner (e.g., node 51) are about 10 hops away from the base station. Sensor nodes
ran TinyDB which is part of the TASK sensor kit. TASK also provided visual tools for
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inspecting the quality of data and the status of the network.
2.3.2 Observations
Data Yield
The entire IBRL sensor dataset [19] contained 2,313,153 entries pertaining to only about
half the expected number of entries. Each entry corresponds to a packet or sample received
from one of the deployed sensors. Each packet contains the sampling date, sampling time,
sequence number (epoch), node id, temperature reading, humidity reading, light reading,
and the voltage level.
IBRL researchers found that 4 nodes failed after the first few days for unknown reasons.
Even before failing, a high number of packet loss was observed. For example, for a little
more than 8 hours starting 11:24 pm on March 1, packets from node 15 were not delivered
to the base station most likely due to network contention or interference. The plot of node
15 data in Figure 2.3 shows missing sensor values over the lifetime of the node1. The rest of
the motes were able to successfully transmit 30% to 82% of their packets over the lifetime
of the deployment. In addition to the previous findings, we observe that the entire network
has gone offline for two intermittent days. Although this may seem as a correlation of
packet losses across sensors, this is not the case over the entire deployment [11]. The two
intermittent days of complete loss may be due to a very high network contention or a base
station breakage. The loss of sensor readings, however, seems to be highly correlated (a
lost packet would result in total absence of all sensor readings). It is also worth mentioning
that in the IBRL deployment, three nodes were potentially deployed later after the very
first deployment of the original 54 nodes. They may also have been deployed initially but
1 Missing periods are measured using a time gap of 5 minutes.
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Figure 2.3: Sensor data for node 15. Missing readings for over 5 minutes are left blank.
never reported any packets until too late in the deployment time for unknown reasons. It
seems like the three nodes rebooted themselves (or were physically reset) as the sequence
numbers did not always follow a sequential order.
In addition to total loss of packets, some nodes have reported packets with missing
sensor values. Several packets (i.e., samples) from node 5 were delivered to the base sta-
tion intermittently until March 3. However, the sensor readings were completely missing
due to unknown reasons. From node 57, only 3 packets were delivered during the entire
monitoring period, one of which had only a single sensor reading (humidity reading).
Measurement Faults
Rajasegarar et al [104] have analyzed the IBRL set for data anomalies. They found that
node 14 reported few anomalous readings (i.e., anomalous temperature and humidity)
within a four-hour window starting midnight March 1. Within the same time window,
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Figure 2.4: Temperature data of 15 nodes from the IBRL deployment.
node 37 reported anomalous readings at all times (i.e., anomalous node). It is believed
that the reason behind the total anomalies of node 37 is its physical placement close to
the kitchen (always higher temperature and humidity) and the unusual interference at the
corner where node 14 is located accounts for its slightly erroneous behavior. In addition to
anomalies resulted from nodes 14 and 37, other forms of fault were observed in [88]. For
example, nodes 24 and 32 as well as other spatially correlated sensor nodes experienced
clipping faults in the light readings over the course of the month. Clipping occurred in the
middle of the day when the light sensor could not read values exceeding the limits of the
analog to digital converter (ADC). As in the redwood forests project, due to low battery
levels, some sensors have also shown abnormal behaviors that manifested themselves as
spikes followed by a “stuck-at” fault as referred to in [88]. In the latter work, researchers
have found that 20% of the total temperature readings were faulty. Figure 2.4 plots the tem-
perature data measured by 15 nodes in the IBRL deployment. The figure reveals a number
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Figure 2.5: Percentage of sensor data faults in the IBRL dataset. Faults mainly include
spike faults, stuck-at faults, and noise faults exhibited by the temperature and humidity
sensors as well as clipping faults in the light readings. The number of outliers is negligible.
of faulty readings that manifest themselves as spikes, noise, outliers, and stuck-at faults.
We will discuss the characteristics of such faults in the coming chapter. Since temperature
and humidity readings are very highly correlated, one can imagine a similar plot for the
humidity data. Notice that the majority of the temperature readings are spatially correlated
(a node’s temperature reading is close to its neighbors’ readings at a time). Temperature
readings are also temporally correlated within a short time window.
Figure 2.5 measures the frequency of faulty readings in the IBRL dataset. A number of
sensor nodes (node 18, 29, 30, 32, 46, and 50) can only leverage 47% to 57% of its overall
collected temperature and humidity readings. The rest of the readings are faulty and may be
harmful to the decision making process. Temperature and humidity sensors exhibit spike,
stuck-at, and noise faults whereas light sensors suffer from clipping. Figure 2.6 shows the
actual number of clipping faults in the IBRL dataset. About half of the sensor nodes exhibit
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Figure 2.6: Number of clipping faults in the IBRL dataset. The histogram shows the num-
ber of anomalous readings caused by a clipping fault for each node.
this behavior.
2.4 SensorScope
2.4.1 Overview
The SensorScope system [50], developed at EPFL (Swiss Federal Institute of Technology
Lausanne), underwent 7 outdoor deployments over a span of three years (2006-2008) in
different locations in Switzerland at a scale ranging from 6 to 97 weather stations. Each
weather station is equipped with a well-packaged Shockfish TinyNode [85] and nine envi-
ronmental sensors which measure a handful of environmental observations every 2 minutes
(e.g., air humidity and temperature, soil moisture, rain precipitation, solar radiation, water-
mark, and wind direction/speed). Sensor motes receive power from an NiMH battery that is
rechargeable via a solar panel located at the top of the station. The two most significant de-
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ployments took place at: (i) a rock glacier located at 2500-meter high on top of a mountain
in Génépi, Switzerland, and; (ii) the 2400-meter high Grand Saint Bernard pass located
between Switzerland and Italy. In both cases, weather data were collected over a multi-
hop network of weather stations and transmitted by a GPRS-enabled gateway to a database
server. Data are publicly accessible over the Internet and can be viewed using popular Web
interfaces (i.e., Google Maps, Microsoft’s SensorMap). The Génépi deployment had 16
stations scattered over 500x500 meters area reporting weather data during August-October
2007 (60 days). Detecting floods and rock falls in the area was the main reason behind this
deployment as the mountain is a source of mud streams and rock releases due to the melt-
ing of underlying permafrosts. The second deployment consisted of 17 stations deployed
in September 2007 for 45 days on a 900-meter long line over the Bernard pass to prevent
avalanches [7].
2.4.2 Observations
Data Yield
There were a few missing data points during both the Génépi and Grand St. Bernard de-
ployments. As an example, during the former deployment, station 7 did not report any
readings over more than a week during the middle stage of the deployment. Mostly, hard-
ware failures due to short circuits accounted for this behavior. As reported in [8], the total
number of data points collected from the two deployments was 5800000 and 4300000 re-
spectively. This results in a data yield of approximately 93% and 87% respectively. In
order to be able to monitor the network, SensorScope collected status packets in addition
to data packets. Status packets carried energy, network, and topology information that can
22
 0
 10
 20
 30
 40
 50
 60
 70
 80
 90
 100
Oct 06 Oct 07 Oct 08
R
el
at
iv
e 
H
um
id
ity
 (
R
%
)
Date
Figure 2.7: Humidity readings spanning 3 days in October. Corrosions forming on the
connector to the sensor board on October 6 due to high humidity accounts for the erroneous
readings.
help network administrators identify potential network and node failures.
Measurement Faults
SensorScope researchers have pointed out several challenges associated with sensor net-
work deployments. Some of the major challenges were: (i) packaging, (ii) calibration, (iii)
detecting software bugs during deployment, and (iv) tracing unexpected failures. Sensor
packaging is important but difficult. In both deployments, erroneous sensor readings were
reported during cold and humid periods due to inadequate packaging. The latter allowed
corrosions to form on the connector to the sensor board causing short circuits. This resulted
in useless readings from all humidity sensors at Génépi mountain [8] on October 6 as seen
in Figure 2.7. It also caused the rain sensor of station 14 at the Bernard pass [50] to report
faulty precipitation values. The humidity sensor, a Sensirion SHT75 sensor, was embedded
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within a stacked-plates structure and a small adapting circuit. Whereas, the wires were
protected using epoxy resin. Calibration is required before, during, and post deployment.
After packaging, sensors were pre-calibrated by comparing their values to a reference sta-
tion over several days. During pre-calibration, some temperature sensors reported an offset
of over than 2◦C, which is much higher than the expected offset of 0.3◦C, and needed to
be discarded. Once deployed, some sensors such as the wind direction sensor should also
be calibrated to avoid significant errors in their measurements. Finally, it is important to
re-calibrate the sensors after deployment to flag faulty readings.
Despite the fact that the majority of software bugs are easily detected and fixed be-
fore deployment and during indoor testing, some code bugs go undetected especially if
configuration parameters are modified right before or during deployment. As an example,
by observing the wind speed data of station 6 during the Génépi deployment, developers
discovered a subtle bug in the wind sensor’s driver: an 8-bit counter was not adequate to
store the number of revolutions the anemometer completes during one sampling period.
The bug was not detected during pre-deployment testing since the sampling period was set
much shorter (30 seconds). This bug affected all wind sensors alike, rendering the wind
speed readings unusable over the period during which counter overflows were encountered.
Figure 2.8 shows wind speed readings collected from two stations during the Génépi de-
ployment. Clearly, all data before October 19 are useless.
Finally, uncorrelated sensor readings may be reported unexpectedly. In [8], authors
joked about one occasion where one of the weather stations continuously generated un-
correlated sensor readings (anomalous node), to find out that it was entirely covered with
plastic wraps by construction workers to protect it from a near-by construction.
24
 0
 2
 4
 6
 8
 10
 12
 14
 16
Sep 01 Sep 15 Sep 29 Oct 13 Oct 27
W
in
d 
Sp
ee
d 
(m
/s
)
Date
Figure 2.8: Wind speed readings collected from two stations during the Génépi deploy-
ment. Data prior to October 19 are unusable due to a software bug in the wind sensor’s
driver.
We have seen that, although sensors were carefully calibrated, anomalies still occurred
due to other issues mentioned above (i.e., inadequate packaging, software bugs, unexpected
behaviors). In [112], for example, authors have identified SHORT faults (outliers) in three
of the 31 weather stations deployed outdoor on the EPFL campus and it is not clear what
caused such faults. Flagging and removing anomalies is usually done manually with hu-
man intervention. Manual anomaly filtering is time consuming, therefore, SensorScope
researchers have called for better approaches that rely on powerful off-line analysis and
rapid on-line detection algorithms to filter out outliers and hence to ameliorate sensor data
quality.
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2.5 GreenOrbs
2.5.1 Overview
The GreenOrbs project [75, 82] aimed at monitoring the micro-climate and ecological
trends in the forest. The collected sensor data support several applications including
fire risk evaluation, biodiversity and forestry research, monitoring of carbon dioxide ab-
sorbed by trees during the photosynthesis process, and estimation of canopy closure [82].
GreenOrbs deployments were carried out at several locations in the forest at a scale ranging
from 50 nodes to 349 nodes during a recent deployment [114]. The long-term goal is to
achieve a year-round kilo-scale sensor network deployment with 1000+ motes. The first
deployment operated over 30 days starting July 2008 and consisted of 50 TinyOS-powered
TelosB [96] motes scattered in a 20,000 meter squared forest at the campus of Zhejiang
Agriculture & Forestry University, Hangzhou, China. The deployed motes formed a multi-
hop network of 6-hop diameter. The second deployment took place in March 2009 with 120
motes forming a 10-hop network. Since then, the network has been continuously expanded.
The system employs the TinyOS conventional services for network-wide synchronization
to enable duty cycling (FTSP [79]), reconfiguration (DRIP [125]), and sensor data collec-
tion (CTP [37]). Motes collect temperature, humidity, light, voltage, and carbon dioxide
(CO2) levels. The network also collects routing, neighborhood, and node statistics infor-
mation. The latter helps diagnosing the network to identify root causes such as link failures
or any functional abnormal behavior in the network [114]. Each sensor mote runs on 2
AA batteries and is enclosed inside a plastic box to protect it from harsh environmental
conditions such as rain. To maintain light readings close to the true illuminance values, the
26
top of the box is designed to be transparent, whereas holes on the sides of the box main-
tain temperature and humidity values close to those outside of the box. Finally, the box is
mounted on a bracket to protect it from wild animals.
2.5.2 Observations
Data Yield
At a scale of 330 nodes, GreenOrbs researchers found that the network yield dropped from
60% to 10% when changing the sampling frequency from 20 minutes to 66 seconds [75].
Further investigations revealed that the main reason behind packet losses was packet drops
due to poor wireless channels or severe collisions. This accounted for 61.08% of all packet
losses. Due to this severe case, about 10% of the nodes were forced to drop a packet 20
to 50 times after 30 failed retransmission attempts. The rest of the packet drops were due
to forwarding queue overflows at the receiver side (i.e. severe data congestion). Ingress
drops could also take place due to a software bug that leads to a locked memory state of
the forwarding queue in CTP. All the ingress drops occurred on less than 5% of the nodes.
In addition, a number of nodes never successfully reported data to the sink [75] due to
software or hardware problems [80]. Routing loops, on the other hand, were considered
silent failures that are hard to detect but can drastically hinder the network performance.
Measurement Faults
Similar to previous deployments discussed above, calibration turned out to be very impor-
tant but hard and time consuming. For instance, during a deployment test of 21 nodes [82],
the maximum deviation of one light reading from another was 6KLux when all motes were
placed under the same illuminance level and 8.41KLux when placed under different illumi-
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nance levels. Light readings were used to estimate the canopy closure (i.e., the percentage
of the ground area vertically shaded by overhead foliage). This shows how important it is to
pre-calibrate the sensors before deployment to eliminate instrumental errors and deviations
in the light readings between correlated sensors, and hence arrive at an accurate estimation.
Despite packaging and calibration efforts, GreenOrbs researchers still identified frequent
pervasive sensing faults [75].
2.6 VigilNet
2.6.1 Overview
As one last real-world example, we consider VigilNet, a sensor network deployment for
target tracking and surveillance [44]. It is an example of an event-driven application. The
major challenge of VigilNet is to accurately estimate the speed and location of an intruder
(e.g., a vehicle) while keeping the entire system stealthy and energy efficient. Stealthiness
is very important when motes are deployed in hostile environments and therefore, are vul-
nerable to attacks. The size of a sensor node should be unobtrusively small and the network
traffic should be minimized. Positioning sensor motes in hidden areas protects them from
node compromise while minimizing network traffic reduces the chance of interception of
RF signals and packet sniffing. In VigilNet, 70 Mica2 motes running TinyOS were de-
ployed over a 280-feet long grassy road, 35 motes on each side of the road. The road may
typically resemble a hostile area to be monitored. A sensor board is mounted on top of
the mote and is capable of measuring magnetic fields generated by the movement of target
objects, acoustic signals, motion, and distance of the object. The dual-axis magnetometer
can sense slowly moving vehicles at a distance of approximately 8-10 feet. In addition,
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few long-range gateways are deployed in the sensor field which are responsible for relay-
ing traffic to a distant base station. The base station is attached to a portable device such
as a laptop which, in turn, triggers two cameras in the sensor field when a movement is
detected.
2.6.2 Observations
In order to precisely estimate the position of the moving vehicle, the number of faulty read-
ings generated by the magnetometers, due to potential change of power state or hardware
failures, should be minimized. VigilNet employs aggregation where a leader node fuses
correlated magnetic readings from its group members and discards readings from deviat-
ing members. The degree of aggregation (DOA), i.e., the number of group members, is
a key parameter which controls the percentage of false positives (i.e., reporting an event
while there is no vehicle in the vicinity of the sensor field) and false negatives (i.e., miss-
ing reports of moving vehicles). Without employing aggregation, the false positive rate
is very high (60%). False positives are eliminated if DOA is set to 3, i.e., a leader node
fuses readings from three members before reporting an event to the base station. In ad-
dition to on-line fault detection and elimination via in-network aggregation, VigilNet also
applies off-line fault detection at the base station by analyzing the spatiotemporal correla-
tion among consecutive events. Consequently, the base station sends power-off signals to
shut down misbehaving nodes.
Similar to the deployments discussed previously, VigilNet researchers have also advo-
cated for software calibration to eliminate sensor drifts as much as possible before deploy-
ment as well as repeated calibrations over time to adapt to changes in the environment.
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Table 2.1: Summary of The Existing Deployments Discussed In This Chapter
Name Num of Motes Sampling Freq Mote Type Duration Area Packaging
Great Duck Island
49 5 minutes
Mica2Dot 115 days 221 × 71 m2
O-rings /conformal
coating98 20 minutes
Redwood Forests 35 5 minutes Mica2Dot 44 days 70-meter white skirt cover
IBRL 54 30 seconds Mica2/Mica2Dot 30 days Intel Lab no packaging
SensorScope
16
2 minutes TinyNode
60 days 500 × 500 m2 stacked-plates structure
/epoxy resin17 45 days 900-meter
GreenOrbs 50 - 349 10 minutes TelosB 30 days - 1 year 20,000 m2 plastic box
VigilNet 70 n/a Mica2 n/a 280-feet no packaging
Unlike the deployments discussed above, however, sensor nodes in VigilNet are more vul-
nerable to security attacks due to the nature of the application. For some experiments,
which required a long duration of time, VigilNet researchers could not afford to deploy
the system unattended due to security issues [44]. Nodes in VigilNet can also be easily
compromised. Despite precise calibration and fault detection via on-line fusion and off-
line analysis, node compromise can drastically affect the fidelity and trustworthiness of the
vehicle detection estimate. Once a node is compromised, injecting falsified readings in a
smart way may harm the aggregation process or even worse these readings become hard
to detect off-line. Hence, anomaly detection algorithms should also be able to identify
such behavior and potentially eliminate readings from compromised nodes. Furthermore,
these algorithms should detect malicious network behaviors that may hinder the network
performance (e.g., data yield, latency, etc.) or shorten its lifetime.
2.7 A Smarter Supply Chain
As can be seen, anomaly detection in existing sensor network deployments is a crucial
challenge which needs to be addressed. Researchers have also envisioned future deploy-
ments at a very large scale. As an example, Franklin et al [33] have envisioned a supply
chain management (SCM) system, an example of a high fan-in (HiFi) system, where sen-
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sor data are initially collected and cleaned at the receptor-level which constitutes a number
of field deployable units (FDUs). A FDU has a network of sensors and a set of RFID
readers. FDUs may be located at different places in the supply chain, including store
shelves, store checkouts, and manufacturing lines. Data are then aggregated and smoothed
by Stargate-like devices [121] at the second level (i.e., dock doors level). At the third level
(i.e., warehouse level), sensor data are arbitrated and sensor streams are correlated across
all devices by full-fledged centralized servers. The interior of the system constitutes the
regional centers (fourth level) where data are validated, and the headquarters (fifth-level) at
which data mining algorithms are run over the processed sensor data streams on the fly to
foster the business decision making process and to provide better sales recommendations.
A HiFi proof-of-concept prototype was proposed by the authors in [33] which constitutes
three-levels of the main system’s hierarchy and uses TinyDB [78] for querying as well as
TelegraphCQ [13], an adaptive data stream processor. The authors have also demonstrated
the significance of pushing data cleaning and data reduction (i.e., aggregation) function-
alities to the edges of the HiFi system. This calls for anomaly detection algorithms at
the integrated WSN-RFID [109] end. The CSAVA (clean, smooth, arbitrate, validate, and
analyze) process discussed in the paper incorporates several data processing tasks at the
various levels of the HiFi system: cleaning, fault detection, anomaly detection, calibration,
stream correlation, and event monitoring. Cleaning and smoothing are achieved by simple
filtering queries; sensor readings with an RSSI (Received Signal Strength Indicator) higher
than a certain threshold will be discarded, and if the number of readings over a time win-
dow is less than a user-specified threshold, these readings are dropped. This calls for more
advanced anomaly detection techniques at the receptor-level which may further improve
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accuracy against erroneous and noisy sensor data, detect abnormal sensor activities, and
avoid fail-dirty cases where sensor nodes fail to report correct readings due to a possibly
drained battery.
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Table 2.2: Summary of Anomalies Prevalent In The Deployments Discussed In This Chapter
Name Data Yield
Observed Anomalies
Anomaly Impact Category
Great Duck Island 28% gateway outage main cause of the very low data yield network failure
rapid depletion of node’s battery 5 motes failed after 5 days node failure
permanent node outages due to very low
humidity
55% of nodes failed within 2 days
broken antennas only 78 out of 150 motes were recovered
outliers, spikes, calibration errors about half of the temperature and humidity readings were faulty measurement faults
Redwood Forests 49% gateway outage outages at the beginning of the deployment accounted for most
of the missing packets
network failure
rapid depletion of node’s battery 5 nodes failed during the second week node failure
low battery, out-of-range/clipping faults,
calibration errors
resulted in several erroneous readings measurement faults
IBRL ≈ 50% unknown network failure 4 nodes failed after the first few days network failure
network contention or interference high number of packet loss, nodes transmitted only 30% to 82%
of their packets
base station breakage entire network went offline for two intermittent days
node reboots three nodes reported packets too late in the deployment lifetime node failure
missing data points two nodes reported packets with missing sensor data points unknown
low battery, spikes, stuck-at faults,
clipping faults, noise, outliers
20% of the total temperature readings were faulty, some nodes
leveraged only 47% to 57% of their overall collected temperature
and humidity readings, about half of the sensor nodes suffered
clipping in light readings
measurement faults
SensorScope
(Génépi)
≈ 93% hardware failure due to short circuit station 7 did not report readings for over a week node failure
stuck-at faults, noise, outliers all humidity sensors reported faulty readings on October 6 measurement faults
calibration errors temperature sensors reported a calibration offset of more than
2°C
software bug a bug in wind sensor’s driver rendered wind data from all
stations useless
unexpected event one station covered by plastic wraps continuously generating
erroneous readings
SensorScope
(St. Bernard)
≈ 87% noise, outliers faulty rain precipitation values reported by station 14 measurement faults
GreenOrbs 60% - 10% packet drops due to link failures accounted for 61.08% of all packet losses network failure
ingress drops all the ingress drops (38.92% of all packet drops) occur on less
than 5% nodes
routing loops accounted for a good number of silent failures
software bugs, hardware problems a number of nodes never reported data to the sink node failure
calibration errors deviation of 6KLux and 8.41KLux in light readings measurement faults
VigilNet n/a a moving vehicle event if not estimated
correctly, the
deployment does not
achieve its purpose
low battery, hardware failure false positive rate is very high (i.e., 60%) measurement faults
calibration errors sensor drifts pre-deployment and over the deployment time
security attacks could not afford to deploy the system unattended malicious behavior
3
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Chapter 3
A Taxonomy Of Sensor Network
Anomalies and Their Detection
Approaches
The previous chapter explored several real-world sensor network deployments and identi-
fied instances of anomalies in each deployment. In this chapter, we systematically analyze
the different types of anomalies prevalent in a sensor network, construct a taxonomy of
such anomalies, and discuss potential detection mechanisms necessary to reveal the root
causes behind each anomaly. Figure 3.1 illustrates three major types of anomalies that can
exist in a sensor network deployment; (i) a natural fault; (ii) a malicious behavior; and (iii)
an event. We discuss each category independently, pinpointing the possible root causes and
the potential tools or mechanisms necessary to detect (and possibly recover from) all or a
subset of these anomalies.
The chapter is organized as follows. Natural faults, malicious behaviors, and events are
discussed in the next three sections. Having emphasized the demand for anomaly detection
mechanisms in real-world applications and deployments of sensor networks, Section 3.4
summarizes the challenges of designing an anomaly detection algorithm for sensor net-
works. Finally, we discus related work in Section 3.5 and conclude in Section 3.6.
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Figure 3.1: Types of anomalies in sensor network deployments and their corresponding
detection mechanisms.
3.1 Natural Faults
Natural faults are of high occurrence and are considered major anomalies that need to be
addressed in almost every sensor network deployment. They can roughly be divided into:
(a) network failures; (b) node failures; and (c) sensor data faults (i.e., measurement faults).
Network and node failures highly impact the network performance and lifetime and are
usually diagnosed either at the base station by specialized tools such as Sympathy [107]
and AD (Agnostic Diagnosis) [80] or in a decentralized manner by on-line self-diagnosis
tools like the recently proposed TinyD2 [74]. These tools usually attempt to identify the
root cause of the failure and resolve the issue immediately either via an automated action
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or by human intervention (e.g., changing node location or replacing a dead battery). A
comparative survey of diagnosis and debugging tools for wireless sensor networks was
compiled in [108]. Visualization tools [53, 114] can also be helpful in detecting network
and node failures. Sensor data faults, on the other hand, degrade the quality of the overall
collected dataset, resulting in imprecise conclusions or maybe meaningless inferences.
3.1.1 Network Failures
Failures inside the network may occur due to several factors including interferences, routing
inconsistencies, duplicate transmissions, lack of response from a subset of nodes, or even
due to unexpected reasons.
Single Link Failures
In ad-hoc networks, a failing or broken wireless link can be roughly defined as a link with a
very poor quality that it becomes impossible to reliably exchange packets between the two
nodes at both ends [73].
Root Causes. In a typical deployment, this transient failure is a result of harsh envi-
ronmental conditions (e.g., wind), node mobility [67], and/or presence of obstacles [60]
(e.g., a herd of deers) in the vicinity of the two communicating end nodes. A long-term
failure is also possible due to severe packet collisions, congestions at the receiving node,
or heavy channel interferences caused by coexisting devices using the same channel. This
dramatically increases the packet loss and/or corruption rate over that link.
Detection. Failing links are usually detected by collection or multi-hop protocols
[37, 97, 133] using metrics like WMEWMA (Window Mean with Exponentially Weighted
Moving Average) [133], LQI (Link Quality Indicator) [21], ETX (expected transmis-
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sions) [23], or a four bit link estimation [32]. Once detected, the network quickly recovers
by allowing a node to use a different link (if there exists one) for data transmissions. Link
failures can also be identified by network diagnosis tools upon collecting enough statistics
at the base station. In Sympathy, for instance, every node periodically sends connectivity
metrics (i.e., node’s routing table and neighbor list), flow metrics (i.e., PACKETS TRANS-
MITTED counter) as well as channel error metrics (i.e., BAD PACKETS RECEIVED and
GOOD PACKETS RECEIVED counters) to the base station [107]. The base station also
keeps track of few metrics such as a SINK PACKETS RECEIVED counter which indicates
the number of received packets from each node. Such statistics help discover disconnected
paths to the sink, poor links, and congestions. AD follows a different approach for detect-
ing link failures [80]. It exploits the correlation of two metrics (i.e., RetransmitCounter and
RadioOnTimeCounter) collected in the same way as in Sympathy. If the correlation score
between the two metrics is high, this indicates that most of the radio-on time is spent for
retransmitting packets and therefore the link between the node and its parent must be of low
quality. Topology visualization tools such as Surge, MViz, and Octopus [53] can further
show a visual indication of a failure or quality degradation of a link upon tree topology
changes.
It is worth mentioning that single link failures usually do not prevent the node from
transmitting its sensor readings to the base station. Once the node updates its routing table,
neighboring nodes with potentially healthy links to that node will still relay its readings to
the sink.
37
Transient Routing Loops
Root Causes. In distance vector routing, a standard routing mechanism in sensor
networks, failure or quality degradation of a single link calls for state updates at each node
that needs to avoid the failed link. During state convergence, inconsistencies in routing
tables may introduce transient loops [92].
Detection. Loops can be inherently detected by the underlying multi-hop routing pro-
tocol. For instance, the data path validation mechanism in CTP [37] allows a node to detect
possible loop formations by comparing the path-to-sink cost (ETX) within the received
data packet with its own path cost. If the former is smaller, the topology information of the
transmitter must be stale, indicating a possible loop. Resolution of transient loops may also
take quite a while. As for the current network diagnosis tools, it is difficult to detect routing
loop anomalies at the back-end by relying solely on a single metric. AD can detect routing
loops by exploiting the correlation between two metrics: (i) LoopCounter which measures
the number of times a similar packet has passed a node; and (ii) SuccAckCounter, the num-
ber of successful transmissions by a node. If the two are highly correlated, the same packet
must have passed through the current node multiple times. Jurdak et al [54] discuss a few
approaches to loop detection at a centralized base station (e.g., injecting diagnostic pack-
ets into the network, use of dynamic source routing, and maintenance of full topology).
However, these approaches do not scale well with the network size.
Broadcast Storms
Root Causes. The broadcast storm problem was first defined in [89] as that of serious
duplicates, collisions, and contentions caused by simple flooding and redundant rebroad-
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casts. Redundant broadcasts are very common in sensor networks and there is a need for
mechanisms to reduce the number of duplicates once detected. As an example, due to
link quality degradation, involved nodes in CTP periodically broadcast frequent probing
beacons to quickly adjust their routing tables using the adaptive beaconing mechanism.
This eventually congests the network with multiple duplicates since no duplicate suppres-
sion mechanism is adopted. On the other hand, a node in Trickle [70] (a dissemination
mechanism used by other code and parameter dissemination protocols to spread updates in
the network) suppresses its own transmission once it hears k similar summaries from its
neighbors. This reduces the number of duplicates to avoid a broadcast storm.
Detection. Currently, there is no direct way to tell at the back-end if a broadcast storm
has actually occurred. Nevertheless, keeping track of the number of duplicates received by
each node may indicate that a storm is more likely to happen.
Network Partitioning
This is yet another network failure which is directly associated with link or node failures.
Network partitioning is considered a significant failure since in some research work the
network lifetime is based on the time till a network partition [14, 116].
Root Causes. Specifically, a failure of a number of critical nodes or a long-term failure
in the link between such nodes and the other parts of the network results in a network
partition or cut. Critical nodes are those few nodes that are geographically positioned
close to the sinks rather than the network edges. This may be a rare event (i.e., failure)
but once occurred, a large subset of sensor nodes can be disconnected. Another form of
network partitions are temporal partitions [45] which are a result of displaced duty cycles at
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different subnetworks. For instance, one subnetwork is sleeping while the other is actively
transmitting readings. The latter is a rare failure if a network-wide time synchronization
protocol such as FTSP [79] is in place.
Detection / Recovery. Detecting cuts at the back-end is an easy task by keeping track
of the number of received packets at each node; lack of packet receptions from a group
of sensor nodes over a long period of time indicates a potential network cut. Moreover,
as proposed in [115], only a small number of sensor nodes called sentinels can be used to
detect ǫ-cuts where the parameter ǫ is the fraction of disconnected nodes and is specified by
the end-user. The proposed algorithm can detect network partitions by solely relying on the
dead/live state of these few sentinel nodes. To resolve network partitioning, either a human
action is required (e.g., repositioning few sensor nodes or replacing batteries of dead nodes)
or some other recovery mechanism such as the one proposed by Didi et al [26] in which a
mobile node (i.e., a robot) is sent to the location where the partitioning has occurred.
Silent Failures
A silent failure [80] is a type of network failures which can go undetected if we solely rely
on a single metric. A single metric (e.g., number of packets transmitted) may appear to be
stable despite the existence of an anomalous network behavior (e.g., routing loops). Exam-
ples of silent failures are ingress drops which occur when a portion of the incoming packets
are dropped by the node, and frequent changes of parents in the routing tree. Routing loops
can also be considered as silent failures since diagnosis tools may easily overlook such a
failure as discussed earlier.
Detection. A detection of a silent failure requires diagnostic tools that exploit spatial
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and temporal correlations between several metrics periodically collected from each node in
the network. For example, AD can detect ingress drops by tracking the correlation scores
of two metrics: ReceiveCounter and TransmitCounter. A node may receive packets from its
children in the routing tree but denies forwarding some of them. Similarly, frequent parent
changes may be detected by AD using the correlation scores between the ParentChange-
Counter and the RadioOnCounter metrics. A high correlation score indicates that a node
changes its parent almost at every instance when the radio is turned on.
Other Causes of Network Failures
Although there are mechanisms to reveal the root causes discussed above, sometimes a net-
work failure is hard to detect. Some sensor network deployments [50,122] form a network
structure that is more complex than the single multi-hop network shown in Figure 1.1. Data
packets can go missing due to gateway outages, lost GPRS signals, and failures in other
parts of a larger network (e.g., the transit network in the GDI deployment).
Table 3.1 summaries the different types of network failures discussed in this section.
The table shows possible root causes and existing mechanisms for detecting every type of
failure.
3.1.2 Node Failures
Node failures are another common faults in sensor networks which may severely hinder
performance if not rapidly detected and agilely recovered from. A sensor node may fail due
to hardware or software crashes, energy depletion, and local rebooting. We briefly outline
each of these anomalies (as well as possible root causes) and present potential techniques
to detect some of them.
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Table 3.1: Network Failures, Their Root Causes, and Possible Detection Approaches
Type Root Causes Existing Detection Mechanisms
single link failure
(transient, permanent)
- wind, obstacle, mobility (transient)
- severe collisions, congestions, channel
interferences (permanent)
- inherently by collection protocols (e.g., CTP [37])
- network diagnostic tools (e.g., Sympathy [107],
AD [80])
- topology visualization tools (e.g., Surge, MViz,
Octopus [53])
transient routing loop - routing table inconsistencies - inherently by routing protocols (e.g., data path
validation in CTP)
- network diagnostic tools (e.g., AD)
broadcast storm - flooding, redundant broadcasts
- adaptive beaconing in CTP
none
network partitioning - failure of critical nodes
- permanent link failure between a critical node
and rest of network
- displaced duty cycles at different
subnetworks (temporal partitions)
- using sentinels [115]
silent failures (e.g.,
ingress packet drops,
parent changes,
routing loops)
- a buffer overflow (ingress packet drops)
- old parent-child link degradation (parent
changes)
- routing table inconsistencies (routing loops)
- network diagnostic tools (e.g., AD)
Hardware Failures
Hardware modules of a single node including communication (radio and antenna), compu-
tation (CPU), and storage (memory) modules may fail or enter a lock state over the course
of deployment due to poor manufacturing or harsh environments (i.e., storms, water floods,
etc.). A bad radio chip, a broken antenna [58, 122], or a locked CPU or memory prevents
a node, whose sensing modules may still be healthy, from transmitting its sensor data to-
wards the sink and hence rendering such data useless. In other words, the sensor data never
leave the node and are never used at the base station for finer-grained analysis.
Software Failures
In spite of the utilization of conventional simulation and hardware emulation tools (e.g.,
TOSSIM [69], AVR JTAG ICE [81]) for debugging a sensor network before deployment,
this combination may still overlook some significant software bugs once the nodes are
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pushed to the field and exposed to real-world conditions and dynamic environments. A
major bug that leads to a node failure is the one that causes task queue overflows. In
addition to task queue overflows, sensor nodes in a real-world deployment may also be
prone to operating system (OS) crashes.
Root Causes. An example of a task queue overflow is observed in the CC1000 radio
stack of TinyOS-1.x where two posts of fairly long execution path of 400 ms are constantly
reposted causing other calls to fail. Consequently, the node enters a deadlock state and can
no longer transmit readings to the sink.
Detection. Detecting software bugs require a source-level debugging tool such as Clair-
voyant [138]. Clairvoyant does not require any extra hardware and does not modify the
source code on the sensor nodes. It is loaded into the boot sector of each node and is used
only when needed. Each node can be debugged separately by using a GDB-like terminal
running at the host machine to send typical debug commands (e.g., break, step, watch, back-
trace). It is also possible to initiate network-wide debug commands addressing all nodes in
the network. The latter commands are spread into the sensor network via simple flooding.
Clairvoyant was able to detect the CC1000 bug by sending a led logging command to dis-
play the value of the head of the task queue on the three LEDs. The head value changes
every time a task is successfully posted. It was observed that the LEDs never changed their
values and hence concluding a task queue overflow. In addition to source-level debuggers,
Agnostic Diagnosis [80] is also capable of detecting the latter bug by correlating two met-
rics: TaskPostCounter which measures the number of tasks posted by the sensor node and
TaskExecuteCounter which is the number of executed tasks. If both metrics are weakly
correlated, it is an indication of a potential task queue overflow which causes the node to
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eventually fail.
Lack of Energy Resources
A power outage may be caused by battery disconnection or lack of energy supplied by
the harvesting system in place (e.g., solar panels). If no energy harvesting techniques are
employed, the battery eventually dies due to energy depletion. Short circuits due to water
contacts (e.g., floods, heavy rain) may also lead to eventual power depletion. Furthermore,
although a rare event, a battery may suffer internal failure or it may be disconnected (e.g.,
loose connection) from the main node circuitry. Full depletion of the energy resource is a
very common failure or anomaly in sensor networks as a significant number of deployments
use non-rechargeable batteries to power up the sensor nodes [11, 82, 122, 126]. Once the
battery is discharged (i.e., battery level is below the operating voltage), a sensor node may
not always be able to report its readings successfully [122].
Node Reboots
For application purposes, sensor nodes may be configured as desired by the application
designer to reboot periodically or there might be cases where a node enters infinite loops
or suffers from stack overflows leading to node reboots.
Detection. Detecting node reboots by sink-based diagnosis tools is fairly simple. For
instance, Sympathy investigates an UPTIME metric of each node. If this counter has rolled
over, it indicates a node reboot since a node resets this metric to zero once a node has
booted. Furthermore, source-level debuggers [138] may identify a subtle bug which leads
to a node reboot. An example of this is a bug in the interrupt routine handler of the Micro-
phone module in TinyOS-1.x. Apparently, because of a constant fire up of the tone detector
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interrupt, handler routines are invoked several times eventually leading to a stack overflow.
Clairvoyant addresses this bug by sending break, cond, and backtrace commands to the
failing node to discover that the stack constitutes of several copies of the same handler
routine that lead to continuous node reboots.
Node Failures Detection and Recovery
Detection of a node failure is usually performed by checking the failing node’s neighbors
[120]. Sympathy does so by first checking if the sink has received any messages from the
failed node over one epoch. If not, the absence of the failed node in the NEIGHBOR LIST
of each of its neighbors is an indicator of a total node crash. CTP follows the same approach
by checking any stale entries corresponding to the failing node in the routing table of its
neighbors. The off-line mechanism proposed by Khan et al [58] can further distinguish
among the four root causes of a node failure mentioned above. The proposed approach
requires an extra piece of hardware ($60), a power meter, that is attached to every node and
acts as a tele-diagnostic power tracer. Each power meter periodically measures the current
draw of the line between the battery module and the sensor mote as well as the voltage
level. The base station uses the power traces obtained from each meter to train a simple
classifier which accepts, as inputs, a number of static statistical features (e.g., mean and
variance of power values over a sliding window) as well as a more complex data mining
based classifier (Markov Model) to further improve the detection accuracy over the static
classifier. Once the training process is complete, classification of every node is performed
based on its current power trace reported within a window of the same size. Power profiles
of a dead node should exhibit similar failure states and the closest state will be assigned
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Table 3.2: Node Failures, Their Root Causes, and Possible Detection Approaches
Type Root Causes Existing Detection Mechanisms
hardware failure (bad
radio, broken antenna,
locked CPU/memory)
- poor manufacturing
- harsh environmental conditions
(e.g., storms)
- tele-diagnostic power tracer [58]
software failure (e.g.,
task queue overflow,
OS crashes)
- constant reposting of multiple tasks
with long execution paths
- tele-diagnostic power tracer
- source-level debuggers (e.g., Clairvoyant [138])
- network diagnostic tools (e.g., AD [80])
lack of energy resource - battery disconnection
- battery depletion
- water contacts
- internal battery failure
- tele-diagnostic power tracer
node reboot - infinite loop
- stack overflow
- tele-diagnostic power tracer
- source-level debuggers (e.g., Clairvoyant)
- network diagnostic tools (e.g., Sympathy [107])
as the failure type for that node. Finally, recovery from node failures is inherent in fault-
tolerant sensor network protocols. CTP, for instance, can quickly reroute traffic around a
failed node in less than a second [37] by applying the adaptive beaconing mechanism.
Table 3.2 summaries the different types of node failures discussed in this section. The
table shows possible root causes and existing mechanisms for detecting every specific type
of failure.
3.1.3 Sensor Data Faults
As mentioned in [38] and [75], network and node failures are functional in that such a
failure can drastically impact the network functionality and hence hinder its performance.
Whereas, sensor data faults or measurement faults are considered non-functional faults
since they only impact the fidelity of the reported data. Measurement faults or anomalies
are those readings that deviate from the expected value and can be triggered by a single
sensor (e.g., light or temperature sensor) or the entire node can experience a hardware
failure or internal malfunction (e.g., loose connection with the sensor board) that drives
46
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
15:00 15:15 15:30 15:45 16:00 16:15 16:30 16:45
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000
1100
T
em
p
er
at
u
re
(°
C
)
/
H
u
m
id
it
y
(R
%
)
L
ig
h
t
(L
u
x
)
Time
Temperature
Humidity
Light
Temperature
 Outliers
C
o
r
r
e
l
a
t
e
d
 
O
u
t
l
i
e
r
s
(a) Outliers in all sensing modalities (temperature,
humidity, and light) seem to be highly correlated
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
02-28
00:00
02-28
06:00
02-28
12:00
02-28
18:00
02-29
00:00
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
T
em
p
er
at
u
re
(°
C
)
/
H
u
m
id
it
y
(R
%
)
V
o
lt
ag
e
(V
o
lt
s)
Time
Temperature
Humidity
Voltage
Voltage
Outliers
(b) Voltage outliers within the operating voltage
range of the temperature and humidity sensor
Figure 3.2: Outlier readings of node 20 in the IBRL deployment.
the node to report false readings for all attached sensors. It is also possible that more than
one sensor is attached to the same ADC channel. Thus, a single channel fault will impact
all sensors connected to it [106, 122]. Sharma et al [113] classify sensor data faults into:
CONSTANT, SHORT, and NOISE faults. This naming convention was first suggested
by Ramanathan et al [106]. Ni et al [88], on the other hand, have compiled an excellent
taxonomy of sensor data faults prevalent in sensor networks. For the sake of consistency
with earlier fault classifications, we decide to adapt the same terminologies used in both of
these works.
Network diagnosis tools are designed to detect functional faults rather than measure-
ment faults, focusing on data quantity rather than data quality [107]. Therefore, detection
of the latter should take a different path. There have been several detection mechanisms
proposed in the literature to identify sensor data faults. They range from rule-based mecha-
nisms [106,112] to mechanisms that are based on statistics to techniques rooted in machine
learning and data mining. In fact, some of these techniques may be able to detect events
or malicious data behaviors and are discussed in both [143] and [136]. Due to the detec-
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tion generality of these mechanisms, we discuss a single method [88] for identifying each
individual fault. Notice that most of these faults can occur in both a temporal and spatial
context. This means that a single sensor may experience an anomalous or faulty behavior
within its own data over time, or that fault can be spatially uncorrelated with other sensors
attached to neighboring nodes.
Outlier (SHORT)
Characteristics. An outlier, or a SHORT fault [106, 113], is a single isolated sensor
reading that is significantly far from the expected reading. This fault has been commonly
seen in several sensor network deployments [50, 55, 106, 122] and its cause is usually un-
known. In the IBRL deployment, for example, a few nodes exhibited one or a couple
of outliers prior to the time where their battery voltage began to drop under the normal
operating voltage of the temperature and humidity sensors. Outliers would appear in all
sensing modalities (temperature, humidity, and light) concurrently. Figure 3.2(a) shows all
instances of correlated outliers within the readings of node 20. It is believed that the cor-
relation between temperature and humidity outliers is due to the fact that temperature and
humidity are measured by the same Sensirion sensor (share the same ADC channel). In
most cases, sensor data outliers also correlate well with an outlier in the voltage readings.
The voltage outlier may be outside the operating voltage range of the sensor. The operating
voltage of the temperature and humidity sensor in the IBRL deployment is about 2.35-2.36
Volts. Below this value, the sensor readings become anomalous. Voltage outliers can also
lie within the normal operating voltage range as is the case with node 20. Figure 3.2(b)
assures that the voltage values for node 20 are in fact outliers as they highly deviate from
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Figure 3.3: Spike faults in different deployments.
the voltage values in previous epochs. Other outliers may appear in the IBRL dataset but
only within a period of a spike fault as we will discuss shortly.
Detection. Typically, the detection of this fault is the process of examining the rate
of change between two successive readings, if the change is dramatically higher, then an
outlier or SHORT fault has just occurred. Since outliers are useless/insensitive data which
is highly uncorrelated with the underlying phenomenon, it can simply be discarded by the
sensor network application.
Spike Faults
Characteristics. Similar to an outlier, a spike is also a reading highly deviated from the
expected reading. However, a spike spans over more than one reading consecutively and
may or may not return to the normal behavior afterwards. Spike faults are very common
in sensor network deployments. Figure 3.3(a) shows two instances of a spike fault exhib-
ited by node 9 in the SensorScope St. Bernard deployment during the first 6 hours of its
lifetime. Another example of a spike fault is seen in a few soil sensors that measured the
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Figure 3.4: Constant faults exhibited by node 6 in the SensorScope Génépi deployment.
ammonium concentration in a 48-sensors 12-day Bangladesh deployment [88, 106]. This
deployment took place in 2006 and aimed at finding the amount of arsenic in groundwater.
In both examples, the data returned to its normal behavior after the spike fault. In IBRL
dataset, spike faults are more frequent and have higher variance and gradient. Moreover,
in the IBRL data, most nodes begin exhibiting a spike fault when approaching the end of
the deployment (between March 19 and March 25) as their battery voltage level goes un-
der 2.36 Volts (see Figure 3.3(b)). Node 18 is the only node that loses its battery power
much earlier than the other nodes and begins exhibiting spike faults on March 8 (see Fig-
ure 3.6(a)). After a number of epochs (≈ 2910 epochs or 1 day), a spike fault transforms to
a stuck-at fault where the sensor readings get stuck at a constant value as we will discuss
shortly.
Low battery, failure of the sensor module, or a short-circuited connection are potential
causes of a spike fault. Apart from being a fault, depending on the application, spikes
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can also be a reflection of the real phenomenon. For instance, light sensors generate large
spikes when a room becomes suddenly dark [71, 129].
Detection. A trivial way to detect this fault involves modeling the rate of change
over a short period of time (i.e., within a pre-defined window size). Distinguishing be-
tween an anomalous event and a spike fault is a difficult task as we will discuss later in
Section 3.3. Therefore, it is not recommended to discard spike faults unless further exami-
nation is carried out to find whether it is a result of a potential failure or a true behavior of
the measured phenomenon.
Stuck-At (CONSTANT) Faults
Characteristics. As the name implies, a “stuck-at” fault is a series of readings that
maintain steadiness for the rest of the node’s lifetime or may return back to normal after
a significant amount of time. False readings may be in or outside the range of the mea-
sured phenomenon. Indeed, the latter is what Sharma et al [113] refer to as a CONSTANT
fault. The fault has been spotted in a few deployments (e.g., IBRL [11], NAMOS [3], and
SensorScope [50]). The rapid 24-hour deployment of the Networked Aquatic Microbial
Observing System (NAMOS) took place in August 2006 and consisted of 9 motes (buoys)
located at Lake Fulmor, James Reserve. The motes reported temperature and chlorophyll
concentration every 10 seconds. Figure 3.4 shows an example of stuck-at faults exhibited
by the temperature sensor of node 6 in the SensorScope Génépi deployment. Notice that the
faulty readings are outside the range of the expected temperature. On the other hand, refer-
ring back to Figure 2.7, we can see that some of the humidity sensors exhibited a constant
fault where the faulty readings were still considered in the range of the true phenomenon.
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Figure 3.5: Rain precipitation measured by two nodes (node 4 and 14) in the SensorScope
St. Bernard deployment. Node 14 exhibits a noise fault.
In the IBRL deployment, almost all nodes exhibited a constant fault over their course of
operation. Instances of a stuck-at fault are shown in Figure 3.3(b) following a spike fault.
Detection. Typically, variance is used as the main detection mechanism since a
near-zero variance within a time window of a predefined size represents a constant behav-
ior. As the case with spike faults, “stuck at” anomalies should not be discarded until we
are certain that it is a case of failure (usually a sensor ADC malfunction) rather than an
exhibition of the true phenomena (as we will see in the case of an expected clipping fault
in the light data when we discuss out-of-range/clipping faults).
NOISE Faults
Characteristics. This fault was similarly labeled by both Sharma et al [113] and Ni
et al [88]. In the former, it refers to high variance in the data and the data are usually
highly uncorrelated with (distant from) the expected readings. The latter also emphasized
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Figure 3.6: Noise faults in the IBRL deployment.
the existence of highly variant data which can still resemble the true physical phenomenon.
Henceforth, it is important to distinguish between an expected noise which is within the
range of the expected behavior and a definitive fault due to low battery or a potential hard-
ware failure (short circuit). One example of a noise fault was spotted at the SensorScope
St. Bernard deployment within the rain meter readings of node 14. As can be seen in
Figure 3.5, during the noise fault, readings have high variance. In the IBRL deployment,
we consider noise to be the fluctuation of highly deviated constant values that appear at
the end of the node’s lifetime when its battery is drained. This behavior is mixed with a
stuck-at behavior as seen in Figure 3.6(a). Only few number of nodes (nodes 6, 18, and 23),
in fact, produced highly noisy data. Figure 3.6(b) shows a closer look at the largest noise
fault exhibited by node 6. The temperature reading rapidly fluctuates between two values
1.1731°C and 122.153°C and may get stuck on any of the two values for a few consecutive
epochs. Unlike outliers, the noise faults in temperature readings are not correlated with
noises in the humidity readings.
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Detection. A primary identifier of a noise fault is the variance. For example, if the
variance of reported sensor data is entirely different from the expected variance as given by
the sensor data sheet, then it is a definitive fault. The data identified this way is invaluable
and cannot be discarded once marked as a natural resemblance of the true phenomenon.
Calibration Errors
Characteristics. Calibration is becoming a highly prioritized requirement for every
sensor network deployment [44, 50, 82, 106, 122]. Calibration is usually performed before,
during, and after deployment to achieve the highest accuracy of the collected sensor data.
Depending on the type of sensors, sometimes pre-deployment calibration is adequate. Nev-
ertheless, some sensors need to be repeatedly calibrated over the course of deployment due
to the change in their calibration equation and exposure to the environment. Usually higher
cost sensors require less calibration and hence experience less calibration faults. One ex-
ample of sensors that need to be continually calibrated is the ISE (Ion-selective Electrodes)
sensor used in the Bangladesh deployment [106]. Calibration is the mapping from the ac-
tual sensor readings to the expected readings resembling the true phenomenon [106]. The
mapping function contains two calibration parameters: (i) the bias or gain which relates
to the value needed to drive the expected rate of change of the sensor readings; and (ii)
the offset which is a constant distance from the true phenomena. The acceptable values of
these two parameters are usually given in the sensor data sheet. Both the bias and the offset
parameters can change over time given the dynamics of the environment and the manu-
facturing cost of the sensor. If the actual readings become distant from the true physical
phenomena, then we say that sensor data has encountered an offset fault. On the other
54
hand, if the readings bear variances higher than the expected rate of change, a gain fault
can be observed within the data. Finally, if both parameters change, this change manifests
itself as a drift fault. The three calibration faults were elaborately discussed in [88].
Detection. Apparently, it is difficult to detect calibration errors in most cases due to
the difficulty of distinguishing between a potential calibration fault and a true measurement
of the phenomenon. Apart from this, spatial correlation may be leveraged to identify mis-
calibrated sensors. Nonetheless, sensor readings from mis-calibrated sensors should not be
discarded as an appropriate formula can be applied off-line to correct the faults.
Out of Range / Clipping Faults
Characteristics. Sometimes, sensor readings may lie outside the sensitivity range of
the transducer or exceed the maximum value allowed by the Analog to Digital converter
(ADC). The latter is a manifestation of a clipping fault. An example of an out-of-range
fault was reported in the Bangladesh deployment [106] while measuring the concentration
of chloride. There were cases when the concentration measurements were high enough that
could not be captured by the sensitivity range of the transducer. In [106], the sensitivity
range is referred to as the total detection range of the calibration curve and any sensors that
report readings outside this range are considered BROKEN. As for clipping, although not
necessarily a fault, it still implies an expected anomalous behavior. In the IBRL deploy-
ment, a clipping fault or anomaly is spotted when very high light intensities are clipped at
the peak. True light values may even reach 100,000 Lux which corresponds to full sunlight.
However, the light sensor in the IBRL deployment could only measure up to 1847.36 Lux
(see Figure 3.7). Despite the fact that there are light readings very close to the lower ADC
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Figure 3.7: Clipping faults exhibited by node 20 in the IBRL deployment. The light read-
ings clipped at the highest peak are outside the range of possible ADC values.
bound (zero), we still cannot conclude that these are indeed clipping faults [88]. Ideally,
clipping faults are similar to “stuck at” faults. The difference between the two is that, with
clipping, the constant behavior is observed only at the peaks of the possible ADC range.
Detection. Clipping faults are indeed similar to “stuck at” faults and hence all
detection mechanisms used for “stuck at” faults can be applied to identify clipping faults.
The only difference between the two faults is that, with clipping, the constant behavior
is observed only at the peaks of the data range. Leveraging spatial correlations, we can
further identify a clipping fault which should not be discarded as it resembles an expected
anomalous behavior.
Connection / Hardware Failures
This and the next fault in the list are in fact primary root causes of other sensor data faults
(such as spike, “stuck at”, and noise faults). We list them here for the sake of completeness
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and consistency with the earlier work of Ni et al [88]. The primary cause of this fault is
short circuits created due to direct contacts with the environment (e.g., water contact, mud,
etc. [50, 106, 122]). As we discussed earlier in Section 2, this fault manifests itself as very
high or very low readings and could also resemble an out-of-range fault. Other causes of
hardware failures include sensor aging and loose wire connections. It is important to note
that it is not always feasible to identify the root cause of an unknown hardware failure, but
once a hardware fault is spotted, generated sensor readings during the period of fault should
be discarded.
Low Battery Levels
Just like hardware failures, low battery is a major cause of other sensor data failures (e.g.,
spike fault followed by a “stuck at” fault [11], noise fault [106] in several sensor network
deployments [11,106,122,126]). In addition, as mentioned in Chapter 2, hardware failures
can be highly correlated with low battery faults. A short circuit can cause an unusual drop
in battery level [122]. Maintaining power profiles using for example tele-diagnostic power
tracers [58] may help identifying low battery failures. More often, data generated during a
low battery period are harmful to the decision making process and should be discarded.
Sensor data faults are very common in sensor network deployments. Uncovering the
root cause of such faults is a task that is sometimes very difficult. Software bugs such
as the driver bug of the wind sensor in the SensorScope deployment [50] and unexpected
conditions such as unintentional covering of the entire sensor mote [8] are hard to track.
The two conditions were discussed earlier in Chapter 2. In the case of an existing software
bug in the sensor driver, spatial correlation among the sensor nodes does not help at all if the
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Table 3.3: Measurement Faults, Their Root Causes, and Detection Features
Type Example Deployments Root Causes Main Detection Feature
outlier (SHORT) IBRL [11], SensorScope [50],
Bangladesh [106], NIMS [55],
GDI [122]
unknown rate of change
Spike IBRL, SensorScope, Bangladesh - low battery
- sensor failure
- short circuit
temporal rate of change
stuck-at (CONSTANT) IBRL, SensorScope, NAMOS [3] - sensor ADC malfunction variance
NOISE IBRL, SensorScope - low battery
- hardware failure (short
circuit)
- poor calibration
variance
calibration error Bangladesh - change in calibration equation
- exposure to environment
spatial correlation
clipping / out of range IBRL, Bangladesh - reading outside the range of
the ADC
variance accompanied by
spatial correlation
same software runs on all sensors. On the other hand, sensor readings of a covered sensor
mote will always be spatially uncorrelated with its neighboring motes but the root cause of
this uncorrelated behavior cannot be revealed unless physical investigation is carried out.
Table 3.3 summaries the different types of measurement faults discussed in this section.
The table shows example deployments where such faults occurred, possible root causes,
and potential data features that can be used in order to detect measurement faults.
3.2 Malicious Behaviors
The second type of anomalies prevalent in sensor networks is malicious behaviors (net-
work and data). This anomaly is more frequent in sensor networks deployed in hostile
environments [44]. Ideally, there are two types of adversaries that can introduce a mali-
cious behavior in a sensor network: (i) insiders; and (ii) outsiders [56, 130]. The resource
capability of outsiders can be unlimited; an outsider with a laptop-class device is capable
of jamming the entire network using a long-range transmitter to emit signals that interfere
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with the same channel frequencies used by the sensor network [130]. A laptop-class out-
sider can also eavesdrop on or capture every single message flowing into the targeted sensor
network. Moreover, he/she can replay messages or inject new data into the network. Nev-
ertheless, outsiders cannot access the code of a sensor node and cannot modify (encrypted)
data generated by each node. In contrast, insiders have a special access to the sensor net-
work by compromising one or more nodes eventually laying hands on the security keys,
code, and data stored in these nodes. Compromising a sensor node usually requires very
little or no effort [42]. Once a node is compromised, it becomes easy to launch attacks
that may affect either the overall network behavior or the data generated by that node. It
is further possible to use another more powerful laptop-class device to attack the network
(i.e., generate a malicious behavior) after stealing all the information and identity of the
compromised node.
Existing link layer encryption and authentication techniques [57, 93] can serve as pre-
ventive measures against outsider attacks. Most of the possible security attacks that are
launched by an outsider can be prevented by denying access of an adversary to join the net-
work using authentication with globally shared keys. However, these mechanisms are ren-
dered useless in the face of an attack launched by a laptop-class insider or a compromised
node. Even with encryption and authentication techniques in place, several anomalous be-
haviors due to an insider attack may still exist in a sensor network deployment. Intrusion
detection systems (IDSes) [18, 128] take one step ahead of preventive measures in an at-
tempt to detect such anomalies. An IDS is a system that monitors/audits host or network
data for suspicious activities. Based on the audit data, an IDS for sensor networks should be
able to detect both the malicious network behaviors that influence the overall performance
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and the forged data that hinder the fidelity of sensor data streams. There are two types of
IDSes: (i) misused or signature-based; and (ii) anomaly-based. In the former, a database
of attack signatures is established a priori from the audit data. Any attack that matches a
signature in the database can be identified. On the other hand, anomaly detection based
IDSes typically mark those behaviors that deviate from the normal behaviors as anomalies
(attacks).
In the following discussion, we present the major attacks against sensor networks that
either affect the data or introduce a malicious network behavior. These attacks can be
generated by either an outsider or an insider. However as mentioned above, a simple au-
thentication and encryption technique is adequate to stop most outsider attacks (e.g., pas-
sive eavesdropping, sinkhole, Sybil, selective forwarding). Therefore, we mainly focus on
compromise behaviors or active attacks launched by a compromised node or laptop-class
insider.
3.2.1 Malicious Data Behaviors
Attack Characteristics. When an adversary captures the sensor node, he/she can re-
program it to inject falsified readings into the network. If a significant number of nodes is
compromised, data forged by these nodes will highly impact the decision making process
at the base station. An adversary can also alter readings sent by neighboring nodes before
forwarding the data messages towards the sink. This, in turn, compromises the integrity of
the sensor data. If a sensor network employs in-network processing or aggregation [77,78],
false data can further mislead the aggregated results computed by the aggregation points
including the base station.
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Figure 3.8: Compromise data behaviors during lab deployment. Node 8 emits normal
temperature readings and is shown as a reference to compare against compromise nodes
(nodes 12, 17, and 20).
Compromise behaviors injected in sensor networks can be classified as either (i) naive
or (ii) smart behaviors. Naive compromised nodes always send falsified readings, whereas
smart compromised nodes inject falsified readings in an intermittent manner along with le-
gitimate data. In both scenarios, a compromised node may send highly deviated readings or
readings which are closer to the normal behavior of other sensor nodes, varying the amount
of harm to the fidelity of the data. Figure 3.8 shows both naive and smart compromise
behaviors with different degrees of deviations exhibited by three nodes (nodes 12, 17, and
20) during two hours of our lab deployment.
During the process of data falsification, an adversary may also decide to change the
behavior of the data to be identical to any of the natural sensor data faults discussed in
Section 3.1.3. Sometimes fault models themselves can be close in characteristics to a naive
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or smart compromise behavior. An example of this behavior is the accelerometer readings
in [112]. In this case, it is very hard to distinguish between a fault and a malicious attack.
In addition, an adversary can manipulate its data or its neighbors’ data in a manner that is
much harder to detect.
Detection. Just like with measurement faults, there are several proposed mechanisms
such as reputation-based mechanisms [36] that detect malicious data behaviors caused by a
compromised node. In general, detection is carried out by using statistical techniques and
leveraging temporal correlations as well as spatial correlations among neighboring nodes.
Rather than addressing complete compromise of a sensor network, all these techniques
hope that less that half of the neighboring nodes are compromised and the detection accu-
racy degrades with the rates of false positives and false negatives increasing no faster than
a rate proportional to the ratio of compromised nodes to the total number of nodes in the
network [56].
3.2.2 Malicious Network Behaviors
Unlike malicious data behaviors, malicious network behaviors do not directly influence
the fidelity of the sensor data, rather, they impact the overall network performance. The
most common security attacks launched by a compromised node or a laptop-class insider
which introduce malicious behaviors into the network are [130, 137]: selective forward-
ing attacks; sinkholes; wormholes; Sybil attacks; spoofing and replay attacks; and De-
nial of Service (DoS). A significant number of proposed IDSes [18, 76, 141] and compro-
mise detection mechanisms can identify malicious network behaviors (such as rule-based,
machine-learning-based, etc.). IDSes offer much higher detection generality than tech-
62
niques targeting a specific spectrum of attacks. A typical IDS may run on the base station,
at every node in the network, or at selected nodes (called monitor nodes). For a survey
of proposed IDSes in sensor networks, the reader is referred to [30]. In this section, we
describe each attack separately and discuss potential ways to detect it.
Selective Forwarding
Attack Characteristics. Once a sensor node is compromised, it becomes trivial for
the adversary to selectively forward flowing traffic. This means that a compromised node
may drop a portion of the packets (control and data) passing through it. Adversaries may
either choose to drop all packets of the same type or deny packets from a number of source
nodes. If every packet is being dropped, the compromised node is said to form a blackhole.
Detection. A selective forwarding attack (or a blackhole) can be detected by a more
generic IDS or by a detection mechanism specifically designed for this type of attack (i.e.,
assuming no other attacks will be launched by the adversary). An example of the latter
is the multi-hop acknowledgment based scheme proposed by Yu and Xiao [140]. In this
scheme, a number of selected intermediate nodes called ACK nodes over the path from
the source to the base station are responsible for notifying the source of any suspicious
drop. Upon detecting an event, the source node sends a report packet containing a prede-
fined ACK counter (which is decremented by one at every hop) towards the base station.
The report packet propagates downstream by every hop and only ACK nodes reply with an
acknowledgment. If an intermediate node does not hear a specific number of ACKs after
some time, it suspects its downstream neighbor and sends an alarm packet upstream notify-
ing the source node of this suspicious activity. After collecting a number of alarm packets,
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a source node filters out false alarms and identifies the malicious nodes where the dropping
might have taken place. A downstream detection mechanism was also proposed where the
base station can reveal packet losses based on the range of lost sequence numbers com-
municated by intermediate nodes downstream. Once malicious nodes are identified, both
the source and the base station can notify the routing layer to exclude such nodes from the
forwarding path.
IDSes follow a different approach. The IDS proposed in [18], for instance, runs on
monitor nodes. A monitor node listens to neighboring traffic and applies a set of rules
to identify misbehaviors. If the number of failures is higher than a certain threshold (i.e.,
expected amount of occasional failures), a flag is raised. The “retransmission rule” is used
to detect selective forwarding attacks (or blackholes). This rule states that if the monitor
node, in its promiscuous mode, did not receive the same packet intended for its next hop, a
failure counter is incremented.
Sinkhole
Attack Characteristics. This is one of the most severe routing layer attacks in sensor
networks [56, 65]. Figure 3.9(a) illustrates a typical form of a sinkhole attack. The com-
promised node is equipped with a long range transceiver that can directly reach the base
station. The adversary launches the attack by advertising this link to the neighbors. Inher-
ent to most of the underlying routing protocols such as CTP, the neighboring nodes choose
the compromised node as their next hop and re-advertise their updated routing informa-
tion (e.g., path quality). In turn, nodes distant from the compromised node may elect the
advertised path and update their routing information accordingly. This eventually enables
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(a) Launching a Sinkhole attack by advertising high
quality links
(b) Launching a Sinkhole attack using a Wormhole
tunnel
Figure 3.9: A demonstration of a sinkhole attack in sensor networks.
the compromised node to suck the entire network traffic in a certain region towards itself.
The adversary can also use a wormhole as discussed later to launch a sinkhole attack (see
Figure 3.9(b)). Once a sinkhole is created, it becomes trivial to launch other attacks such
as the selective forwarding attack discussed earlier.
Detection. Ngai et al [87] proposed an intrusion detection algorithm that defends
against a sinkhole attack. In their work, the base station is assumed to have the loca-
tion information of all nodes in the network. The algorithm first identifies a number of
suspected nodes. Suspected nodes are those that report data which are inconsistent with
the other nodes in the network. The algorithm then forms a circle covering all suspected
nodes. All nodes inside the circle are called the affected nodes. Once the list of affected
nodes is formed by the base station, the base station forms a request message containing
a timestamp, the list of all affected nodes, and the base station’s private key and floods it
into the network. The timestamp and the key are used to avoid replay attacks. Once an af-
fected node receives the request, it checks to see if its id is in the list. If so, it sends a reply
message, over the reverse path, to the base station containing its own id, the id of the next
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hop, and the path cost (e.g., link quality of the path from the node to the base station). Such
information indicates the network flow (routing patterns) and is maintained in the node’s
routing table. Upon receiving all replies, the base station constructs a tree using the next
hop information and discovers the sink hole represented by the root of the tree since all
information flow towards the root node. Moreover, an algorithm is proposed to identify the
sinkhole in the presence of a few compromised nodes that attempt to trick the base station
into believing that a good node is the sinkhole hiding the identity of the real sinkhole. This
algorithm exploits encryption and authentication and uses redundant paths to send the reply
messages to the base station to avoid selective forwarding attacks initiated by the malicious
nodes. It also attempts to identify the malicious nodes by exploiting inconsistencies within
the collected network flow information at the base station.
Wormhole
Attack Characteristics. The wormhole attack was first introduced by Hu et al [48]
for ad-hoc networks. In this attack, a tunnel is typically established between two distant
malicious nodes (e.g., compromised nodes in Figure 3.9(b)). Each malicious node uses a
higher-than-usual transmission power to relay the network traffic flowing into it without
modifying the contents of the forwarded packets. This forces nodes at two opposite parts
of the network to believe they are neighbors. In a similar attack called the “Hello flood”
attack, a form of a Denial of Service, the adversary attempts to convince every node in
the entire network that it is a neighbor of the compromised node by broadcasting beacon
messages using an extremely high transmission power. As a result, all messages generated
by nodes that are at least two hops away from the malicious node will be lost. Similar to a
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sinkhole, a wormhole can be used to launch other attacks in the network such as a sinkhole
(Figure 3.9(b)), a selective forwarding attack, or a Sybil attack discussed later.
Detection. An RSSI-based mechanism was proposed in [95] which detects wormholes
(and Hello floods) in the presence of no other attacks in the network. This scheme assumes
that every node is aware of its geographical location and the sensor network is symmetric,
static, and homogeneous. Upon reception of a message, each node computes the expected
signal strength of the received signal using both the predefined transmission power and
the distance between itself and the node that transmitted the message. If the difference
between this value and the actual RSSI value reported by the radio chip is greater than a
certain threshold, the received message is considered suspicious and the node transmitting
the message is labeled as “suspicious.” The receiving node then broadcasts its findings to
its neighbors who, in turn, reply with their opinions about the same suspicious node. The
receiving node uses these opinions (votes) to determine if the suspicious node is launching
a wormhole (or a Hello flood) attack.
The rule-based IDS in [18] uses the “radio transmission range rule” to detect a worm-
hole (or a Hello flood). This rule states that “all messages received by the monitor node in
a promiscuous mode must be originated from one of its neighbors.”
Spoofing / Replay
Attack Characteristics. An adversary can change the compromised node’s routing
information, spoof its own identity, or fabricate snooped link-layer acknowledgments. As
for acknowledgment spoofing, most link-layer protocols used in today’s sensor network
deployments use implicit and/or explicit acknowledgments. By fabricating an acknowl-
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edgment upon listening to neighborhood traffic, an adversary may be able to persuade the
sending node to think that the destination node is alive while in fact it is being disabled
by the adversary or has already failed. The adversary can also convince the sending node
that a weak link is strong leading to selective forwarding since the link cannot deliver the
packet. On the other hand, modifying/replaying routing information or impersonating an-
other node’s identity may result in network failures such as routing loops and network
partitioning. With identity spoofing in sensor networks, since a node can hear its neigh-
borhood traffic, it can simply use one of its neighbors identities as its own to deteriorate
the network functionality. For instance, an adversary (i.e., a compromised node) can spoof
routing updates in CTP [37] in order to create a routing loop between two nodes A and B.
The adversary first picks up node A’s identity by listening on neighboring traffic. It then
sends a fake routing update message to node B containing node A’s address as the source
address. Node B then marks node A as its parent and rebroadcasts the update. In turn, node
A snoops (overhears) node B’s update and marks node B as its parent [56]. This causes
traffic to circulate between both nodes endlessly until the loop is detected. The same meth-
ods described in Section 3.1.1 can be used to detect such a failure. However, there will be
no clear distinction between a natural network failure or a failure caused by spoofing.
Detection. Chen et al [16] have proposed a scheme that exploits the spatial correlation
property of the received signal strength (RSS) to detect and localize identity spoofing and
thus to avoid routing loops. In this scheme, the RSS readings of every identity are clustered
in a signal space using the K-means clustering algorithm. The RSS readings from the same
physical location should belong to one cluster. If a malicious node claimed the identity of
another node, its RSS readings would belong to a different cluster since it is distant from
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the other normal node. Based on the distance between the centroids of the two clusters, the
scheme can tell that the network is under a spoofing attack. The accuracy of this detection
scheme is improved if the compromised node is located further away from the node with
the stolen identity.
Sybil Attack
Attack Characteristics. Sybil attacks were first discussed in the context of peer-to-
peer networks [27]. It is an example of an identity-based attack where the compromised
node claims multiple identities. A taxonomy of the different forms of a Sybil attack on
sensor networks was established in [86]. The authors distinguished between Sybil attacks
using direct vs. indirect communication, stolen vs. fabricated identities, and simultaneous
vs. non-simultaneous use of identities.
Detection. The authors in [86] proposed five techniques to verify the identity of a
Sybil node (i.e., an imaginary node with a stolen or fabricated identity). These are: (i)
radio resource verification; (ii) cryptographic key validation; (iii) identity registration; (iv)
position verification; and (v) code attestation. Each one of these techniques may miss one
or two types of the classified attacks except code attestation which is always capable of
detecting any form of a Sybil attack.
Denial of Service
Attack Characteristics. A Denial of Service (DoS) attack eliminates a network’s
capability to perform its expected functionality. All previous attacks discussed so far are
mainly routing layer attacks. DoS attacks, however, can affect any of the five layers (phys-
ical, link, routing, transport, and application layer). Wood and Stankovic [134] constituted
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a comprehensive survey of DoS attacks. In their survey, they have shown that most of these
attacks can be countered using cryptography, authentication, or fairly simple preventive
measures except for jamming. Jamming is a physical layer attack whereby a laptop-class
insider can use a long-range transceiver to interfere with the radio frequencies used by the
legitimate sensor nodes [130]. This may shut the entire network down in a short period
of time. This can also happen if a small number of compromised nodes with similar radio
capabilities as legitimate nodes that are randomly distributed across the network launch a
collaborative jamming attack [130]. In addition, the Hello flood discussed earlier is another
example of a DoS attack. It uses higher power to transmit “Hello” messages to the entire
network. Finally, notice that network and node failures may also cause a DoS attack since
such failures may render parts of the network non-functional.
Detection. The work in [83] surveys a number of detection techniques proposed for
jamming. Typically, these techniques use signal strength, location information, or an es-
timate of the transmitter’s interference strength as the detection measure. As for Hello
floods, techniques used to detect wormholes can similarly be used to reveal Hello floods as
well. Finally, the rule-based IDS in [18] uses the “repetition rule” to detect a generic DoS
attack. The repetition rule states that “the same message can be retransmitted by the same
neighbor only a limited number of time.”
In summary, there are instances where proactive measures may be adequate to prevent
malicious behaviors. Nevertheless, a total compromise of a sensor node or a small num-
ber of nodes can break these measures. Rapidly detecting a malicious behavior when the
adversary launches the attack is another line of defense. Once the malicious behavior is
identified, further actions can be taken to eliminate the compromised node. Table 3.4 sum-
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Table 3.4: Malicious Network Behaviors, Attack Characteristics, and Possible Detection
Approaches
Type Attack Characteristics Potential Existing Detection Mechanisms
selective forwarding - an adversary (i.e., compromised node) may
drop some or all packets (control and data)
passing through it.
- if all packets are being dropped, the node
becomes a blackhole
- rule-based IDS [18]
- multi-hop ack based scheme [140]
sinkhole - adversary possesses a long range transceiver
that can reach the base station
- adversary sucks all traffic in certain region
towards itself by advertising its high quality
link
- intrusion detection algorithm proposed by Ngai et
al [87]
wormhole - adversary establishes a tunnel between two
distant compromised nodes using a
higher-than-usual transmission power
- nodes at opposite sides of the network think
they are neighbors resulting in packet losses
- if all nodes become neighbors of the
compromised node, this leads to a Hello flood
- rule-based IDS
- RSSI-based mechanism [95]
spoofing / replay - change compromised node’s routing
information
- spoof node’s own identity
- fabricate snooped link-layer
acknowledgments
- data path validation in CTP
- network diagnostic tools (e.g. AD)
- exploiting spatial correlation property of RSS [16]
Sybil attack - compromised node claims multiple identities - radio resource verification, cryptographic key
validation, identity registration, position
verification, and code attestation [86]
Denial of Service - eliminate network’s capability to perform its
expected functionality
- shut down the entire network in a short
period by jamming with a long-range
transceiver
- hello floods
- rule-based IDS
- RSSI-based mechanism [95]
- techniques relying on signal strength, location
estimation, or transmitter’s interference
strength [83]
maries the different types of malicious network behaviors. The table pinpoints the main
characteristics of each attack and lists potential mechanisms to detect the attack.
3.3 Events
The last type of anomalies in sensor network deployments is events. In event-driven appli-
cation deployments such as VigilNet, the application administrators are interested in these
abnormal instances that deviate from the normal setting. They would like the deployed
network to notify them of any inconsistent behavior within the monitored area. Figure 3.10
illustrates few examples of potential events which occurred in the IBRL deployment. Usu-
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Figure 3.10: Potential events prevalent in the IBRL deployment.
ally, events manifest themselves as sudden abnormal jumps in the data. However, the
amount of jump and the behavior of the data after this differs from one situation to another.
Due to the high uncertainty involved in predicting the behavior of an event, it is important
to study the types of events desired to be detected by the deployed sensornet. Often, the
characteristics of the event are known a priori or by experimentations [132].
Detection. Three approaches are common for event detection: (i) fully centralized;
(ii) loosely distributed; and (iii) fully distributed. In the centralized approach, all data
points are first gathered at the base station and then a detection algorithm is applied over
the collected data. This incurs high detection delay and high energy cost. In the second
approach, i.e., loosely decentralized, events are tracked at each sensor node individually.
When an event is detected, it is reported to the base station for further verification with other
nodes’ suggestions. Finally, the fully decentralized approach requires the sensor nodes to
exchange information in order to detect a potential event in their vicinity without direct
help from the base station. Wittenburg et al [132] proposed a fully decentralized scheme
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for event detection and qualitatively compared it with other schemes. Their scheme is
proven to be superior to others as it consumes less processing and memory resources, does
not require any cluster-like infrastructure, leverages pre-training to improve accuracy, and
allows sensor nodes to collaborate.
A key factor in detecting events is to be able to disambiguate between a faulty measure-
ment and an event that has happened in a specific region [39]. Fault-event disambiguation
is not a trivial task. However, if spatial correlation is exploited, geographically independent
faults can be distinguished from events which are based on correlated readings observed by
a number of sensors in a region or event boundary. The work of [25] proposed a spatial data
mining based mechanism to detect event boundaries in presence of faulty measurements.
Data-Centric Anomalies. Having classified anomalies into three major categories
(natural faults, malicious behaviors, events), we now identify these anomalies that only
influence the collected data samples (data-centric). Measurement faults, malicious data
behaviors, and events are all examples of a data-centric anomaly. Data faults and mali-
cious data behaviors hinder the quality, integrity, and/or trustworthiness of the sensor data
whereas events manifest as abnormal data. Some detection mechanisms focus on data-
centric anomalies in general and do not necessarily distinguish a measurement fault from
an event from a malicious data behavior. For a survey of such mechanisms, the reader is
referred to [143].
3.4 Characteristics of Anomaly Detection Algorithms
After establishing a comprehensive taxonomy of the different types of anomalies in sensor
network deployments, we now discuss the challenges in designing an anomaly detection
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mechanism or algorithm. These challenges are common to all types of anomalies discussed
in this chapter. An anomaly detection algorithm should be:
• Resource-aware: The most prevalent resource constraint in the majority of sensor net-
work deployments is “energy.” Communication usually accounts for the highest amount
of energy consumption. Processing power can also be high if advanced and more com-
plex operations are performed at the sensor node (e.g., surveillance [44]). Memory,
on the other hand, may not be a constraining resource in recent days [127]. However,
writing to flash memory is still very expensive in terms of power consumption. Given
these constraints, an anomaly detection algorithm should try to eliminate any additional
burdens on the battery capacity and, if possible, utilize the remaining space in the data
memory before attempting to write to much larger flash memory.
• Simple: The cost of computation may not be the major concern in sensor network de-
ployments. However, algorithms that run on low-power resource-constrained embed-
ded devices such as sensor motes should not incur a high computational complexity.
Complex algorithms can incur delay and may unexpectedly crash the operating system
running on top of the sensor motes. Moreover, it is difficult to debug or track the oper-
ation of a large network of tiny sensor motes to ensure the correctness of the detection
algorithm before deployment. Hence, simplicity of algorithms may ease the debugging
process.
• Accurate: As any other detection algorithm, an anomaly detection algorithm designed
for sensor networks should achieve a high detection accuracy. Anomaly detection
schemes that yield high rates of false positives and false negatives are not desirable.
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• Rapid: Detection latency is an important measure of the effectiveness of an anomaly
detection algorithm. A low detection latency is desirable in all cases. In an event-driven
application, for example, events should be identified in a timely manner. Natural faults
and malicious behaviors should also be revealed before the entire network goes down or
the sensor data is severely contaminated with inconsistent data points.
• Scalable: Most deployments discussed in Chapter 2 constituted a descent number of
sensor nodes. A recent deployment of GreenOrbs [114] consisted of 349 nodes and is
still in expansion. Therefore, detection algorithms that run perfectly in a lab environ-
ment with few sensor nodes may not necessarily adapt to networks at large scales.
• Adaptable: WSN deployments usually involve incremental installation of new nodes in
the field over time. The detection algorithm should tolerate any addition of new nodes
or removal of dead nodes.
• Robust: Although we have put down a comprehensive taxonomy of anomalies, some-
times it is difficult to anticipate the true behavior of an anomaly (e.g., a new attack on
sensor networks). Therefore, it is highly desirable that a detection algorithm identifies
unknown anomalies such as novel events, unexplored future faults, or newly emerged
malicious activities.
• Secure: This challenge is perhaps more relevant to sensor networks deployed in hostile
environments. An algorithm designed for revealing a malicious behavior should itself
be resilient to attacks.
• Practical: In this chapter, we discussed a number of detection and mitigation techniques
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against anomalies in sensor networks. However, most existing techniques have not been
tested in real-world deployments. This calls for conducting real-world experiments to
prove the effectiveness of such techniques under realistic environments. Moreover, in
recent sensor network deployments for monitoring applications, several other services
are employed such as sensor data collection, parameter dissemination, etc. Rather than
interrupting the normal operation of the sensor network, an anomaly detection algorithm
or service should run alongside existing protocols.
3.5 Related Work
An earlier attempt was made by Jurdak et al [54] to classify anomalies in sensor networks.
However, the authors only addressed natural faults and did not elaborate on measurement
faults. A measurement fault, as one type of a natural fault, is a very significant type of
anomaly and was extensively described in our work for further classification following the
same terminologies used in [88] and [112]. Malicious behaviors and events can also be
considered as anomalies in sensor network deployments and hence are an essential part in
our taxonomy.
Ni et al [88] compiled a study of sensor data faults prevalent in sensor network deploy-
ments and presented helpful features that can be used in the detection process. Both [137]
and [130] surveyed the different types of malicious network behaviors and discussed a num-
ber of countermeasures. Our work borrowed the terminologies presented in these works to
maintain consistency. However, we deal with anomalies in general rather than single mea-
surement faults or malicious network behaviors. This work is more general in scope by
providing an insight to the reader about “anything” that can go wrong in a sensor network
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whether deployed in a friendly or a hostile environment by constructing a comprehensive
taxonomy of such anomalies.
A number of surveys [30,108,136,143] exist in the literature that address the detection
of a specific scope of anomalies discussed in this chapter. In [108] the authors compared
among the various diagnosis and debugging tools which handle functional faults (network
and node failures). The work of [143] surveyed the different mechanisms for detecting data-
centric anomalies. Intrusion detection systems for identifying malicious network behaviors
were discussed in [30]. Finally, Xie et al [136] studied a number of detection mechanisms
for data-centric anomalies as well as malicious network behaviors. Our work in this chapter
differs from these surveys in two aspects. First, the main focus of this chapter is the analysis
rather than the detection of different types of anomalies that are prevalent in recent sensor
network deployments. Second, the discussion in these surveys does not necessarily show
how each detection mechanism deal with every individual anomaly. In contrast, our work
gives the reader an insight on how to do so by presenting some existing solutions.
3.6 Summary
In this chapter, we established a taxonomy of different types of anomalies prevalent in sen-
sor network deployments. We discussed each anomalous behavior and gave insights on how
to potentially identify such a behavior using existing detection mechanisms. Finally, having
advocated for anomaly detection mechanisms, we presented the challenges of designing a
new mechanism suitable for real-world sensor network deployments. This comprehensive
study can also help researchers narrow their focus to a specific type of anomaly or choose
to implement a more generalized anomaly detection mechanism.
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Chapter 4
Data-Centric Anomaly Models
The performance of anomaly detection algorithms is usually measured using the total resid-
ual error. This error metric is calculated by comparing the labels assigned by the detection
algorithm against a reference ground truth. Obtaining a highly expressive ground truth
is by itself a challenging task, if not infeasible. Often, a dataset is manually labeled by
domain experts. However, manual labeling is error prone. In real-world sensor network de-
ployments, it becomes even more difficult to label a sensor dataset due to the large amount
of samples, the complexity of visualizing the data, and the uncertainty in the existence of
anomalies. In this chapter, we propose an automated technique which uses highly repre-
sentative anomaly models for labeling. This technique will be extensively used in con-
secutive chapters. We demonstrate the effectiveness of this technique in the next chapter
through evaluating a proposed classification algorithm using the designed anomaly models
as ground truth. We will show that the classification accuracy is similar to that when using
manually labeled real-world data points.
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4.1 Overview and Motivations
Evaluating the accuracy of anomaly detection algorithms requires matching the predicted
labels—or clusters in case of an unsupervised algorithm—against a solid ground truth.
Obtaining a highly accurate ground truth is by itself rarely possible. Often, algorithm de-
signers simply rely on visual inspection to label anomalies and normal behaviors in the
original dataset. Although this mechanism may achieve a good point of reference, it be-
comes tedious to inspect the entire data obtained form real-world deployments. In addition,
inspectors are sometimes uncertain if a suspicious reading is in fact an anomaly unless they
are experts in their domain. Although uncommon, algorithm designers may use metrics
such as distance, density, or a running average to label anomalies in the original data [142].
However, these labeling techniques are themselves anomaly detection mechanisms that
have their own deficiencies.
An alternative approach to obtaining a ground truth is to inject artificial anomalies with
known labels into the existing sensor dataset. Although this may entirely eliminate errors
associated with mislabeling the original data, injected anomalies should follow models
highly expressive of the true anomalous behaviors. To the best of our knowledge, this work
is the first to propose such models. In [112] and [15], most anomalies are injected using
random noise generation with adjustable parameters. An injected outlier, on the other hand,
is represented as an extremely large or extremely low reading. Outliers can also follow an
injection model with specific parameters that control their values. Anomalies injected using
random noise or outlier generation do not necessarily mimic the true behaviors observed
in real-world deployments and hence a new injection method is required. Different sensor-
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net deployments may exhibit different anomalous data behaviors depending on the type of
sensing modalities being monitored and the sensor manufacturer. Existing sensor networks
that are deployed for environmental monitoring purposes, mostly share similar character-
istics. Sensors in these deployments typically measure a certain number of phenomena
including temperature, humidity, and light intensity. To design our anomaly models, we
choose to study the Intel Berkeley Research Lab (IBRL) deployment. Despite the fact
that the IBRL deployment does not cover all possible anomalous behaviors, it still gives
us a good basis for designing such models. One can extend these models to include new
behaviors that may be seen in other deployments. In cases, some anomaly models (e.g.,
outlier models) may only require an addition to or modification of a list of values (e.g., true
outliers), whereas in other cases, an entirely new model should be designed.
In addition to measurement faults, we also design models for injecting naive and smart
compromise data behaviors. It is safe to assume that those two models are highly represen-
tative of the adversary’s intention to disguise himself/herself, while injecting falsified read-
ings that hinder the quality and trustworthiness of the collected sensor data. Finally, events
in event-driven sensornet applications often exhibit distinct characteristics. Given this fact,
it is infeasible to design a unique model for generating all kinds of artificial events. As a
result, application administrators may simulate possible events to be detected and based on
the data behaviors, suitable models can be designed. The models designed in this chapter
are based on a time-series analysis. This choice was made due to the fact that anomalies
may also be injected into existing sensor network deployments in real-time. This enables
online detection mechanisms, such as the one we propose in chapter 6, to rapidly evaluate
their accuracy on the fly.
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4.2 Modeling Anomalies
In the previous chapter, we analyzed the characteristics of data anomalies that can exist
in real world deployments. Based on these characteristics, we now define mathematical
models that are highly expressive of data-centric anomalies. Since sensor readings in real-
world sensornet deployments arrive at the base station in real-time, we can define time-
series models which act upon streams of sensor data that express a number of sensing
modalities (e.g., a stream of temperature readings). To this end, a newly arrived reading
can be mapped using the following general model:
yp,k =






φ if n ≤ p < n+ w
xp,k otherwise
(4.1)
where p represents the current epoch, k is the sensing modality and yp,k is the newly mapped
sensor reading. This general model states that if the current epoch lies within a certain time
window w starting at epoch n, then we apply a specific mapping function φ over the current
sensor reading xp,k. The mapping function φ is the function upon which the anomalous
reading is generated and hence is dependent on the anomaly type. Here, it is assumed that
current readings represent the true phenomena. If we are dealing with an existing sensor
dataset such as the IBRL dataset, we would first filter out anomalous readings within a
larger time window before applying the mapping, as we will do by filtering out outliers in
the coming chapter. On the other hand, if sensor readings are being delivered in real-time,
they may themselves be anomalous at the time of modeling, introducing additional noise
that may affect the model accuracy. Therefore, anomaly modeling is usually preferred
during the initial deployment when the nodes are presumably healthy.
81
Table 4.1: A Set of All Outliers In The IBRL Dataset Prior To Battery Voltage Drops Under
2.40 Volts
Node 2 Node 4 Node 8 Node 20 Node 26 Node 32 Node 39 Node 43
Voltage (Volts) 0.0180369 2.14412 0.0346855 2.4341 2.4341 2.42416 2.17553 18.56 2.09866 0.00910083 0.0271085 2.45421
Temperature (°C) 3.4068 -38.4 0.016 -38.4 -38.4 -38.4 -38.4 NA -38.4 90.9208 175.681 385.568
Temp - Prev Epoch (°C) 18.508 21.948 20.958 23.9684 23.1832 22.8402 29.2886 NA 21.086 24.369 25.9566 24.7708
Humidity (R%) -1854.52 -4 -8983.13 -4 -4 -4 -4 4.65665 -4 137.512 -455.449 0.580611
Humidity - Prev Epoch (R%) 39.450 36.198 42.082 33.8744 34.536 35.5072 27.2555 NA 43.7186 33.7 37.162 38.4629
Light (Lux) 158.24 235.52 0 890.56 625.6 566.72 1847.36 23 12.88 9.20694e−11 0.562671 1.80992
Light - Prev Epoch (Lux) 338.56 202.4 114.08 802.24 566.72 507.84 1847.36 NA 11.04 165.6 323.84 684.48
Date 02-28 03-16 03-06 02-28 02-28 02-28 03-20 03-03 03-20 03-16 03-21 03-19
Time 08:02:17 16:04:09 23:15:40 15:04:47 15:46:17 16:14:17 11:03:22 13:08:56 21:59:22 18:34:17 13:50:07 13:22:51
Epoch (Sequence Number) 849 50772 22835 1694 1777 1833 61690 12950 63002 51072 64903 59089
4.2.1 Outliers
In the IBRL deployment, a few nodes exhibited one or a couple of outliers prior to the
time where their battery voltage began to drop under the normal operating voltage of the
temperature and humidity sensors. Table 4.1 lists all these instances of outliers. Outliers
would appear in all sensing modalities (temperature, humidity, and light) concurrently. The
outliers in the table show no correlation whatsoever with the sampled reading in the pre-
vious epoch or, in other words, the expected sensor reading at the time of outlier. We
have also seen that the occurrence of outliers correlates well with the occurrence of out-
liers in the voltage values. However, we cannot model outliers as a function of voltage
since there is no clear dependency between the two values (sensor reading outlier and
voltage outlier). Therefore, outliers can be modeled as φ = ck where ck ∈ Ck is a spe-
cific outlier to be injected at epoch n. Notice that the time window w in Eq. 4.1 is equal
to one since an outlier only happens at a single epoch. Several outliers can be injected
at different epochs as this was the case with nodes 20, 32, and 39 in Table 4.1. The
set Ck holds all observable outliers for sensing modality k. Referring to Table 4.1, the
set {−38.4, 0.016, 3.4068, 90.9208, 175.681, 385.568} is mapped from SI units to the raw
ADC values to form the set C of temperature outliers in the IBRL dataset. This set can be
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expanded to cover more outlier instances. An outlier instance can also be randomly gener-
ated as either a much lower value or much higher value than the possible values of the true
phenomenon [112]. However, a randomly generated outlier may not be as representative as
known outliers in existing deployments.
4.2.2 Spike Faults
As discussed earlier, the IBRL dataset contains a large number of spike faults within humid-
ity and temperature readings. To model spike faults, the model should highly approximate
the spike behavior once it takes place. As the relationship between spike data points and
epochs is non-linear, a high-degree (i.e., > 4) polynomial regression can be applied to
fit the faulty readings. The following r-th order polynomial equation can then be used to
estimate the spike value of a sensing modality k at each epoch:
φ = θ(β0,k + β1,kqk + β2,kq
2
k + ...+ βr,kq
r
k) (4.2)
θ() is a rounding function since sensor readings are injected in ADC format. The re-
sponse dependent variable in this case is φ and the predictor independent variable is the
current epoch increment qk = (pk − n). To determine the current epoch increment, the
value of the epoch where the spike has just occurred (i.e., n) is subtracted from the current
epoch. Finally, β0,k represents the intercept, and {β1,k, ..., βr,k} are the polynomial coef-
ficients of the regression equation. To inject a spike fault, one would choose n to be the
very first incident when the sensor node began to exhibit a spike fault and w to be the spike
period (e.g., w = 2910). Recall that epochs represent sequence numbers and hence, for
each sensor node, not all epochs are available since packet loss is certain during the spike
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(b) Node 6
Figure 4.1: Various modeling techniques for spike faults exhibited by two sensor nodes in
the IBRL deployment: nodes 6 and 18. For each node figure, the upper region plots the
entire period of the spike fault followed by the steady behavior of a stuck-at fault. The
lower region plots the first two hours of the spike period.
period.
Although regression can be a good approximation of the original spike data, it does
not model the spike behavior as accurate as numerical methods (e.g., linear interpolation).
Hence, we further propose two interpolation techniques: (i) simple linear interpolation and
(ii) spline interpolation. The resulting fitting curves for the three techniques are plotted
in Figure 4.1. The figure also shows the original data points representing a spike fault
exhibited by both node 6 and node 18. Data points were obtained by mapping the tem-
perature values from degree Celsius to their corresponding ADC format. Apparently, the
fitted curve obtained by simple linear interpolation and spline interpolation passes through
all faulty data points. Nevertheless, missing packets will have to be interpolated as well. If
the number of missing packets during the spike period is very large, some of these packets
may be interpolated at the peaks of the fitted curve. This is the main drawback of using
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the spline interpolation method. The smoothed curve can be leveraged to inject exact spike
data points if such points occur at the same epochs as the original spike points. Spline
interpolation (or linear interpolation in general) requires all the dependent and independent
variables to be stored in memory. If fault injection is to take place offline, this adds no
burden. However, if faults need to be injected at the sensor level, sensors do not have the
capacity required to store this huge amount of points. Hence, regression is preferred in the
latter case as only the regression function needs to be stored in the node’s data memory and
is used to generate spike points given the current epoch value.
Finally, ADC readings for the temperature and humidity sensors highly depend on the
sensor manufacturer. For instance, Sensirion temperature and humidty sensors used in the
IBRL deployment sample readings as 14-bit ADC output whereas other sensors such as the
temperature sensor on the MTS300 sensor board can only sample 10-bit of ADC output.
4.2.3 Stuck-at Faults
In the IBRL dataset, most stuck-at faults maintain steadiness until the end of a nodes life-
time. This steadiness follows a spike fault. The sensor reading may also become stuck
at a constant value which follows as a result of a noise fault. Since these two values are
consistent across nodes, stuck-at faults can be modeled as φ = ck where ck ∈ {c1, c2}k.
For instance, for humidity, c is chosen to be the converted ADC value of either 114.894 or
-3.91901 R%. Although a stuck-at fault does not always exhibit a zero variance over time
(few faulty readings are slightly deviating from c1,k or c2,k), the only chosen two constant
values are adequately representative of a stuck-at fault and these few deviating readings can
be considered as part of the fault. As constant faults following a spike fault usually carry
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out until the end of the deployment or until the node energy is entirely depleted, the time
window w can be specified as large as a week to 10 days (see Figure 3.3(b)). Furthermore,
n can carry on after the spike fault has ended (n = nspike + wspike).
4.2.4 Noise Faults
As pointed out in chapter 3, noise faults in the IBRL deployment may take place at the
end of the node’s lifetime when the battery is being depleted. Similar to stuck-at faults, we
model this behavior as φ = ck where ck ∈ {c1, c2}k. However, this behavior is repeated
over m times whereby in each iteration we switch between c1,k and c2,k. Furthermore, in
every iteration w is randomly chosen to be small enough in order not to lead to a constant
fault otherwise. More formally, a noise fault exhibited by a sensing modality k over a
number of windows W can be given as
Ynoise,k =
W
∑
i=0


ni+(wi−si)
∑
p=ni
c1,k +
ni+wi
∑
p=ni+(wi−si)
c2,k

 (4.3)
and ni = ni−1 + wi−1 when i > 0. Other types of noise faults are possible in other
deployments as mentioned in [88]. These faults may be modeled using a white Gaussian
noise with zero mean and σ variance [113] in a way similar to a naive compromise behavior
as we will discuss shortly.
4.2.5 Clipping Faults
Similar to stuck-at faults, clipping faults can be modeled by maintaining a constant value
over a number of epochs (i.e., φ = ck). The only difference is that, with clipping, the
constant value represents the maximum limit bounded by the number of bits of the analog
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to digital converter (ADC). As mentioned in Chapter 3, the light sensors in the IBRL de-
ployment could generate readings up to 1847.36 Lux. The minimum ADC value is omitted
from the list of clipping model parameters.
Notice that the above fault models and their parameters are designed based on the IBRL
dataset. If the sensornet is operating in a different context, model parameters have to be
updated accordingly. Furthermore, additional models may have to be designed for other
contexts. Still, the proposed real-time fault models provide a common ground for modeling
faulty data in cyber-physical systems especially those used for environmental monitoring.
4.2.6 Events
In the previous chapter, we discussed the characteristics of potential events that could take
place in a real-world scenario. As mentioned, it is infeasible to model all events using one
single model and therefore event detection mechanisms consider few known events to be
identified [132]. To this end, we merely consider one of the potential events exhibited by
node 16 during the IBRL deployment (see Figure 3.10(b)). This behavior may be modeled
using a random offset ok followed by a very small white Gaussian noise (φ = ok + xp,k ±
σp,k). The node then recovers after a time window w has passed. Other event models can
be designed in a similar fashion.
4.2.7 Compromise Data Behaviors
Recall that compromise data behaviors can be either naive or smart. Both behaviors can be
modeled as φ = xp,k ± σp,k, where σp,k is the variance of a white Gaussian noise with zero
mean. In case of a naive behavior, the additive noise is added continuously over the entire
injection window w. On the other hand, the additive noise is only added during half of the
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current injection window if it is a smart compromise behavior. If the number of injection
windows is W , then a smart behavior for a sensing modality k is formally expressed as:
Ysmart,k =
W
∑
i=0


ni+
wi
2
∑
p=ni
(xp,k ± σp,k) +
ni+wi
∑
p=ni+
wi
2
xp,k

 (4.4)
where ni = ni−1 + wi−1, i > 0. During the process of data falsification, an adversary
may also inject anomaly models identical to the fault models discussed earlier. Moreover,
in most sensor network deployments, a behavior of a noise fault highly matches that of
naively injected falsified readings [112]. Therefore, such faults can follow the same model
of a naive compromise behavior.
Finally, the amount of deviation of compromised readings overtime should be high
enough to impose a threat (e.g., temperature variations outside the normal variations of
the true temperature readings which happen due to calibration errors and other factors),
otherwise, the final result would lie within the expected range.
4.3 Summary
In this chapter, we proposed models to generate sensor data anomalies which closely rep-
resent those prevalent in real-world sensor network deployments. A common ground truth
can be established by injecting anomalies according to their models into an existing sen-
sor dataset or deployment. Automatic labeling of the data eliminates any potential human
errors of mislabeling some of the data samples through tedious visual inspections. In the
coming chapter, we will show how expressive the designed models are by injecting a num-
ber of faults into an existing real-world sensor dataset. The resulting ground truth serves as
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a reference to measuring the accuracy of a classification algorithm we propose. We achieve
similar accuracy measures as those when using real faults for training the classifier.
In this chapter, we designed anomaly models based solely on the IBRL deployment
and one of our lab deployments. The IBRL deployment exhibits most of the anomalous
behaviors that can be found in an environmental monitoring application. However, sensor
data faults still depend on the sensor type and manufacturer. In the IBRL deployment, only
a certain number of sensors were used, namely temperature, humidity, and light sensors.
Other types of sensors manufactured by other manufacturers may exhibit different faulty
behaviors than those in the IBRL deployment as we saw in Chapter 3. We plan to come up
with new expressive fault models for such data-centric anomalies. We also wish to model
more interesting events such as unauthorized office access in the near future. Furthermore,
other than data anomalies, we intend to establish a solid ground truth representing network
and node anomalies as well. Network and node failures impact the network performance
and lifetime, and thus detecting such anomalies is very desirable despite the fact that it is
not the main objective of this thesis.
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Chapter 5
Data-Centric Anomaly Detection in
Sensor Networks
As we have seen from the previous chapters, data-centric anomalies are highly prevalent in
sensor network deployments. To meet one of the main goals of this dissertation, that is of
enhancing quality assurance of sensor data acquisition schemes, it is crucial to first iden-
tify data-centric anomalies. There have been a number of data-centric anomaly detection
schemes proposed over the past decade [143]. These range from rule-based, to statistical-
based, to graph-based, to machine learning based mechanisms. The latter have proven to be
effective in detecting measurement faults. In the next section we discuss these schemes and
pinpoint their weaknesses. In Section 5.2, we propose a new machine learning based data-
centric anomaly detection framework which is capable of accurately identifying sensor data
faults as well as compromised data behaviors. We summarize the chapter in Section 5.3
5.1 A Taxonomy of Data Mining Based Data-Centric
Anomaly Detection Techniques
Data mining techniques for anomaly detection have been widely used over the years in
various domains including intrusion detection, fraud detection, medical anomaly detection,
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industrial damage detection, image processing, anomaly detection in text data, and sensor
networks [12]. A data mining approach has proven its effectiveness in extracting knowl-
edge from sequences of data stored in a time-series databases over repeated measurements
of time [41]. Data acquired from WSNs is usually periodic and is stored in a centralized
database once it reaches the base station, hence can qualify as inputs to such data mining
systems. Later in this chapter, we propose a centralized abnormal node detection mech-
anism in which a sensor node is classified as either normal or abnormal depending on its
sensor readings collected at the base station within a certain time window (offline).
Recently, researchers have explored the effectiveness of a number of data mining tech-
niques to extract knowledge from real-time data streams which dynamically flow in and
out of an observation platform, and are usually characterized as always changing, requir-
ing a quick response time, and allowing only one scan over a given stream [2, 41]. This
is very beneficial in occasions where the stream data points cannot fit in memory as is
the case with the resource-constrained sensor motes. Once again, sensor data can be seen
as streams transmitted by one sensor node and later received by and flow in and out of
the neighboring nodes. Mining sensor data streams is the process of extracting knowl-
edge from sensor streams using single-scan, on-line, and multilevel stream processing and
analysis methods [41]. In the next chapter, we propose an on-line data-centric anomaly
detection mechanism whereby the mining/detection task is carried out by every node in the
network before possibly aggregating data from child nodes. It uses a stored hypothesis to
determine the class of the node—either itself or its child node in case the sensor network
is deployed in a hostile environment—as either legitimate or abnormal. The hypothesis is
obtained during the training phase whereby nodes extract statistical features on the fly and
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communicate them to the base station rather than communicating the raw sensor readings.
One major advantage of this approach is that stream data points are discarded rather than
being stored in memory.
In this section, we discuss some of the popular existing data-centric anomaly detec-
tion mechanisms which were proposed over the past decade. Figure 5.1 shows a taxon-
omy of data mining (DM) based schemes for anomaly detection in sensor networks. All
these schemes have their roots in machine learning (ML). Some rely on classification for
distinguishing normal from anomalous behaviors while others use clustering techniques.
Classification is a supervised learning problem in which a classifier (i.e. model, learner, or
hypothesis) is constructed describing a pre-labeled sensor dataset (training set). The model
can then be used to classify future unlabeled sensor data tuples. Since sensor data is usually
unlabeled in advance, domain expertise can be leveraged to label sensor dataset generated
in earlier deployments, or synthetic anomalies can be injected into existing datasets along
with their class labels using the anomaly models proposed in Chapter 4. Clustering, on the
other hand, is an unsupervised learning technique which does not require the sensor train-
ing dataset to be labeled in advance. With clustering, sensor data tuples will be grouped
together into a number of groups and each group is assigned a class label (the simplest case
generates two clusters; one labeled as normal while the other is labeled as anomalous).
The classification of schemes in Figure 5.1 is based on the type of the machine learning
technique being used. The following discusses each category and pinpoints the strengths
and/or weaknesses of the schemes in each of these categories. We also discuss alternative
approaches to anomaly detection in sensor networks at the end of the section.
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Figure 5.1: A taxonomy of data mining based anomaly detection approaches in wireless
sensor networks
Clustering-based
Rajasegarar et al [105] proposed a k-nearest-neighbor (k-NN) clustering-based off-line ap-
proach for anomaly detection in sensor networks. More concisely, there are two forms of
clustering involved: (i) a fixed-width distance-based clustering algorithm [29] with width
(diameter) w and, (ii) a k-NN clustering algorithm which runs on the base station to detect
anomalies. The fixed-width clustering algorithm may simply run directly on the base sta-
tion (centralized) after collecting all raw sensory data from all sensor nodes in the network,
or the process can be distributed among the sensor nodes to eventually form global clusters
at the base station. Figure 5.2(a) illustrates this process. To perform the clustering in a
distributed manner, each sensor node applies the fixed-width clustering algorithm locally
over the data features to form a number of distinct clusters. This number is determined al-
gorithmically and data features are a transformed and normalized form of raw sensor data
samples collected over a certain time window. To obtain such features, each sensor node
first computes a tuple of local statistics (mean and variance for transformation, min and
max for normalization) applied over the time window for each attached sensor and then
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forwards the tuple to the base station. The base station then computes the global statistics
tuple by combining all received statistical parameters and then floods the resulted tuple to
the entire network eventually arriving at each sensor node. After applying fixed-width clus-
tering, each sensor node forms a cluster summary for each cluster consisting of the centroid
and the number of samples in the cluster. It then forwards all cluster summaries to the par-
ent node (assuming a tree topology as in the figure). Upon receiving all cluster summaries
from all of its children, a parent node merges the received clusters with its own clusters
based on the inter-cluster width (if inter-cluster distance between the centroids of two clus-
ters is less than the width w) and then forwards the new cluster summaries up the tree. This
process continues until the base station receives all cluster summaries from its children,
merges the clusters with its own clusters, and applies k-nearest-neighbors distance-based
clustering to identify anomalous clusters. In k-NN, each sensor node chooses k shortest
distances among the distances to other clusters (inter-cluster distances). The average of
the k shortest inter-cluster distances (ICDi) of each sensor node i is then calculated and
compared with the total number of inter-cluster distances (ICD). A cluster is considered
normal if its ICDi value lies within one standard deviation from the mean ICD, otherwise,
it is marked as anomalous.
Simulations over the Great Duck Island dataset have shown that this approach can
achieve 4% false positive ratio while drastically reducing the amount of energy consumed
when the decentralized approach is in play (due to collecting cluster summaries instead
of raw data). This clustering-based approach, however, has several deficiencies. First,
anomaly detection is always performed off-line at the base station. Second, there is a
communication overhead involved due to the need for collecting local statistics from each
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(a) Clustering-Based [105] (fixed-width clustering
at every node and k-NN clustering at the base sta-
tion)
(b) Quarter Sphere One-Class SVM-Based [102,
144]
Figure 5.2: Clustering-based and SVM-based data-centric anomaly detection in wireless
sensor networks
sensor node to compute the global statistics tuple at the base station and then disseminates
it over the network to reach all sensor nodes. Third, decentralized clustering is performed
independently from the sensor data collection, therefore the base station can still be able to
detect anomalies in the network but lacks any raw or even aggregated sensor data. Finally,
the number of clusters k in the k-NN clustering algorithm and the cluster width parameter
w are user-specified design parameters and their values can dramatically affect the detec-
tion accuracy. For instance, if w is chosen to be at one of the extremes, the algorithm can
not detect anomalies at all.
Another clustering-based mechanism was proposed by Rajasegarar et al in [103] which
leverages the unique shapes of a hyper-ellipsoid (see Figure 5.3). In this work, each sen-
sor node stores a number of observations over a certain time window. Each observation
includes a number of sensing modalities. Each node then computes the sample mean and
the covariance matrix of these observations. It then takes the inverse of the covariance
matrix to form a hyper-ellipsoid. The resulting hyper-ellipsoidal parameters (i.e., sample
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Figure 5.3: A scatter plot of the temperature and humidity readings from a 4-hour window
of readings (starting March 1) obtained during the IBRL deployment. Anomalies shown in
the figure are elliptical anomalies discussed in [103]
mean and inverse covariance matrix) are then used to find the Mahalanobis distance be-
tween all observations and the sample mean. If the latter is greater than a certain threshold,
the sensor observation at a time is considered a local anomaly, otherwise, it is locally nor-
mal. After this, a node communicates its elliptical parameters as well as the number of its
samples to its parent node. A parent node merges its children hyper-ellipsoidal parameters
with its own parameters, and communicates the results up the tree. The gateway node then
communicates the globally computed hyper-ellipsoid over each detection window back to
all the nodes in the network where a node would find global anomalies by computing the
Mahalanobis distance, once again, and comparing it with the threshold.
The above clustering-based scheme incurs relatively high computational complexity
bounded by the cost of computing the inverse of the covariance matrix. The scheme also
introduces an additional overhead due to communicating the hyper-ellipsoidal parameters
up and down the tree. In addition to the computation and communication cost incurred by
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this scheme, it requires all sensor readings within a a large time window to be stored in
memory. Referring to the same example in [103], storing 3000 data points of 5 sensing
modalities each requires less than 30100 bytes (assuming the size of a sensing modality
value is 2 bytes) large enough not to fit in the data memory of the most popular resource-
constrained sensor platforms (e.g., MicaZ uses 4 KBytes of RAM).
SVM-based
An SVM-based anomaly detection mechanism in sensor networks was proposed in [102].
Similar to [66], the mechanism uses quarter spheres as the separating hyperplane and a
one-class (unsupervised) SVM. Each sensor reading {xi : i = 1..n} is mapped to its
corresponding feature vector in a higher dimensional space using a non-linear mapping
function φ(xi). After the mapping is complete, the anomaly detection considers solving
the following SVM optimization problem:
min
R∈ℜ,ξ∈ℜn
R2 +
1
vn
n
∑
i=1
ξi
subject to ‖φ(xi)‖
2 ≤ R2 + ξi),
ξi ≥ 0, i = 1..n
(5.1)
Both the slack variables {ξi : i = 1...n} and the regularization parameter v ∈ (0, 1)
control the number of anomalous feature vectors. R is the radius of the quarter sphere. In
other words, the detection algorithm finds the best quarter sphere that has the minimum
radius from the origin while covering most of the mapped feature vectors. To reduce com-
putational complexity, the primal problem (5.1) can be mapped to the following dual linear
problem using Lagrange and the kernel trick:
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min
α∈ℜn
−
n
∑
i=1
αik(xi, xi)
subject to
n
∑
i=1
αi = 1,
0 ≤ αi ≤
1
vn
, i = 1..n
(5.2)
where αi ≥ 0 are Lagrangian multipliers and k(xi, xi) = φ(xi).φ(xi) is the kernel
function which is equivalent to R2. In order to be able to solve equation (5.2), the feature
vectors need to first be centered by subtracting from each feature vector the mean of all
feature vectors in the space. This results in the centered feature vectors and the new norms
k̃(xi, xi) will be extracted form the diagonal elements of the kernel matrix K̃ = K−1nK−
K1n +1nK1n, where K = k(xi, xj) is the original n× n kernel matrix and 1n is an n× n
matrix with all values equal to 1/n. Once the Lagrange multipliers αi are computed, an
anomalous feature vector is detected if its corresponding αi equals to
1
vn
.
As in [105], the anomaly detection algorithm can be entirely applied at the base station
(off-line) after collecting all raw sensor data, or it can be executed in a distributed man-
ner (on-line). Figure 5.2(b) illustrates the operation of the distributed anomaly detection
algorithm. Each leaf node (assuming a tree topology) applies the above anomaly detec-
tion approach locally (i.e. maps sensor data to feature vectors, solves equation (5.2) for
the Lagrangian multipliers αi, and marks any αi with the value
1
vn
as a local anomaly)
and finds the local ‘minimum’ radius R and the L-2 norms of the feature vectors k̃(xi, xi)
(i.e. temporal correlation or distance between each measurement and the rest of n mea-
surements). It then stores these two values in its memory and sends its local radius to its
parent node. After receiving all local radii from its children, a parent node computes the
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mean, median, maximum, or minimum radius which will serve as the global radius Rm.
A parent node then communicates the global radius back to its children. Upon receiving
the global radius, a feature vector is identified as globally anomalous by the child node if
its norm k̃(xi, xi) > R
2
m. Depending on the desired coverage of global anomaly detection,
global radius computation can be done at any sensor node in the network. As an example,
in Figure 5.2(b), both nodes C and S can compute a global radius and communicate it with
their children and their children’s children. The figure shows a tree topology, however,
the algorithm can adapt to any other topology assuming there exists a leader node that can
compute the global radius and communicates it with its neighbors.
Similar to [105], the decentralized anomaly detection algorithm was tested on the Great
Duck Island dataset and was able to reduce energy consumption several time folds due to
the reduced communication cost of exchanging radius information between nodes instead
of propagating the raw sensor readings. Moreover, the decentralized algorithm scales well
since anomaly detection is performed locally by each sensor node over the node’s measure-
ment window. The main disadvantage of this approach is the high complexity imposed by
solving the dual linear problem of equation (5.2). It is also expensive to perform matrix
computation resulting from centering the feature vectors. It is therefore very costly for a
low-power resource-constrained sensor node to carry out such computations. Moreover,
there exists a significant detection delay due to the time needed to receive the computed
global radius at each node. Finally, there are several user-defined parameters that need to
be carefully chosen; these include the type of the distance-based kernel function and its pa-
rameters, the regularization parameter v, and the computation criteria of the global radius
(e.g. mean, median, minimum, or max).
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Zhang et al [144] extends the above SVM-based technique to be able to distinguish
between sensor faults and interesting events while running in real-time (i.e. detection is
performed at every sensing interval) using spatio-temporal correlations among neighboring
nodes. The mechanism assumes that nodes are fully synchronized. Rather than unicasting
the local radius R to its parent, instead, each node locally broadcasts its learned radius to its
neighbors. Upon receiving local radii from all neighboring nodes, each node then finds the
median radius Rm. A single measurement is considered an outlier if its distance from the
origin of the feature space is larger than both R and Rm. Once an anomaly is detected, the
anomalous node requests its neighbors distances from their own origins. If its own distance
is larger than it local radius and the median distance of all neighbors is larger than the
median radius (and both are larger than the global radius), the anomaly may be classified
as an event. Otherwise, it may be considered a measurement fault. In addition to this, the
authors also proposed three techniques to update or re-learn the normal model overtime.
Compared to the work of Rajasegarar et al [102], all proposed techniques achieved better
detection rate with less false positives.
Bayesian-based
A number of Bayesian based approaches to the problem of anomaly detection in sensor
networks have been proposed [28, 46, 51, 64, 112]. In these works, a Bayesian model is
learned online or off-line and then used for inferencing anomalies. For instance, in [28],
a naive Bayesian model is first learned on the fly using only the nodes readings and then
its accuracy is tested over time. Once the accuracy improves significantly, the learned
predictor is put in action; the reading is considered anomalous if the number of misclassi-
100
fication instances is higher than half. The latter scheme highly relies on the fact that the
entire observation history of the sensor node is summarized by the previous reading and the
node’s immediate neighbors (parent and child). This assumption holds if the sensor read-
ings are both spatially and temporally correlated. The scheme uses m data ranges to predict
the missing reading or replace its detected anomalous reading with a more likely reading
within the predicted data range. In order to estimate the probabilities of the Bayesian
model, a total of (1 +m+ 3m2/2 +m3/2) counters are needed to be stored at each node.
If the phenomena is stationary over space, the learning is performed in-network whereby
each node communicates its local counters to its parent after every specified epoch and then
resets its counters to zero. The parent node, in turn, sums up its children counters with its
own and forwards the resulting counters up the tree. This process continues until the base
station receives the last counter summaries and accumulates them over a number of epochs.
In [112,113], the authors proposed a 5-state supervised Hidden Markov Model (HMM)
based approach where the states correspond to day, night, short faults, noise faults, and
constant faults. The latter HMM is a simple dynamic bayesian network (DBN) which is
characterized by (i) the set of observations (i.e., sensor readings), (ii) the five states, (iii)
the emission probabilities of obtaining a sensor observation given the current state, (iv) the
state transition probabilities, and (v) the initial state probabilities. Due to high variations
in the sensor readings (e.g., as a result of calibration errors), temperature observations
were discretized using bins of size 0.1◦C each. For each sensor observation, the classifier
generates the most likely state that resulted in the current sequence of observations. If a
fault state is encountered, the observation is classified as anomalous. This scheme can both
detect and classify faults according to their types.
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The major disadvantage of Bayesian-based approaches is the complexity involved in
estimating the model parameters (i.e. probabilities) in terms of both processing and com-
munication costs. For example, it takes O(N2T ) to find the transition probabilities for the
HMM based scheme using a forward-backward procedure [100] where N is the number of
states and T is the number of observations. In addition, the stationary version of the naive
Bayes approach in [28] does not scale well as the packet size communicated to the base
station and containing the model parameters (or counters) increases with the increase of the
number of model classes (number of data range intervals).
Neural Net based
Artificial neural networks (neural nets) are desired due to their lower computational cost
compared to other machine learning mechanisms. There has been few proposed anomaly
detection mechanisms for sensor networks which rely on neural nets [15, 117, 129]. A
neural network is a weighted directed graph connecting input vertexes (called neurons) to
output vertexes via a number of vertexes called hidden neurons. To learn the model, back-
propagation is usually used whereby the output of each neuron is computed using the edge
weights and the neurons’ outputs from the previous layer. The result is then multiplied by
a nonlinear activation function.
An Echo State Network (ESN) based online fault detection scheme was proposed
in [15] in which all neurons are interconnected and can have a zero-weighted edges. The
connections and weights of the neurons are generated randomly and do not change, reduc-
ing the learning algorithm to a simple linear regression. Only the output weights change
during training and the activation function used is the hyperbolic tangent. After learning
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the model at the base station (sensor readings are communicated to the sink during train-
ing), the ESN classifier is deployed onto the sensor mote. Anomalies are identified on the
fly if the distance from ESN predictions to the actual sensor readings is larger than a certain
threshold. The main disadvantage of this scheme is that memory usage, detection time, and
detection accuracy do not scale well with the number of neurons. In terms of memory, a
larger ESN model requires larger program memory space to store the weight matrix (O(n2)
where n is the number of neurons) and the activation function. The authors attempted to
reduce the size of the weight matrix by using compressed raw storage which only stores
the 10% non-zero weights and the matrix layout (O(2nz + n + 1) where nz is the number
of neurons with non-zero output weight). They also reduce ROM usage by using a tan-like
activation function which offers a high approximation of the original tanh function. The
same holds for detection speed; a larger number of neurons requires longer time to identify
anomalies (from about 0.5 seconds with 50 neurons to 4 seconds with 400 neurons). The
scheme was able to detect short and noise faults within the LUYF (Life Under Your Feet)
dataset [84] with a lower false positive compared to simple rule-based schemes [112].
Siripanadorn et al [117] proposed an unsupervised neural nets based scheme for de-
tecting faults in sensor network deployments. The scheme employs a Self-Organizing
Map (SOM) as the classifier coupled with Discrete Wavelet Transforms (DWT) to reduce
the amount of communicated sensor readings to half without losing the significant fea-
ture of the data. SOM maps high-dimensional data onto low-dimensional (typically two-
dimensional) discretized representation of the input space which is, in this case, the wavelet
coefficients representing the fault-free data. Similar to Chang el al [15], a new observation
is considered anomalous if the distance between the reading and the predicted output neu-
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ron is greater than a certain threshold. In addition to synthetic datasets, the latter scheme
was tested on three real-world datasets (IBRL, SensorScope, and NAMOS datasets) and
could detect 100%, 83%, and 99% of faults in the three datasets, respectively. As in [15],
this scheme is sensitive to the number of neurons. In addition, the number of training
epochs needs to be carefully chosen.
Ensemble-based
Recently, Curiac and Volosencu [17] have exploited ensemble classifiers in detecting data-
centric anomalies in sensor networks. The proposed mechanism which leverages spatio-
temporal correlations uses 5 different dynamic hypothesis to tackle detection: (i) a simple
average classifier, (ii) an autoregressive linear predictor, (iii) a neural net, (iv) a neural
net autoregressive predictor, and (v) an adaptive Neuro-Fuzzy Inference System (NFIS)
classifier. Each of these classifiers exploits a certain feature (spatial redundancy, temporal
redundancy, spatio-temporal correlation, and recent temporal changes). The final label pre-
diction of the node, to determine if it is either anomalous or normal, is based on a weighted
vote of the five hypothesis. The mechanism was tested using a mixture of simulated data
and data from a real world deployment. Erroneous temperature readings were simulated
by applying heat from a heat lamp or cold air from a mobile air conditioning unit. The en-
semble was able to detect 99.71% of the temperature anomalies. In this mechanism, there
is a good number of threshold values that need to be determined a priori. Moreover, certain
classifiers may impose higher complexity such as neural net and NFIS classifiers. Finally,
classifiers’ weights need to be carefully specified based on simulations and experiments.
Yu et al [141] proposed an intrusion detection system based on SLIPPER; a rule-based
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boosting algorithm. The authors defined some rules for detecting data-centric anomalies.
However, the effectiveness of the proposed IDS was never tested by any means.
Other Approaches
Besides leveraging data mining techniques, other research has explored other mechanisms
to detect data-centric anomalies in sensor networks [9, 36, 63, 106, 113, 139]. Next, we
briefly discuss three of these schemes. For a list of other techniques, the reader is referred
to [143].
Rule-based. In this approach, a set of heuristic rules or constraints is predefined
(learned) based on scientific experience, domain knowledge, and/or analysis of datasets
from existing and earlier deployments [52, 59, 106, 113]. A typical rule will have a thresh-
old parameter to identify faults or anomalies when the data does not satisfy this parameter.
An example of rule-based anomaly detection was presented in [106]. In their work, the
authors defined a set of rules (SHORT, NOISE, BROKEN, BAD BATTERY SENSOR,
and INVALID NLDR) each associated with a threshold parameter for filtration of faults
from normal data. The filtration process was applied over a dataset obtained from a re-
cent deployment which took place in Bangladesh and aimed at measuring the quality of
groundwater in Ganges Delta. During this process, each sensor data tuple was assigned a
bit vector that corresponds to all pre-defined rules (when one rule applies, its corresponding
bit is set). Based on the applied rules, the system assigned an ordered list of human actions
and if several rules applied, the system reported the rule that applied to most tuples from
the same sensor. Similarly, in [113], two major rules are defined: (i) the NOISE rule and;
(ii) the SHORT rule. By using the NOISE rule, a node is assumed to experience a NOISE
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fault if the standard deviation of the sensor readings within a time window is above a cer-
tain threshold and a SHORT fault if the rate of change between two consecutive readings
is above a certain threshold. CONSTANT faults are detected when the standard deviation
is zero. The rules were applied over multiple datasets obtained from four real-world de-
ployments (IBRL, GDI, SensorScope, and a deployment in Lake Fulmor at James Reserve
(NAMOS)) identifying SHORT and NOISE faults with different rates of false positives and
false negatives. Rule-based techniques are simple which makes them suitable for being im-
plemented at the sensor level. However, such mechanisms highly depend on the threshold
parameters. In addition, with some specific rules, other parameters such as the window size
is hard to specify and can only be determined by domain experts.
SSA-based. Yao et al [139] proposed a Segmented Sequence Analysis (SSA) ap-
proach to anomaly detection which leverages spatio-temporal correlations to construct a
piecewise linear model of the sensor data stream. The scheme aligns the latter model with
a reference model and then computes the distance between both models using a similarity
measure. An anomaly is detected if the distance measure is greater than a specified thresh-
old which needs to be carefully determined. This scheme requires humongous amount
of memory (max 2052 KBytes) and takes 5 seconds on average to process about 30,00
samples.
Statistical-based. In [9], a simple and practical statistical-based data-centric
anomaly detection algorithm was presented, whereby each sensor node maintains and pe-
riodically updates a probability distribution of difference between its current reading and
both its previous reading as well as its neighbors’ readings. A reading is flagged as anoma-
lous using a simple significance test in which the current difference is compared to a certain
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threshold (i.e., significance level). The statistical distribution parameters are updated on the
fly, so previous differences are dropped at every new epoch. This reduces the size of infor-
mation stored at the node. Two methods were proposed to update the distribution of dif-
ferences: (i) a parametric approach where differences are well fit by a known distribution
(e.g., Gaussian distribution with mean µ and variance σ2), and (ii) a non parametric ap-
proach using simple frequency histograms. The memory cost of the former method is only
2(k + 1) floating-point numbers where k is the number of neighbors. The non-parametric
method increases the memory usage to m(k + 1) where m is the number of bins in the
histogram. The proposed algorithm was tested over a synthetic dataset as well as a sensor
dataset obtained from an earlier sensor network deployment at the Sevilleta LTER site [24].
It was able to detect measurement faults in the temperature readings with entirely no false
positives. Similar to rule-based and SSA-based techniques, this algorithm requires human
expertise to determine the threshold value. In addition, the time to learn the distribution
model still requires about 9 hours in typical scenarios.
Table 5.1 summarizes the anomaly detection mechanisms discussed in this section. In
the next section, we propose a novel data-centric anomaly detection framework which can
be categorized under ensemble-based schemes. The proposed framework has shown to be
effective in identifying compromised data behaviors and measurement faults in real-world
sensor datasets. It improves the detection accuracy using a popular boosting algorithm
called AdaBoost [35].
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Table 5.1: Anomaly Detection Schemes Discussed in This Section
Scheme Technique Type Operation Test Datasets
Centralized Decentralized GDI IBRL SensorScope NAMOS LUYF Bangladesh Synthetic
Rajasegarar '06 [105]
k-NN
Clustering
Unsupervised
√ √ √
Rajasegarar '10 [103]
Ellipsoidal Clus-
tering
Unsupervised
√ √ √ √
Rajasegarar '07 [102]
Quarter Sphere
SVM
Unsupervised
√ √ √
Elnahrawy '04 [28] Naive Bayes Supervised
√ √ √
Sharma '07 [112] HMM Supervised
√ √ √ √ √ √
Chang '09 [117]
Echo State Net-
works
Supervised
√ √
Siripanadorn '10 [117] SOM-DWT Unsupervised
√ √ √ √
Curiac '12 [46] Ensemble Supervised
√ √
Yu '08 [141] SLIPPER Supervised
√
Ramanathan '06 [106] Rule-based Other
√ √
Sharma '07 [112] Rule-based Other
√ √ √ √ √ √
Yao '10 [139] SSA-based Other
√ √ √
Bettencourt '07 [9] Statistical-based Other
√ √
5.2 Adaboost-Based Centralized Data-Centric Anomaly
Detection in Sensor Networks
In this section, we propose a novel data-centric anomaly detection framework rooted in
machine learning which accurately identifies both measurement faults in real-world sensor
datasets as well as compromise data behaviors. The schemes discussed in the previous
section were not tested against compromised data behaviors which are more likely to oc-
cur in sensor networks deployed in hostile environments. Similar to measurement faults,
compromise data behaviors hinder the fidelity of the collected sensor data. Let us consider
a network of a number of MicaZ motes (see Table 1.1) deployed in an uncontrolled hostile
area. MicaZ motes are accompanied by connectors to a programming board which enables
developers to install the application code before deployment or at site with the help of a
battery-powered laptop. By using inexpensive off-the-shelf equipments such as AVR JTAG
ICE [81], an adversary may attach a laptop to one of the motes [42] and downloads the en-
tire ROM code containing all cryptographic keys within seconds. Once compromised, a
sensor node is reprogrammed to emit forged data to mislead the base station. Therefore,
conventional cryptographic techniques [57,93] become ineffective and additionally impose
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a heavy load on such resource-constrained devices.
The proposed framework, which we call ABANDON, leverages the AdaBoost algo-
rithm [35] as its learning engine. As a supervised learning approach, AdaBoost has the
following advantages: (1) It has a good theoretical basis; (2) The implementation is sim-
ple; (3) The computational complexity is not too high; (4) It rarely suffers from the over-
fitting problem; and (5) It easily utilizes heterogeneous categorical and continuous data
types. AdaBoost has been proven effective in detecting network intrusions in wired net-
works [47] using the KDD Cup 1999 dataset. In the KDD Cup 1999 dataset [20], each
network connection is characterized by several features. Unlike the latter work, we extract
simple statistical features that highly express the anomalous behavior of a sensor node.
Such features have proven to be very effective in identifying a data-centric anomaly.
5.2.1 System Overview and Assumptions
We consider a sensor network model consisting of M sensor nodes deployed in an area of
interest. Sensor nodes report their readings—potentially over multiple hops— to a base sta-
tion. The network may also be structured according to a tiered-architecture [90] whereby
few number of PC-like sensor devices such as Stargate [121] act as masters while the rest of
the nodes are highly resource-constrained. Each master node receives sensor readings from
a number of neighboring nodes and is assumed to be honest. In a real-world deployment,
sensor nodes have multiple sensors that are capable of sensing more than one phenomenon
of interest. We refer to a phenomenon as a sensing modality. We assume that, to achieve
the highest performance, all sensor nodes are spatially and temporally correlated. In other
words, sensing modalities provide close values in space and time. If the latter assump-
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tion holds, all features extracted over the sensing modalities can be used for classification
whereas a sensing modality providing uncorrelated data might not be preferable unless it
is combined with other extracted features. For existing ecological or environmental de-
ployments, this assumption is valid due to two reasons [9]: (i) node-to-node spacing is
usually less than 100-200 meters, and (ii) sensing modalities such as air temperature, rel-
ative humidity, light flux, soil moisture, and soil temperature exhibit a substantial amount
of temporal coherence due to common climate drivers. Furthermore, in a case of a two-tier
architecture, the network is assumed to be densely populated (i.e., higher neighborhood
density). This is essential for obtaining larger training sets at the master nodes to avoid
over-fitting. ABANDON runs on the base station or the master nodes. Every node is char-
acterized by a series of statistical features which are inherently different from the features
used by boosting algorithms when detecting intrusions in a wired network. Figure 5.4 il-
lustrates the two major steps taken before a sensor node is identified as either anomalous or
normal. Like most data mining based frameworks, our proposed framework employs two
major steps: (i) feature extraction, and (ii) classification. During feature extraction, a num-
ber of statistical features are extracted which characterize the nature of the node’s sensor
readings over a certain time window Tp. The feature vector is then fed to the classification
stage where a previously trained AdaBoost ensemble classifier predicts the node’s class as
either anomalous or normal.
5.2.2 Feature Extraction
The success of unsupervised methods in this area [102, 103, 105, 144] inspired us to utilize
statistical features to characterize the behavior of the sensor data. As discussed in previous
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Figure 5.4: Detecting anomalies with ABANDON
chapters, measurement faults exhibit unique data behaviors that deviate from the normal
readings in a certain way. Similarly, compromised nodes send falsified reading in an effort
to mislead the querying node. A naive compromised node may always send falsified data,
whereas some smart compromised nodes can send mixed data containing bogus and correct
values or some values that are slightly deviated from the true value.
Nevertheless, raw data sent by sensor nodes cannot reliably characterize anomalous
data behaviors. Therefore, unsupervised methods use statistical measures or summaries
(such as variance, etc.) over the raw sensor readings to evaluate the quality and trustwor-
thiness of such readings. Hence, we seek a number of features that are highly expressive
of the various types of data-centric anomalies. Ni et al [88] suggested a number of sta-
tistical features that can be utilized for detecting measurement faults. These include rate
of change, spatial distance, mean, variance, temporal correlation, and spatial correlation.
Some of these features have already proven their effectiveness in statistical-based [135] and
rule-based detection techniques [113]. Some of these features may also highly characterize
the nature of a compromised data behavior. Inspired by these facts, we leverage a num-
ber of statistical features in detecting both sensor data faults (e.g., outliers, spikes, stuck-at
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faults, noise faults) as well as compromise data behaviors (naive, smart). Some of these
features are perfect for detecting certain types of data-centric anomalies than the other.
We now explain how features are being extracted. Suppose S = {1, 2, ...,M} is the
set of sensor nodes administered by the base station or one of the master nodes. Within a
certain time window Tp, the master node (or base station) collects L readings of dimension
K from each administered node m ∈ {1, ...,M}. Here, K represents the number of sensing
modalities (M >> K). For each sensing modality k ∈ {1, ..., K}, the master node extracts
a feature vector {f1,k, f2,k, ..., fN,k} over the node’s readings {xl,k : l = 1...L} where
N is the number of desired features. The final feature vector for all sensing modalities
is represented as f = {f1,1, f1,2, ..., f1,K , f2,1, f2,2, ..., f2,K , ..., fN,1, fN,2, ..., fN,K}. Four
types of features may be extracted. The first feature highly characterizes most of the data-
centric anomalies and is calculated as
fn,k =
√
(x1,k − σ)2 + (x2,k − σ)2 + ...+ (xL,k − σ)2
L
(5.3)
where σ =
x1,k+x2,k+...+xL,k
L
. This feature is actually the standard deviation of sensor
readings over Tp for sensing modality k. The standard deviation feature is effective in
identifying naive and smart compromise behaviors as well as certain measurement faults
(e.g., noise faults).
Once again, let us consider for a specific sensing modality k during a fixed time interval
Tp, L readings are collected by the master node from each administered node m. Assuming
that sensor readings are collected every epoch (say 30 seconds), and only those readings
within the time window Tp are considered by the master node during extraction, we can
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compute the absolute deviation of node m among all nodes’ ith readings as
adi,k = |xi,k − µ| (5.4)
and µ =
∑
M (xi,k)
M
. Notice above that sensor nodes are not necessarily synchronized and
some readings may be missing as a result of possible network contentions. If one reading
is missing within the extraction window Tp, it is simply excluded from calculations. Given
all absolute distances for all readings over Tp, we can now compute the second type of
features:
fn,k =
∑L
i=1 adi,k
L
(5.5)
This feature, indeed, captures the spatial correlation between each node’s readings and
the readings of its neighbors. The absolute distance feature may capture compromised data
behaviors that utilize an offset parameter to achieve highly deviated readings from the true
phenomenon but with rather very small and stealthy gradient over time. The spatial distance
to the neighboring nodes can also be utilized to identify events within a small region.
Two other features may be utilized in identifying a certain type of data-centric anoma-
lies. Consider again L sensor readings of sensing modality k collected from node m, the
following equation captures the data range over the extraction window Tp:
fn,k = max[x1,k, x2,k, ..., xL,k]−min[x1,k, x2,k, ..., xL,k] (5.6)
The data range feature, which is simply the difference between the highest and lowest
readings observed during Tp, can be effective in detecting different types of measurement
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Table 5.2: Summary of Extracted Statistical Features
Feature Symbol Correlation Description
Standard Deviation SD Temporal The variance of readings within Tp
Data Range DR Temporal The difference between highest and lowest reading within Tp
Highest Gradient MG Temporal The maximum rate of change between two consecutive readings over Tp
Absolute Distance AD Spatial The absolute deviation of a sensor reading from its neighbor’s readings
faults, events, and malicious data behaviors. Finally, if the master node or the base station
keeps track of the maximum rate of change of a certain sensing modality over one extraction
window, it may detect outliers as well as spike faults in that specific sensing modality.
Notice that the standard deviation, data range, and maximum gradient features capture the
temporal correlation among sensor readings overtime. Table 5.2 lists all four features that
can be utilized by our framework.
5.2.3 Ensemble Classification
Rule-based and statistical-based detection techniques highly depend on the threshold value.
In some cases, it is difficult to determine the optimal threshold. In addition, in a typical
environmental monitoring application, a number of sensing modalities is being measured
and hence imposing different threshold requirements. To avoid adjusting threshold values,
clustering-based detection mechanisms employ a distance measure such as Euclidean or
Mahalanobis distance to identify anomalies. Despite the fact that unsupervised learning
methods do not require any pre-labeling mechanisms, they have their own weaknesses as
we discussed in Section 5.1. Nevertheless, supervised learning based mechanisms usually
achieve higher detection accuracy compared to their unsupervised counterparts provided
a common ground truth. In Chapter 4, we were able to design very highly expressive
anomaly models which serve as the ground truth in this case. Thus, our framework adopts
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a supervised learning algorithm called AdaBoost into detecting data-centric anomalies.
AdaBoost [35] is a machine learning algorithm that can be used in conjunction with
many other learning algorithms to improve their performance. Consider a two-class prob-
lem with the output variable y ∈ {−1, 1}. Given a feature vector f , a classifier G(f)
returns a class prediction of −1 or 1. For U input feature vectors F = f 1, f 2, ..., fU and
the corresponding true classification sequence Y = y1, y2, ..., yU , the error rate over the
entire training sample for this classifier G(f) is
ǫ =
1
U
U
∑
i=1
I(yi 6= G(f i)) (5.7)
and the expected error rate on future predictions is EFY I(Y 6= G(F )). We choose
U feature vectors rather than M to increase the size of the training dataset, and in some
cases to avoid over-fitting (U = λM , where λ is the number of extraction windows). A
classifier is called a weak classifier if its error rate ǫ is slightly better than random guessing.
AdaBoost sequentially applies the weak classification algorithm to repeatedly modified
versions of the data producing a series of weak classifiers Gq(f ), q = 1, 2, ..., Q. The final
prediction is then computed as the weighted majority vote of all weak classifiers:
G(f) = sign
(
Q
∑
q=1
αqGq(f )
)
(5.8)
where α1, α2, ..., αq are computed by AdaBoost according to the following equation
αq = log
(
1− ǫq
ǫq
)
(5.9)
In this work, we use decision stumps as well as decision trees as weak classifiers. De-
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Algorithm 1 AdaBoost.M1
Input: Sequence of U labeled feature vectors (f i, yi), yi ∈ {1,−1}, i = 1, ..., U
Base classifier G(f) (e.g., decision stump, decision tree)
Number of iterations Q
1: Initialize: wi = 1/U, i = 1, 2, ..., U
2: for q = 1 to Q do
3: Call Gq(f) using wi
4: Get back a hypothesis hq : {f
i
1,k, f
i
2,k, ..., f
i
N,K} → yi ∈ [−1, 1], i = 1, 2, ..., U
5: Calculate error ǫq of hq as:
6: ǫq =
∑U
i=1 wiI(yi 6=Gq(fi))∑U
i=1 wi
7: Compute αq =
1
2
ln((1− ǫq)/ǫq)
8: Set wi ← wi.exp[αq.I(yi 6= Gq(fi))], i = 1, 2, ..., U
9: end for
10: Output: G(f) =
[
∑Q
q=1 αqGq(f)
]
cision trees [99] are tree-like graphs where intermediate nodes act as decision points and
branches represent the decision outcome at the branching node. The final prediction ap-
pears at the leaf nodes (i.e., class labels). Decision stumps are one-level decision trees with
one internal node (root) connected directly to the leave nodes. A decision tree or decision
stump algorithm looks at all possible thresholds for a specific feature vector f extracted
over the sensor data of each node, and selects the one with the maximum information (clas-
sification) gain (i.e., the one that best partitions the set of feature vectors f1, f2, ..., fU into
two sets; one with class label y = 1 and the other is labeled with y = −1). AdaBoost
proceeds as in Algorithm 1 [35, 43, 110].
5.2.4 Evaluation
Depending on the type of data-centric anomaly, a feature extractor may choose to extract
different set of features. In case of uncertainty, choosing the entire set of four features will
not influence the classification error since AdaBoost is robust to ‘useless’ features. In this
section, we test the effectiveness of the ABANDON framework in identifying measurement
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faults in the IBRL dataset as well as compromised data behaviors injected in a real-world
testbed of 25 MicaZ motes.
Detecting Anomalies in IBRL dataset
In this experiment, we extract 3 statistical features (SD, DR, and MG) which capture a
number of measurement faults prevalent in the IBRL deployment such as spike faults, out-
liers, stuck-at faults, and noise faults. We will show that such features are adequate to
identify all types of faults in this dataset with entirely no false positives in some cases.
Since light readings in the IBRL dataset did not exhibit a strong spatial correlation (some
motes were potentially located in darker areas than others), we avoided using the spatial
distance feature in detecting faults.
Sharma et al [113] had tested their proposed algorithms using the IBRL dataset as well.
They first tested the effectiveness of enforcing simple rules such as the NOISE rule which
states that “if the standard deviation of the sensor readings over a certain time window is
above a certain threshold, the sensor is assumed to suffer a noise fault”. In [113], noise
faults in the IBRL dataset are those we refer to in Chapter 3 as the combination of spike,
stuck-at, and noise faults that usually appeared at the end of the deployment (i.e., those
caused by low battery). Further, in [113], a basic 2-state Hidden Markov Model (HMM)
based mechanism was used to detect both noise faults and outliers in the temperature read-
ings. Given a sequence of readings, a HMM provides the state that most likely resulted
in the current observation. That being said, if the state associated with a new reading is a
NOISE state, the reading is classified as faulty. In order to use the HMM approach, it is re-
quired to first estimate its parameters. This is achieved during the training phase whereby
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faults are injected into the training dataset. This approach proved to have higher detec-
tion accuracy with lower false positives and false negatives than the other two techniques
discussed in [113] (i.e. rule-based, time-series based).
We evaluated the effectiveness of our approach in detecting sensor data faults prevalent
in the IBRL dataset by first using a portion of the existing faults as ground truth. Then we
injected a number of fault models designed in Chapter 4 to obtain a ground truth highly
representative of the actual faults in the IBRL dataset.
Training With Real Faults. In this experiment, we trained the classifier with real
faults which already existed in the IBRL dataset. We considered a number of time windows
where few nodes exhibit one or more faults. For example, referring back to Figure 2.4, the
one-day time window starting at 4:27 AM in March 8 and the 8-hour window starting at
12:29 PM in March 18 can both be good candidates for training as they cover a good portion
of a spike fault exhibited by nodes 18, 19, and 35, and possibly followed by a stuck at
fault. Recall that both time windows start at the time when the node’s temperature/humidity
sensor obtains a faulty reading due to the low voltage level of the node. For noise faults,
any time window (> 120 epochs) between March 23 and March 26 will be sufficient to
represent a noise fault exhibited by node 6 (refer back to Figure 3.6(b))
After that, we measured the detection accuracy by testing the classifier using a different
subset from the IBRL deployment that potentially contains combinations of spike, stuck-at,
and noise faults. We used 40 time windows of different lengths (30mins − 8hours) and
ran the extraction and classification phases a number of times over the same time window.
At each run, we used different number of statistical features extracted over the time frame
of temperature, humidity and light readings, as well as different number of faulty nodes to
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Figure 5.5: The detection error of the classifier using all three statistical features (highest
gradient, temporal deviation, data range) over all sensing modalities (temperature, humid-
ity, light). False negatives are eliminated at iteration 12. In this specific experimental run,
there were no false positives since the very first iteration.
lead to either the training or the testing sets. For 70% of the time windows, a combination of
only two or three decision stumps was adequate to identify all the spike faults (followed by
a stuck-at fault) and noise faults that have not been explored yet. 30% of the time windows
resulted in higher false positives and false negatives. This is due to the length of the time
window being very small or very large. If the window size is very small, it is not adequate
to cover a spike behavior, while a larger time window covers a portion of the readings
from other nodes that are included in the initial training or testing set of anomalous nodes.
A conclusion which suggests that training a classifier using real-world existing sensor
datasets is tricky and error prone, and relying on injected fault models highly representative
of the sensor data is less sensitive to human errors. Moreover, it is difficult to determine
the optimal length of the time frame where sensor faults may be present. To measure the
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effectiveness of the classifier to identify all types of faults while at the same time requiring
no human intervention in determining which features should be extracted, we extracted all
three statistical features (temporal deviation, highest gradient, and data range) concurrently
over all sensing modalities and fed them to the classification stage. Figure 5.5 plots the
detection accuracy over a few number of iterations during one of the experimental runs.
Combining all features may result in higher detection error. However, in some cases the
number of false positives and false negatives eventually degrades to zero after a few number
of iterations. Using a combination of features extracted over a number of sensing modalities
can capture higher number of faulty behaviors in a real-world sensor dataset and at the same
time can still eliminate false positives (and false negatives) entirely.
As for outliers, we trained the classifier with 3 outlying values from Table 4.1. Not
surprisingly, all other outliers were easily detected with zero false positives using a combi-
nation of two simple decision stumps.
Training With Injected Faults. In this experiment, we injected a number of faults
at different time windows during the beginning of the IBRL deployment. This guarantees
that most nodes are healthy and have not exhibited faults due to a low battery. Before
injecting faults, however, the list of few known outliers in Table 4.1 was first filtered out
especially if the outliers lie within the injection window. This ensures that only the injected
faults are present in the training dataset, and hence improving our confidence in the ob-
tained ground truth. The injection model was designed as follows. The first 400 epochs
(200 minutes) were allocated for outliers. We randomly injected 10 outliers into the tem-
perature and humidity readings of 3 nodes. After that, we used the same nodes to inject
spike faults followed by stuck-at faults into a window of 3500 epochs of the node’s tem-
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perature and humidity readings. Finally, we proceeded with only one node and injected a
noise fault into its temperature readings over a duration of 800 epochs.
Training was conducted in a similar manner as with real faults, specifying different
lengths of the time window for each run. During the testing phase, we chose time frames
where real outliers are present in the IBRL dataset. As expected, all outliers in Table 4.1
where easily detected using a combination of only two simple decision stumps. After that,
we tested the classifier over time windows containing spike behaviors (potentially followed
by stuck at behaviors as well as noise faults). Once again, such faults were detected using
a combination of few decision stumps and depending on the window length, false positives
varied from 0.0208 to entirely no false positives. For smaller window sizes (< 4 hours),
the ratio of false negative was higher than that of the false positive (< 0.0417). Both ratios,
however, maintained steady after a number of AdaBoost iterations. Finally, we achieved
similar error ratios as in Figure 5.5 when using all statistical features combined to detect
faults within the temperature and humidity readings. The errors might fluctuate differently
over the first few number of iterations. However, both false positives and false negatives
eventually decreased to zero. This shows that the anomaly models well represented the
true behavior of real-world anomalies and hence resulted in a solid reference ground truth.
That is said, automatic injection of anomalies according to the models designed in the
previous section eliminated any human errors and tedious work associated with manual
visual inspections.
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Figure 5.6: The first two hours of training data during the experimental deployment. The
black lines correspond to readings from normal nodes.
Table 5.3: Compromise Data Behaviors (Training Phase)
Node ID Sensing Modalities Deviation Anomaly Type
8 light, acoustic σ = {20, 30} naive
12 temp, light, acoustic σ = {30, 30, 30} smart
17 temp, light, acoustic σ = {10, 10, 10} naive
20 temperature σ = 15 smart
Detecting Compromise Data Behaviors
In addition to measurement faults, we also tested the effectiveness of the proposed frame-
work in detecting compromised nodes. We designed an experimental testbed consist-
ing of 25 MicaZ motes with different kinds of uncalibrated sensor boards (MTS300 and
MTS310). The network was deployed in a 5 × 5 grid and employed a multi-hop routing
protocol whereby most sensor motes communicate their sensor readings every 30 seconds
to the base station over multiple hops. Hence, learning is performed at the base station.
The sensor motes collected room temperature, light intensity, and acoustic signals. Since
no calibration was performed, there was a significant amount of drift in the sensor readings.
The experiment consisted of two phases, the training phase and the testing phase. During
the training phase, 84% of the nodes were programmed to behave normally, whereas the
code of the rest was modified to simulate behaviors of compromised nodes. Table 5.3 lists
the compromise parameters during the training phase while Figure 5.6 plots such behaviors
122
 540
 545
 550
 555
 560
 565
 570
 575
 580
03:00 03:15 03:30 03:45 04:00 04:15 04:30 04:45 05:00
T
em
pe
ra
tu
re
 (
E
ng
 U
ni
t)
Time
node 1
node 5
node 10
node 17
(a) Temperature
 600
 620
 640
 660
 680
 700
 720
 740
 760
 780
03:00 03:15 03:30 03:45 04:00 04:15 04:30 04:45 05:00
L
ig
ht
 I
nt
en
si
ty
 (
E
ng
 U
ni
t)
Time
node 1
node 5
node 10
node 17
(b) Light
380
400
420
440
460
480
500
520
03:00 03:15 03:30 03:45 04:00 04:15 04:30 04:45 05:00
A
co
u
st
ic
(E
n
g
U
n
it
)
Time
node 1
node 5
node 10
node 17
True Outlier
(c) Acoustic
Figure 5.7: The first two hours of testing data during the experimental deployment. Acous-
tic signals exhibited one outlier reading over the 2-hour period (at 3:50 am).
Table 5.4: Compromise Data Behaviors (Testing Phase)
Node ID Sensing Modalities Deviation Anomaly Type
1 light, acoustic σ = {10, 15} naive
5 light, acoustic σ = {30, 30} smart
10 temp, light, acoustic σ = {10, 8, 10} naive
17 temp σ = 15 smart
over the first two hours of the experiment. Notice the high variations in the light readings
among the nodes. Despite our efforts to achieve high spatial correlation within the light
fluxes, the sensors were exposed to slightly different levels of light coming from the ceiling
lambs in the lab. To this end, temporal variations were more effective in classifying nodes
and adding the absolute distance to neighboring nodes did not increase the classification er-
ror after all. Nevertheless, the ensemble classifier was able to leverage spatial correlations
among the temperature and acoustic readings as well as temporal coherences of the three
sensing modalities.
During the testing phase, we maintained the same percentage of compromised nodes.
However, we selected other nodes to be compromised and varied their compromised be-
haviors randomly based on the affected sensing modalities, the degree of deviation, and the
compromise category (naive vs smart, see Table 5.4). Figure 5.7 plots the sensor readings
of the misbehaving nodes as well as sensor readings from the rest of the network. Notice
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the true outlier in the acoustic data. We did not filter out this single outlier and hence it ac-
counted for the higher rate of false positives when acoustic features were extracted over the
period within which it was present. Moreover, in order to diversify the compromise behav-
iors, two nodes where intentionally selected to inject falsified readings of a unidirectional
behavior using a varying noise (node 12 during training and node 5 during testing).
We ran the experiment several days and extracted several testing sets. We then fed
the sets into the classification stage and calculated the error rates. Here, we considered
the first two hours of both the training and testing experiments (Figures 5.6 and 5.7). We
varied both the length of the extraction window Tp and the number of extraction windows
λ and extracted two features (SD and AD) over the three sensing modalities. We also
considered a simple decision stump and a decision tree as the base classifier (i.e., weak
learner). Figure 5.8(a) illustrates the accuracy of the ensemble classifier after 100 iterations
using decision stumps as base classifiers. The learner always achieves the highest accuracy
with different values of λ when Tp is set to 10 minutes. The degradation in accuracy at
higher values of λ owes to the acoustic outlier present in the testing set since increasing λ
may reach a point where one extraction window would cover the outlier. The false positive
rate when λ = 5 is 0.008 which is the proportion of single outlier to a set of extracted 125
samples (feature vectors). Figure 5.8(b) shows the total rate of false positives and false
negatives for this particular run when the extraction window was set to 10 minutes. Finally,
the classification accuracy decreases for Tp larger than 10 minutes. In addition, over larger
Tp, the number of extraction windows λ should be set large enough to avoid over-fitting.
Figure 5.9 shows an instance where over-fitting may take place (when λ is set too small
while the length of the extraction window is large (25, and 30 minutes). To avoid over-
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Figure 5.8: Accuracy of the ensemble classifier after 100 iterations using decision stump
as the base classifier.
fitting, one could also set the number of iterations to a small number limiting the ensemble
from over-training itself [98]. Cross validation can also be used to determine the best
number of iteration automatically [35]. In our experiment, four iterations were adequate
to maintain a test error of 4% for all Tp periods. This also reduces the computational
complexity of the classifier.
To further improve the accuracy of the classifier for larger Tp, we chose decision trees
as the base classifiers. Figure 5.10(a) plots the classification accuracy in this case. Using
decision trees can reduce the classification error or totally eliminate it at the cost of in-
creased complexity. For example, comparing the classification accuracy in the latter figure
when Tp is set to 15 minutes to those shown in Figure 5.8(a), one can notice that the clas-
sification error improves by a factor of 5 when λ is set to 4 while setting λ to 2, 3, or 6
eliminates the classification error which was introduced when using decision stumps as the
base classifier. Using trees as weak classifiers also avoided the over-fitting cases that where
introduced when using decision stumps with higher values of Tp (see Figure 5.10(b)).
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Figure 5.9: Classification accuracy at 100 iterations. The learning process suffers from
over-fitting for larger Tp when λ is set too small.
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Figure 5.10: Accuracy of the ensemble classifier after 100 iterations using decision trees as
base classifiers.
As a final evaluation, we compare AdaBoost (using decision stumps as the base classi-
fiers) with two variants of a Support Vector Machine (SVM) classifier: (i) the max ‘soft’
margin linear discriminant classifier which performs better in cases were extracted features
are linearly inseparable (SVM SOFT); and (ii) the dual form of the former (SVM DUAL).
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SVM classifiers are another type of supervised machine learning algorithms that have a
strong theoretical basis as we discussed in Section 5.1. Table 5.5 lists the test errors of the
evaluated classifiers. The first three classifiers incorporate both the SD and AD features
whereas AdaBoost1 only uses the temporal standard deviation (SD) feature.
Table 5.5: Test Errors of The Evaluated Classifiers
Tp(minutes)
5 10 15 20 25
SVM SOFT 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.06
SVM DUAL 0.06 0.08 0.11 0.05 0.06
AdaBoost2 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.08 0.07
AdaBoost1 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.04 Overfit
From the table, we can see that AdaBoost results in a higher detection accuracy com-
pared to SVM in cases where the extraction window is small, whereas, both versions of
SVM perform better than AdaBoost for larger Tp most of the times. This is because these
SVM versions are designed for linearly inseparable data and as Tp increases there is more
chance that an anomalous behavior taking place earlier matches that of the current phenom-
ena since sensing modalities (e.g. temperature) may vary overtime. Also notice that using
an additional feature may improve the accuracy of the AdaBoost classifier but not neces-
sarily. This depends on Tp, the phenomena being sensed, and the anomalous behaviors
being monitored. In our experiment, it helps to extract spatial distance features as com-
promised nodes emit readings that are deviated from the readings of normal nodes (either
intermittently or at all times).
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5.3 Summary
In this chapter, we first surveyed a number of data-centric anomaly detection schemes
which have their roots in machine learning and data mining. We also explored few alter-
native approaches to the problem of identifying data-centric anomalies in sensor networks.
After presenting the pros and cons of each of these schemes, we proposed a novel data-
centric anomaly detection framework which leverages boosting techniques as its learning
engine. The proposed framework has proven effective in detecting different types of data-
centric anomalies. It accurately identified measurement faults within the IRBL dataset with
no false positives in most cases. We also ran a real-world experimental deployment at our
lab and used the proposed approach to detect compromise data behaviors. It was shown that
classification accuracy improves when using a short extraction periods (10 minutes). Fur-
thermore, using decision trees as base classifiers may improve the accuracy of the ensemble
for larger windows.
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Chapter 6
Practical Online Data-Centric aNomaly
Detection (POND)
The ABANDON algorithm proposed in the previous chapter runs at the base station or at
the Stargate-like master nodes in a multi-tier sensornet deployment. A tremendous amount
of effort is required to allow such algorithm to run at the sensor level. Designing such
a system brings with it a new set of challenges. First, sensor motes are highly resource-
constrained. A PC-class memory storage is far from being possibly installed at these motes.
In addition, powerful micro-controllers that drive robots and other embedded devices still
incur a high cost and are not preferable as drivers for sensor motes; the original vision of a
sensor network deployment constitutes a large number of low-cost sensor devices to mea-
sure their environment with the least cost possible. And on top of all, ’energy’ is scarce.
Communicating a large number of unnecessary packets, performing CPU-exhaustive op-
erations, and writing on an external flash is overly avoided in most sensornet protocols.
Second, low-cost sensor motes usually run light weight operating systems that have their
own set of limitations and are programmed using a compressed version of a typical pro-
gramming language where not all functionalities are supported. To this end, we propose
a practical online data-centric anomaly detection (POND) framework that employs light-
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weight, accurate, and rapid detection scheme at every sensor node in a sensornet deploy-
ment.
This chapter is organized as follows. In the following section, we present the main mo-
tivations behind designing a generalized online data-centric anomaly detection framework
for sensor network deployments. Section 6.2 describes an overview of our POND frame-
work and lists realistic assumptions. Section 6.3 discusses the details of each functional
block in the POND framework. Section 6.4 elaborates on few implementation aspects. We
evaluate the framework in section 6.5 through simulations and a real-world in-door ex-
perimental deployment. Simulations enabled us to carry out evaluation on a bigger scale
in an effort to measure the effectiveness of our framework when employed in large-scale
sensor network deployments, whereas a smaller scale real-world deployment showed the
applicability and practicality of the proposed framework to function in real-world. In the
same section, we present our developed SNMiner toolkit which offers a great amount of
functionality for running our experiments. Section 6.6 explains limitations and possible
evasions to our framework. Finally, we give a general discussion and present some future
work in Section 6.7, and conclude in Section 6.9.
6.1 Motivations
Let us consider a hybrid event-driven query application where nodes only report their sen-
sor readings upon detecting a specific event (e.g., once detecting a particular situation about
fire-alert from humidity readings, sensor nodes periodically report humidity and wind data
in order to closely measure the possibility of a fire [91]). In the latter application, a detec-
tion mechanism should be employed to first detect the desired event and later on, during
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sensor data collection, identify and possibly filter out measurement faults which may lead
to falsified conclusions. As another example, consider a query-based sensornet applica-
tion deployed in a hostile environment. In this type of applications, it is important to
achieve precise and sensitive interpretations about the monitored region. In an effort to
mislead interpretations over the collected data, an adversary may inject falsified readings
into the network. At the same time, sensor nodes may suffer from connection failures or
low battery level that could lead to anomalous behaviors different from those compromised
ones. Hence, in this type of applications, the detection mechanism should be capable of
identifying and possibly filtering out both types of anomalous behaviors towards protect-
ing the quality and trustworthiness of the collected sensor data. VigilNet [44] serves as
a perfect example of a hybrid application. In VigilNet, 70 sensor nodes work together to
detect an intruding vehicle (event). To accurately estimate the speed and location of an
intruder, faulty readings should be filtered out by fusing (i.e., aggregating) readings from
a number of adjacent nodes. Due to the nature of the VigilNet application, sensor nodes
are also vulnerable to being compromised. Hence, an anomaly detection scheme should
be able to identify malicious data behaviors, measurement faults, as well as events of in-
terest. Some of the existing approaches are efficient in detecting measurement faults but
may not necessarily apply to events or malicious data behaviors of potentially different
characteristics. If a node is running its own detector as in [103] and [28], a compromised
node will not be detected as adversary can entirely manipulate the detector’s code. In addi-
tion, most of the recently proposed schemes [103, 105, 113] rely on datasets obtained from
an earlier sensornet deployment and have not been employed in a real-world deployment
(i.e., their applicability in real world sensor network deployments is not clear). Usually
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Figure 6.1: A sensor network deployment leveraging a collection tree-like protocol such as
CTP [37]
deployments form a tree topology similar to the topology view of Figure 6.1 and apply a
number of collection (e.g. CTP [37], MultihopLQI [97]) and configuration dissemination
(e.g., DRIP [125]) protocols. Therefore, an online anomaly detection mechanism should
run alongside these protocols without disrupting the normal operation of the sensornet. In
this chapter, we propose an online practical anomaly detection framework to identify data-
centric anomalies in sensornet deployments. Our framework may run alongside sensor
data collection and is tunable to accommodate different sensornet applications. The frame-
work enables application administrators to train a network of deployed sensors, instructs
the nodes to extract on-line statistical features, and leads every node in the network to carry
out the classification.
Atop challenges faced by wireless networks, a sensor network mainly imposes two ad-
ditional resource constraints: memory and battery constraints. Our framework uses on-line
feature extraction whereby statistical features are being extracted on the fly overcoming the
need to maintain a list of the sampled data points over the extraction window. In addition
to memory constraints, energy is the most precious resource perhaps in every sensornet
132
deployment and the major abuser of the energy resource is communication. Therefore,
our anomaly detection framework also attempts to minimize the amount of communication
by only communicating the statistical summaries at the initial deployment (i.e., during the
training phase) and later on, if the sensornet is being deployed in a hostile environment,
may communicate these summaries between the child nodes and their parents. If a sensor
node is designed to hold an external flash of an adequate size, writing on flash memory is
still very expensive in terms of power consumption and is avoided during feature extrac-
tion. In addition, the latter process is conducted in a way whereby nodes sample sensor
readings faster than the reporting frequency. Hence, POND is capable of rapidly and accu-
rately identifying data-centric anomalies in existing sensor network deployments “on the
fly” while reducing memory and communication overhead.
6.2 System Overview and Assumptions
We consider a sensor network deployment consisting of M sensor nodes and each node can
observe A sensing modalities. The proposed framework aims at environmental monitoring
applications where motes sense basic phenomena (e.g. temperature, humidity, light inten-
sity, etc.). While more complex phenomena can be considered, the advantage of the high
detection speed offered by the POND framework is lost. This is due to the high energy in-
volved when sampling complex sensors such as seismic and image sensors [101]. If by any
means sampling the sensors faster than the reporting frequency incurs a high non-negligible
energy cost, feature extraction can be performed over the sensor readings obtained at the
original reporting frequency. The latter modification leads to reporting only one legitimate
packet over a significantly larger extraction window (i.e., the last packet). This, however,
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should not be an issue since sensor readings are assumed to be spatially and temporally
correlated, and reporting one packet that summarizes the sensed phenomena over the ex-
traction window can be adequate. The network employs a multi-hop tree-like collection
protocol such as CTP. Furthermore, our mechanism aims at but not limited to large deploy-
ments [82] since nodes in densely populated areas are more likely to be correlated in space
and time. Given a large number of sensor nodes, the global correlation assumption can also
be relaxed by using a clustering technique to merely group the correlated sensors in dif-
ferent clusters and apply the anomaly detection within each cluster. Figure 6.2 shows two
main phases that constitute the POND framework; the training/re-training phase and the ac-
tual on-line detection phase. During the training phase, anomalous data behaviors of a set
of selected misbehaving nodes are first injected into the sensor network. A node’s behavior
can be characterized by different parameters depending on the desired anomalous behav-
iors to be learned. Every node periodically extracts a statistical feature vector describing its
sensed data and communicates it up the tree leveraging the same tree structure used for data
collection. Upon receiving the set of all feature vectors from all nodes in the network, the
base station runs a number of classification algorithms to obtain the best detector and then
disseminates the resulting detector code down the tree to reach every sensor node in the
network. During the online detection phase, each node continues to incrementally extract
a feature vector. Based on the application in hand, a sensor node will discard anomalous
readings if the sensornet is deployed for monitoring applications, sends an alarm signal to
the base station in case of an event in event-driven applications, or communicates its feature
vector up the tree if the sensornet was deployed in a hostile environment.
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Figure 6.2: Block diagram of the proposed online data-centric anomaly detection frame-
work for sensor network deployments
6.3 The POND Framework
In this section, we detail the description of each functional block in the training and online
detection phases of the POND framework.
6.3.1 Misbehavior Injection
At the base station, every node is labeled as either anomalous or normal node and then a
number of anomalous behaviors is injected into the network. This can be done in two ways:
off-line at the gateway node or in-network. While monitoring the sensor network, the end
user may inject the desired anomalous behavior into the sensor stream of an anomalous
node upon receiving its readings at the gateway node. This simple approach does not add
any extra overhead to the deployed network as all the tedious work is done on the PC side
(i.e., off-line). However, since sensor readings are usually reported at a low frequency, this
slows down the training time. A better alternative is to instruct all nodes in the network to
sample their readings faster than the reporting frequency as we will discuss later (e.g., 10
times faster). However, by doing this, communicating these samples will add a noticeable
135
overhead. Off-line injection is adequate if feature extraction is performed entirely at the
gateway node. For a more realistic scenario and to enable on-line feature extraction dur-
ing the training phase, we may need to deliver the anomaly models in-network. There are
several ways to achieve in-network delivery or anomaly models. One could think of using
a point-to-point routing protocol such as AODV or Dymo to deliver single anomaly mod-
els to individual nodes. From a practicality point of view and as we use TinyOS-powered
devices for evaluation, we wish to leverage existing implementations of network protocols.
There are several implementations of AODV in TinyOS, and Tymo is the TinyOS imple-
mentation of Dymo that we can use. Like every reactive routing protocol, Dymo floods
the network with route requests to discover the desired route to the anomalous node and
requires each node to maintain a routing structure. A second way is to rely on the link
estimates and parent information in CTP to construct a global view of the tree topology
off-line. Then, one can generate a reverse path to the intended node by creating a source-
routing like packet. Source routing was also implemented in the newer versions of TinyOS
and can be utilized for this purpose. Using this approach, the packet size increases with the
increase of the depth of the tree. A third way is to leverage the tree structure of Koala and
sending anomaly models hop-by-hop down the tree to reach the individual nodes. Koala,
however, requires logging of sensor readings to flash memory and is not the de facto stan-
dard for TinyOS-powered sensornet applications. One last approach is to disseminate the
anomaly models to the entire network and those nodes that are labeled as anomalous set
their local data model correspondingly. A number of configuration dissemination protocols
are already being used in existing deployments (e.g. DRIP, DIP [72]). Upon receiving the
list, a node marks itself as anomalous only if its id is in the list and accepts the behavioral
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Table 6.1: A Summary of Anomaly Models
Anomaly Type Mapping function (φ)
Outlier φ = ck where ck ∈ Ck
Spike
φ = θ(β0,k + β1,kqk + β2,kq
2
k + ... + βr,kq
r
k),
qk = (pk − n), θ() is a rounding function
Clipping φ = ck where ck ∈ {c1, c2}k
Compromise
φ = xp,k ± σp,k where σp,k is the variance of
a white Gaussian noise with zero mean
Event φ = ok + xp,k ± σp,k where ok is the data offset
parameters assigned to it. Each of the four approaches discussed imposes an extra over-
head. The choice among the four approaches depends on the anomaly type and space. In
general, source routing, although not scalable, is suitable for injecting single fault models
into a small number of nodes, whereas it imposes less overhead to disseminate the anoma-
lous behaviors if the number of anomalous nodes is large (e.g., 35% compromised nodes).
As discussed in Chapter 4, each type of anomalies may require different model param-
eters and mapping function expressed by Equation 4.1. Table 6.1 summaries the anomaly
models discussed in Chapter 4, some of which will be used in the evaluation section. In
the evaluation section, we inject a combination of measurement faults, compromise data
behaviors, and events to measure the effectiveness of our framework in detecting various
co-existing anomalies.
6.3.2 On-line Feature Extraction
After the anomaly injection phase, every node periodically extracts a statistical feature vec-
tor describing its sensed data every extraction window Tp. Each sensor node periodically
obtains a new sample of its sensing modalities every Ts (Tp = β × Ts, where β usually
ranges between 5 and 10 to avoid high sampling overhead, we will show the effect of
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such value on the overall energy cost in section 6.5) and incrementally computes a statis-
tical summary f = {f1,1, f1,2, ..., f1,K , f2,1, f2,2, ..., f2,K , ..., fN,1, fN,2, ..., fN,K}, where N
is the number of desired statistical features and K ⊂ A is the number of desired sensing
modalities. Ni et al [88] have suggested several important statistical data features that can
be effective in detecting a fault such as the rate of change, spatial distance, mean, vari-
ance, temporal correlation, and spatial correlation. These can also be effective in case of an
event or a malicious data behavior. In this work, temporal features such as highest gradient
or incremental variance are extracted by performing time-series incremental analysis over
the sensor stream whereas spatial features such as distance require information about the
node’s neighborhood prior to extraction. For each sensor node to determine the set of de-
sired features, a bit vector may be disseminated over the network during the injection phase
or hard-coded in the node’s code image. The following discusses the set of online features
which we proved to be effective in detecting anomalies as well as other features that may
be utilized in some cases.
Temporal Deviation
To incrementally compute the standard deviation feature n of the sensing modality k, each
sensor node keeps track of three values [2]: (i) the number of readings L over the extraction
window Tp; (ii) the sum of readings
∑
xl,k where {xl,k : l = 1...L} are the sensor readings
of modality k; and (iii) the square sum of readings
∑
(xl,k)
2. The following equation is
then used to calculate the standard deviation feature n for each modality k:
fn,k =
√
∑
(xl,k)2 −
(
∑
xl,k)2
L
L− 1
(6.1)
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(a) Training phase. Only the summary is sent every extraction window
(b) Detection phase. A reading will be suppressed if it is anomalous
(c) In case of a node compromise, the sensor reading is sent along with the summary
Figure 6.3: Online feature extraction and collection (β = 10, λ = 2)
The temporal deviation feature is effective in identifying naive and smart compromise
behaviors as well as certain measurement faults (e.g., noise faults).
Highest Gradient
This feature is utilized to identify outliers and spike faults. It keeps track of the maximum
rate of change over one extraction window. In this case, we only need to maintain two
values; the highest (max) rate of change and the sensor reading from the previous epoch or
sample xl−1,k. The incremental feature extraction of the highest gradient feature n for each
modality k proceeds as in Algorithm 2. The highest gradient feature may also be effective
in identifying events.
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Algorithm 2 Highest Gradient Feature Extraction
1: fn,k = x2,k − x1,k
2: for all {xl,k : l = 3...L} in Tp do
3: if |xl,k − xl−1,k| > fn,k then
4: fn,k = |xl,k − xl−1,k|
5: end if
6: end for
Algorithm 3 Data Range Feature Extraction
1: max = min = x1,k
2: for all {xl,k : l = 2..L} in Tp do
3: if xl,k > max then
4: max = xl,k
5: else
6: if xl,k < min then
7: min = xl,k
8: end if
9: end if
10: end for
11: fn,k = max−min
Data Range
Data range is an effective feature which captures the difference between the highest and
lowest readings within Tp. It can be incrementally calculated using the psuedocode of
Algorithm 3. The data range feature can be effective in detecting different types of mea-
surement faults, events, and malicious data behaviors.
Neighborhood Distance
The spatial distance to the neighboring nodes can be utilized to identify events within a
small region as well as compromise data behaviors. It captures the spatial correlation be-
tween each node’s readings and the readings of its neighbors. To compute such feature
off-line, the base station is required to know the global view of the network. Fortunately, a
CTP data packet contains the parent and link quality information within its header. There-
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fore, we can utilize such information to build the tree topology view of the network. We
may then estimate the closest c neighbors from every sensor node and use their readings at
a time instance (or small time window) to find the distance between the sensor node’s read-
ing and the average reading of its neighbors. To obtain the sensor readings at the time of
training, a node may append the average of its readings over the extraction window within
the payload of the feature vector. At the sensor level, during the actual online detection
phase, neighborhood readings can be obtained by snooping on the data traffic within the
node’s vicinity. Usually, the extra energy spent during snooping is negligible. The av-
erage of the neighborhood readings can be incrementally computed without the need to
save the actual readings from the neighbors. At the end of the extraction window, a node
then computes its neighborhood distance feature by simply taking the difference from its
own incremental average of Tp to the incremental neighborhood average. This feature is
effective in detecting events.
Other Features
Temporal deviation, highest gradient, and data range features can all be good indications
of a CONSTANT fault. All three features combined can be used to detect a CONSTANT
fault since the value of all three features will be zero over the extraction window Tp. An
alternative to the latter feature combination is a feature that is set to a high value if any of
the latter three statistics computed over one extraction window sums to zero. Moreover,
there are several other features that can be utilized. However, they may not be as effective
as the latter features in detecting anomalies (i.e., may not improve on the classifier’s ac-
curacy). Examples include temporal autocorrelation, simple moving average (SMA) over
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Tp, moving average of the voltage level, and the CUmulative SUM (CUSUM) for change
detection.
6.3.3 Feature Collection
If we denote the data reporting frequency as Tc, then Tc = λ×Tp. λ represents the number
of contiguous extraction windows. Usually the reporting frequency is about 5-30 minutes
in environmental monitoring applications. In order to leverage the same tree structure used
for data collection during the training phase, every node sends its extracted feature vector
up the tree every λ. To avoid collision with other feature vectors from the sibling nodes,
a node waits a random back-off (few milliseconds) before sending its feature vector at the
end of every extraction window. Figure 6.3(a) shows a scenario where λ = 2 and β = 10.
Recall that β is the number of readings being sampled during the extraction window Tp.
The number of feature vectors necessary to construct a classifier at the base station can
vary. To reduce communication overhead and to rapidly re-train a new detector (e.g., an
application administrator decides to incorporate new events), setting λ to 2 or 4 may still
generate a predictor with very low false positives as we saw in Chapter 5. It can also be
set higher than that merely for performing cross validation on a larger set of feature vectors
and/or avoiding over-fitting. In the evaluation section, setting λ to one was adequate to
achieve zero false positives in some cases with no instances of over-fitting.
6.3.4 Filtering Noise
Recall that labels are known by the application administrator whenever retraining is to be
initiated. During retraining, existing anomalous behaviors (faults, events, or known mali-
cious data behaviors) will be filtered out at the base station by the off-line detector learned
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previously (it is a copy of the same detector running on each node after dissemination as we
will discuss later in this section). Recall that during the training phase, sensor nodes com-
municate feature vectors describing their data. If sensor node i is sampling faulty readings,
the offline detector will filter all readings from node i regardless of its pre-assumed label.
Filtering noisy data enables the base station to generate a more accurate classifier. During
training at the initial deployment, however, the noise filter is disabled since no detector will
yet be learned. Hence, we assume that during the initial deployment all sensor nodes are
benign or normal. Otherwise, we may need to use a classification algorithm that considers
noise within the training dataset such as RobustBoost.
6.3.5 Classification
Upon receiving the statistical summaries from all sensor nodes, the base station evaluates
a number of supervised machine learning algorithms and chooses the algorithm that gives
the best trade-off between complexity and accuracy (i.e., small false positives and false
negatives). For rapidly detecting compromise data behaviors within a small Tp, we have
proven in Chapter 5 that boosting algorithms (we used AdaBoost) are superior to other clas-
sification algorithms such as Support Vector Machines (SVMs) and simple decision trees.
AdaBoost can also be effective in classifying other data-centric anomalies as well (e.g.,
measurement faults). It essentially generates a final hypothesis that is a linear combina-
tion of weak classifiers whose error rates are slightly better than random guessing. Several
classification algorithms can serve as the base classifier. A simple decision stump, which
chooses the feature that has the maximum information gain first, is desirable due to its low
complexity. To further reduce the complexity associated with boosting and to generate an
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easier-to-interpret ensemble classifiers, we use an alternating decision tree (ADTree) [34].
Algorithm 4 shows the steps necessary to generate an ADTree classifier that is a gener-
alization of voted decision stumps. W+(d) and W−(d) represent the total weights of the
positive and negative examples, respectively, which satisfy condition d. α is a smoothing
factor used to avoid zero frequency problems [94]. Each rule r in the tree consists of a con-
dition d, a precondition, and two predictions a and b. The first rule r0 always holds (i.e., d
is always true) and thus has only one prediction value aroot. Notice that, in the case of de-
cision stumps, all rules in the final rule set R have preconditions that will evaluate to true.
Also, note that a rule in a consecutive iteration is very likely to have a similar condition as
that of a rule obtained in previous iterations (lines 11-15). In this case, only the predictions
of the existing rule will be updated using the new rule’s prediction values. This avoids the
burden of choosing the optimal value of Q (number of iterations). Choosing this value has
been an open research problem and sometimes the best values is determined through cross
validation [34]. In the evaluation section, we loosely choose 300 iterations as the value of
Q and still obtain very low complex ADTree classifiers without overfitting.
6.3.6 Classifier Dissemination
Over The Air (OTA) programming is often used in sensornet deployments to reprogram
the sensor nodes without physically attaching each node to a programming board. This is
essential in large scale deployments of unattended sensors for two reasons: (i) convenience
(no physical human presence is needed); and (ii) due to the difficulty of accessing the
deployed nodes in some regions. OTA programming protocols such as Deluge [49] can be
used to disseminate the new code image containing the predictor (e.g., ADTree), which is
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Algorithm 4 ADTree with decision stump as base classifier
Input: Labeled vectors (f i, yi), yi ∈ {1,−1}, i = 1, ..., U
Number of iterations Q
1: Initialize: ǫ = 0.05, wi,0 = 1, i = 1, 2, ..., U
α = ǫ+
∑
wi,0
aroot =
1
2
ln
(
W+(true)+α
W−(true)+α
)
Add rule r0 with condition true and prediction aroot to a final set of rules R
2: Pre-adjust: wi,1 = wi,0e
−ayi
α = ǫ+
∑
wi,1
3: for q = 1 to Q do
4: Generate the set D = (fn,k < θ) using wi,q
5: for all di ∈ D do
6: Zq = 2
(
√
W+(di)W−(di) +
√
W+(¬di)W−(¬di)
)
7: end for
8: Select dq that minimizes Zq
9: Calculate predictions of rq:
10: a = 1
2
ln
(
W+(dq)+α
W−(dq)+α
)
, b = 1
2
ln
(
W+(¬dq)+α
W−(¬dq)+α
)
11: if (rq with a similar condition dq is in R) then
12: Add its predictions to existing rule’s predictions
13: else
14: Add rq to R along with its new predictions
15: end if
16: wi,q+1 ← wi,qe
−rq(f i)yi
17: α = ǫ+
∑
wi,q+1
18: end for
19: Output: class(f ) = sign (
∑
ri(f))
the output of the classification phase. Since Deluge is inherently reliable, each node will
receive a copy of the modified image and reboots itself. The modified code may reset the
behaviors of those nodes that were selected as anomalous nodes during the misbehavior
injection phase to normal.
6.3.7 On-line Detection
When a node receives the predictor, it transforms itself to the detection phase and stays
in that phase until instructed by the base station otherwise. A node continues to extract a
feature vector every Tp and feeds it to the predictor. The predictor may produce both false
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positives and false negatives if new types of unlearned anomalous behaviors were present
in the sensornet deployment (e.g. an unknown event, a new type of un-modeled fault, or a
different undetected malicious data behavior). A false positive is a node that is classified as
anomalous but in fact is a normal node. Since applications such as environmental monitor-
ing rely on the fact that sensor readings are temporally and spatially correlated, missing few
values from sensor motes producing the false positives does not harm the fidelity of the data
and application administrators or data analysts may draw similar conclusions regardless of
the missing readings (i.e. a very low false positive rate is acceptable). On the contrary, false
negatives are those anomalous nodes that are misclassified as normal. If collected sensor
data are visualized at the base station, application administrators can visually inspect the
small number of false negatives, model the new behavior, and re-launch the training phase.
Notice that the detector drops a packet if any of the sensing modalities exhibit an
anomalous behavior. For instance, if the sensor node incurs an outlier in its temperature
readings, the other legitimate light and acoustic readings at the time of the outlier detection
are wasted. We understand that this is valuable information and should not be dropped.
However, similar to false positives, we believe that the few number of omitted light and
acoustic readings are well substituted by other spatially correlated readings from its neigh-
boring nodes. A sensor node may proceed depending on the type of anomaly:
Fault Detection
If a node samples faulty readings over Tp, the on-line detector running on that node identi-
fies such behavior and sends an alarm signal to the reporting (i.e. sensor collection) module
within the same node. In turn, the reporting module suppresses the sample obtained at the
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end of the current extraction window Tc (see Figure 6.3(b)). Since some faulty sensors may
exhibit temporary faulty characteristics and may return to normal operations (e.g. a wet
sensor is dried up), the on-line feature extraction phase continues to capture such charac-
teristics over time. If the sampled readings return to normal, the extracted feature vector
should pass the detector and the reporting module keeps forwarding readings up the tree.
Event Detection
Assume we have trained the network to detect unauthorized access to a room (i.e. light
is turned on suddenly for a short period of time). If such an event happens, the detector
identifies the abnormal data behavior caused by the event and sends an alarm signal to the
base station. Otherwise, a node can keep silent and will not trigger any alarm.
Compromise Detection
As discussed earlier, once a node is compromised, the code, cryptographic keys, and data
are all exposed to the adversary. Hence, it is ineffective to rely on the compromised node
itself to filter the anomalies as the adversary may completely eliminate the node’s detector.
To this end, the detection is applied on parent nodes in the tree every time the parent node
receives a new feature vector from its child nodes (Figure 6.3(c)). The detector passes an
internal alarm signal to the forwarding module once it detects a falsified reading from one
of its child nodes. The forwarding module, in turn, denies forwarding readings sent by the
misbehaving child node. Integrity of the sensor data becomes critical if the compromised
node is located closer to the base station. In the worst case, the compromised node may
intercept every single packet passing through it and alter its readings. In this case, readings
from a large number of sensor nodes in the subtree (the compromised node is the root of the
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subtree) will be discarded. To avoid missing benign readings, multi paths can be leveraged
if the sensornet employs a multi-path collection/routing protocol.
6.3.8 Re-training / Feature Re-selection
POND can adapt to different types of data-centric anomalies once installed. For in-
stance, network administrators may set up the network to initially detect certain events
(e.g., fire). Later on, it may become desirable to detect other types of events (e.g.,
movement) and possibly filter out outliers in other sensors (e.g., humidity). Each of
these anomalies affects different sensors (e.g., temperature vs. magnetometer and hu-
midity) and therefore it is necessary to re-train the network using a new feature vector
f = {f1,1, f1,2, ..., f1,K , f2,1, f2,2, ..., f2,K , ..., fN,1, fN,2, ..., fN,K}, where K here is the set
of new modalities (e.g., magnetometer and humidity). It is assumed that the new event or
anomaly is known in advance and can be modeled using one of the anomaly models we
designed in Chapter 4. If this is not the case, then further inspection is considered and a
new anomaly model is designed before the anomaly can be injected into the network. Also
notice that N can be changed to only cover those useful features. For example, it suffices
to extract the rate of change feature in case of an outlier. Decreasing N , however, does not
necessarily decrease the classifier’s complexity since the ADTree algorithm we discussed
chooses the feature that results in the best split (most useful) at each iteration.
Another scenario where re-training may be required is when new sensors are installed
in the field. Each sensor is usually attached to the mote and motes are re-programmed to
collect readings about the new phenomenon. In order for POND to detect anomalies gener-
ated by the new sensor, the feature space f needs to be expanded to cover the new modality
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k. If the feature space remains unaltered, the detection accuracy of the ensemble classifier
may drop dramatically. In the evaluation section, we will see that removing the absolute
distance feature which is extracted over the light readings introduces a false negative rate
of 4% due to inability of detecting clipping faults.
6.4 Aspects of Implementation
As we discuss later in the evaluation section, we have used TinyOS as the underlying oper-
ating system running on the sensor nodes. The TinyOS system, libraries, and applications
are written in nesC; a simplified variant of the C-language. To generate the online predic-
tor, we have used the JBoost library. A function call passes two references to the generated
C predictor, one for an array of pointers containing the feature vector and one representing
the scores. Since JBoost supports text attributes in addition to attributes of type double,
we can eliminate a large number of the original code space. The code for handling text
attributes comprises of dynamic memory allocation of a large hash table of size 1031.
Eliminating such code avoids using the unnecessary malloc and realloc functions. While
malloc is resource consuming and can cause the sensor node to crash [68], realloc is in fact
not supported in nesC. Reducing the code space of the online detector to its minimum and
uses only static memory allocation will save us space in the program memory and avoids
crashes in data memory.
6.5 Evaluation
To evaluate the effectiveness of our proposed POND framework, we rely on both simula-
tions as well as real-world experimental deployments. In both cases, the target platform
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Figure 6.4: Functional block of the SNMiner toolkit
was MicaZ [118] and the sensor board mounted on top of the mote was chosen to be the
MTS300. We used three sensors present on the board: (i) temperature, (ii) light, and (iii)
acoustic. Moreover, the feature extraction was carried out over only one extraction window
(λ = 1). The latter parameters were adequate to achieve a high detection accuracy in a
short period of time.
6.5.1 SNMiner Toolkit
Over the past year, we have developed a tool called SNMiner that enables us to inject
anomalies into an existing sensor network deployment, disseminate various parameters,
collect/extract feature vectors, and evaluate a set of learning algorithms. Figure 6.4 depicts
the building blocks of SNMiner. Rather than relying on publicly accessible datasets, us-
ing sensor datasets from earlier deployments [102,105,112], or generating synthetic sensor
data, SNMiner models faults and malicious behaviors under the dynamics of a realistic sen-
sor network scenario/setup. We utilized SNMiner to inject anomalous models (similar to
those listed in Table 6.1) during both simulation and the real-world experimental deploy-
ment. The various mechanisms for injecting anomalies into an existing deployment was
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discussed in Section 6.3.1. Although not part of the primary goals of SNMiner, the tool
also enables injection of anomalies into sensor datasets obtained from earlier deployments
such as the IBRL deployment. In this case, rather than receiving readings from the net-
work, sensor readings are retrieved from a sensor database. To inject faulty readings into
a sensor dataset, SNMiner reads the true readings of a selected sensor node over a certain
window, transforms the readings based on the desired fault model (see Section 4.2), and
then writes the readings back into the database. This is done one reading at a time in order
to simulate a real-time injection. Sensor streams are visualized by SNMiner in real-time
for early detection of any obvious anomalous behavior (see Figure 6.5(a)). For instance, if
one sensor mote reports fully anomalous readings over the initial deployment, it can simply
be removed or examined, then recovered prior to training the network or putting it under
operation. SNMiner collects feature vectors extracted over the network as discussed in this
chapter. Features can also be extracted from an existing sensor database created during
the initial deployment or those databases loaded with sensor datasets from previous de-
ployments. Last bot not least, few supervised machine learning algorithms (e.g., decision
trees, boosting classifiers with different set of base classifiers) are evaluated in real-time.
Figure 6.5(b) shows a number of snapshots of the different tabs illustrating the different
parameters chosen during the simulation setup discussed next.
6.5.2 Simulation Study
TOSSIM [69] is a discrete event sensor network simulator which simulates an entire, po-
tentially deployable, TinyOS application. Moreover, TOSSIM Live — an extension to the
TOSSIM simulator — integrates well with SNMiner. Since simulating sensor readings
151
(a) Rea-time visualization of sensor data streams en-
ables early detection of obvious anomalies
(b) The various tabs used for injecting anomalies,
extracting statistical features, and evaluating classi-
fication models
Figure 6.5: SNMiner graphical user interface.
is not supported by TOSSIM, we have created a dummy module (DummyC) to replace
the modules PhotoC, TempC, and MicC which correspond to the three sensing modalities
(temperature, light, and acoustic), respectively. Apparently, using dummy readings does
not adequately compare with real sensor values. However, by examining the dataset ob-
tained from an earlier experimental deployment as well as real-world deployments [11], we
attempted to generate values that are adequately representative. In this simulation study,
we injected a different number of data-centric anomalies into a network of 200 nodes. This
was performed using the off-line injection method discussed in Section 6.3.1. There are
two injection phases: one for training the classifier and one for testing its effectiveness.
The injected anomalies are listed in Table 6.2 and Table 6.3.
We ran the experiment a number of times. In each run, we varied β and Ts while
maintaining an extraction window of 2 minutes during the training and testing phases. For
all runs, we set the number of boosting iterations to 300. There were no instances of
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Table 6.2: Injected Anomalies During The Training Phase (Simulation)
# Nodes Anomaly Type Modalities Parameters
2 Outlier Temperature Random ck ∈ Ck ={45, 259, 291, 925, 1009, 1022}
2 Clipping Light Random ck ∈ {0, 1023}, over entire window
3 Event Light o29 = 715, o30,31 = 272, σ = 0, w29 = 2, w30,31 = 3
2 Naive Temp, Light σ35 = {13,20}, σ37 = {18,23}
2 Smart Light, Mic σ44 = {20,30}, σ55 = {25,35}
Table 6.3: Injected Anomalies During The Testing Phase (Simulation)
# Nodes Anomaly Type Modalities Parameters
3 Outlier Temperature Random ck ∈ Ck ={45, 259, 291, 925, 1009, 1022}
3 Clipping Light Random ck ∈ {0, 1023}, over entire window
2 Event Light o27 = 715, o40 = 272, σ = 0, w27 = 4, w40 = 3
3 Naive Temp, Light σ33 = {18,28},σ34 = {22,18},σ41 = {30,30}
3 Smart Light, Mic σ50 = {18,25}, σ52 = {20,24}, σ53 = {30,35}
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Figure 6.6: Detection errors for different values of β. Three statistical features were ex-
tracted (temporal deviation, data range, and highest gradient). Errors are recorded after 300
boosting iterations.
over-fitting. While using large Q ensures the convergence of the boosting algorithm, the
boosting algorithm finished earlier during some of the experimental runs as a result of too
little weights being placed on the training examples. Figure 6.6 plots the detection error,
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Figure 6.7: Resulting ADTree classifier when β is set to 20 during simulation (refer to
Figure 6.6). Number of iterations = 65.
false positive rate, and false negative rate for each run. The figure shows that the accuracy
of the classifier drops when decreasing the value of β. This is mainly because the number of
samples used to extract the three features (see Section 6.3.2) becomes smaller. The actual
detection ratio, however, is still within the range of 98% to 100%. Due to the high packet
loss rate, some anomalous samples may even get dropped before reaching the base station.
When β was set to 20, the classifier could identify all anomalies using a combination of
only 6 decision stumps or rules. This shows the advantage of using a combination of
simple classifiers (here, decision stumps) rather than a single complex classifier. The final
classification label is determined using the resulting ADTree of Figure 6.7. A score is
computed by adding up all prediction nodes (blue ellipses) traversed via the true edges of
decision nodes (red boxes). If the final score is negative, then the node is classified as
anomalous. Finally, we considered the case where one of the sensing modalities was not
included in the feature extraction phase. In this case, clipping faults in the light readings
were missed during the detection (i.e., testing) phase resulting in a false negative ratio of
4%. This suggests that including more features can increase the classifier accuracy.
As mentioned earlier, there was a large number of lost packets during simulation. If
anomaly injection was performed in-network (as done during our real-world deployment),
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Table 6.4: Injected Anomalies During The Training Phase (Real-World Experiment)
Nodes Anomaly Type Modalities Parameters
1,5 Outlier Temperature Random ck ∈ Ck ={45, 259, 291, 925, 1009, 1022}
8 Clipping Light Random ck ∈ {0, 1023}, w8 = 100 sec
13 Spike Temperature
Following a 3rd degree polynomial regression model with
β0, ..., β3 = {532.8, 0.2397, -0.001264, 4.433e-06}
20,21 Smart Light, Mic σ20 = {20,30}, σ21 = {25,35}
Table 6.5: Injected Anomalies During The Testing Phase (Real-World Experiment)
Nodes Anomaly Type Modalities Parameters
9 Outlier Temperature Random ck ∈ Ck ={45, 259, 291, 925, 1009, 1022}
11,12 Clipping Light Random ck ∈ {0, 1023}, w11 = 80 sec,w12 = 120
18 Spike Temperature
Following a 3rd degree polynomial regression model with
β0, ..., β3 = {532.8, 0.2397, -0.001264, 4.433e-06}
19,20 Smart Light, Mic σ19 = {15,25}, σ20 = {10,24}
our tests of the detection accuracy should improve since in-network injection ensures all
samples (normal and anomalous) will be used during feature extraction.
6.5.3 Real-World Experimental Deployment
We set up an in-door experimental deployment of 22 MicaZ motes randomly scattered
over a grid of 6ft × 4ft. The motes were initially programmed with the POND applica-
tion which does not include the detector code. As before, we injected different number
of anomalous behaviors into the network during both the training (Table 6.4) and testing
(Table 6.5) phases. Here, 10 readings were sampled (β = 10) at a sampling frequency of
30 seconds. The latter parameters were adequate to achieve a 100% detection accuracy
in a short period of time (i.e., 5 minutes). Figure 6.8 shows the detection accuracy of the
classifier (Figure 6.9) when extracting all three features over all sensing modalities. It took
7 iterations to eliminate all false negatives. There were no false positives since the first
iteration.
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Figure 6.8: Detection error when extracting all three features and using all three sensing
modalities during the experimental deployment of 22 nodes. It takes 7 iterations to achieve
a perfect detector.
Figure 6.9: The resulting ADTree classifier when all features are extracted over all sens-
ing modalities during the experimental deployment. Boosting stops at iteration 70. (Fig-
ure 6.8).
6.5.4 Analytical Evaluation
Communication Cost
As discussed in Section 6.3.1, injection of anomaly models may be performed either offline
or online. If we choose to perform the injection at the base station and to achieve a rapid
detection, we need to instruct the nodes to send their readings faster than the reporting
frequency. This incurs an extra communication overhead of O(β×λ× h) per node, where
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h is the number of hops to the base station. Recall that rapid detection is one of the main
goals of our proposed framework. If we merely rely on the readings reported at the original
rate, the learning cost would be entirely eliminated, but this does not meet the original goal
of achieving faster detection. If otherwise the injection is to be performed at each node in
the network, the additional communication cost depends on the injection method used. For
example, if we solely rely on source routing to deliver the anomaly model to the selected
nodes, polling messages are first disseminated into the network to obtain the tree structure.
Once the topology information is known, it requires O((h + P )h) to deliver the model to
each selected anomalous node, where P is the number of model parameters.
During the feature collection phase, every node only needs to communicate its feature
vector every Tp for λ consecutive extraction windows. The feature vector will be for-
warded by all intermediate nodes along the path to the base station. Hence, this translates
to λ × O(hNK). This only happens during the training/re-training phase in case the net-
work administrator trains the network to detect measurement faults and/or events. On the
other hand, if the sensor network is being deployed in a hostile environment, an additional
communication cost of λ × O(NK) is incurred with every reported sensor reading. This
is because after the training phase, a node will continue to transmit its feature vector to its
parent.
Computation Cost
During the feature extraction phase, computing the feature vectors by itself is a light weight
process compared to other previously proposed detection mechanisms. A couple of vari-
ables V is updated at each sample leading to a total of λ × O(βV NK) prior to detection.
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In order to check if the node is anomalous, the resulting ADTree is traversed a number
of times to compute the final score. The latter process depends on the tree structure. For
instance, referring to Figure 6.7, only 6 additions and 5 checks are needed before the node
can be determined as either anomalous or normal. As can be seen, the computation com-
plexity of POND during the detection phase is bounded by a small number of checks and
additions.
Power Consumption
By simply relying on the data sheets of the various sensors and the mote’s hardware
components, we can estimate the total energy consumed during both communication
and sampling. The total energy consumed during communication can be computed as
Etotal = (h−1)× b×V (ITX + IRX)TX , where b is the total number of bits to be transmit-
ted, V is the operating voltage (assuming a fully charged set of AA batteries, V = 3 Volts),
ITX is the current drawn when transmitting one bit of information, and IRX is the current
drawn per bit during receive mode. TX is the time spent during transmission or reception
of one bit. The CC2420 radio chip [21] is commonly installed in most of the popular sen-
sor platforms (e.g., MicaZ, TelosB). For this particular chip, ITX varies from 8.5mA at a
transmission power of −25dBm to 17.4mA at 0dBm, IRX is 19.7 mA, and the data rate
is 250kbps (TX = 4µs). Using 3 sensing modalities, a TinyOS packet would be of size
24 bytes including header information. Given these values and assuming 6 hops, the total
energy spent on communicating one data packet to the base station ranges from 324.864µJ
to 427.392µJ .
In contrast, the energy consumed when sensing basic environmental phenomena is an
158
order of magnitude smaller. Power consumption of sensors highly depends on the type
and specifications of the sensor device (current draw, data acquisition rate, etc.). For in-
stance, the total amount of power dissipated when sampling a 12-bit value of the Sensirion
SHT11 humidity sensor, which is embedded onto the TelosB main board, is 80µW (at 1
measurement/s) [111]. Given that a 12-bit measurement is obtained within a maximum of
80ms [111], a node consumes a maximum of 6.4µJ when sensing one humidity reading.
With the SHT11 sensor, the humidity measurement resolution can be further reduced to
8 bits to enable extreme low power applications. In this case, the total energy consumed
when sensing an 8-bit humidity reading will become 1.6µJ , since the time it takes to obtain
an 8-bit measurement is 20ms at maximum. Assuming β×λ is 10, this sums up to 16µJ . If
an anomalous reading is detected using POND, this can use 20 times less energy compared
to communicating the anomalous reading to the base station using the lowest transmission
power (i.e., −25dB). Recall that sampling the sensors at a higher frequency is only used
to achieve rapid detection. It is possible for the node to sample readings at the original rate
but this would require β samples for the node to detect a possible anomaly.
Memory Footprints
MicaZ, one of the very popular commercial sensor platforms, has only 4KBytes of RAM.
TelosB, on the other hand, offers 10KBytes of data memory. Therefore, in most cases,
we should wisely utilize the RAM to store the least amount of information when possible.
Since feature extraction is done on the fly, POND keeps track of a very small number
of variables over the extraction window as discussed in Section 6.3.2. If we denote the
average number of variables for a specific feature as V , then the total memory cost will be
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O(V NK). Our entire POND implementation required a total of 2439 bytes of RAM.
In terms of program memory, the detection code fits well into the TelosB program mem-
ory of 48KBytes along with other necessary protocols used in a sensor network deployment
(DRIP, CTP, and SRP). TelosB is considered one of the most resource constrained devices.
MicaZ offers higher program memory of 128KBytes which allows a larger code space but
is not essential to the operation of POND. Our entire POND mote application required a
total of 29810 bytes of flash.
Table 6.6 provides a complexity comparison of our proposed POND framework against
two other popular anomaly detection schemes: (i) an unsupervised clustering-based scheme
[103] (ELL), and (ii) the supervised Bayesian-based scheme proposed in [28] (BAYES).
ELL works as follows. Each sensor node stores Rw observations of dimension K (Rw >>
K) over a certain time window. Each node then computes the sample mean and the K×K
covariance matrix of the Rw observations. The latter computation incurs a complexity
of O(RwK
2). It then takes the inverse of the covariance matrix—O(K3) using Gaussian
elimination—to form a hyper-ellipsoid. The resulting hyper-ellipsoidal parameters (i.e.,
sample mean and inverse covariance matrix) are then used to find the Mahalanobis distance
between all observations and the sample mean. If the latter is greater than a certain thresh-
old, the sensor observation at time t is considered a local anomaly, otherwise, it is locally
normal. Computing the Mahalanobis distance by itself requires multiplication of three ma-
trices. After this, a node communicates its elliptical parameters as well as the number of its
samples to its parent node. This incurs a communication cost of K+(K(K+1)/2)+1 since
the covariance matrix is symmetric. In case of faults or events, this communication cost
is replicated after every time window. A parent node merges its children hyper-ellipsoidal
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Table 6.6: Comparison of Total Complexities Per Node
Scheme Communication Complexity Computation Complexity Memory Usage
POND λ × O(hNK) λ × O(βVNK) O(VNK)
POND-HOSTILE λ × (O(hNK) + O(RNK)) λ × O(βVNK) O(VNK)
ELL [103] O(WK2) O(RK2) O(RwK)
BAYES [28] O(em3) O(em3) O(m3)
Table 6.7: Description of Parameters Used In Table 6.6 And Section 6.5.4
Parameter Description Typical Value
λ number of consecutive extraction windows 1 or 2
β number of samples within one Tp 10
h number of hops to BS 6 (e.g., IBRL [11]: in-door deployment of 54 nodes)
P number of injected model parameters 1 (outlier in temperature only)
N number of features 3 (std, max gradient, range)
K number of sensing modalities 3 (temperature, light, acoustic)
V avg. number of variables during extraction (std = 3, max gradient = 2, range = 2)
R total number of readings 28800 (for Tc = 30 seconds, 10-day deployment)
W total number of windows 10 (1-day window from a 10-day deployment)
Rw number of readings within window w 2880 (1-day window with Tc = 30 seconds)
m number of data ranges in BAYES [28] 5
e number of epoch in BAYES [28] 2
parameters with its own parameters—adding additional complexity—and communicates
the results up the tree. As an additional communication overhead, the gateway node needs
to communicate the globally computed hyper-ellipsoid over each detection window back
to all the nodes in the network where a node would find global anomalies by computing
the Mahalanobis distance once again and comparing it with the threshold. Compared to
the communication cost of ELL, POND requires no additional communication during the
detection phase which is an order of magnitude savings in terms of communication.
In addition to the higher computation and communication cost incurred by ELL, the
total amount of information stored by POND is much smaller than that stored by ELL.
ELL requires all sensor readings within a time window (i.e., Rw) to be stored in memory
and usually Rw is much larger than K. Referring to the same example in [103], storing
3000 data points of 5 sensing modalities each requires less than 30100 bytes (assuming the
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size of a sensing modality value is 2 bytes) large enough not to fit in the data memory of
the most popular sensor platforms.
BAYES [28] is a naive Bayesian based outlier detection scheme which highly relies on
the fact that the entire observation history of the sensor node is summarized by the previous
reading and the node’s immediate neighbors (parent and child). This assumption holds if
the sensor readings are both spatially and temporally correlated. The scheme uses m data
ranges to predict the missing reading or replace its detected anomalous reading with a more
likely reading within the predicted data range. In order to estimate the probabilities of the
Bayesian model, a total of (1 + m + 3m2/2 + m3/2) counters are needed to be stored at
each node. If the phenomena is stationary over space, the learning is performed in-network
whereby each node communicates its local counters to its parent after every specified epoch
and then resets its counters to zero. The parent node, in turn, sums up its children counters
with its own and forwards the resulting counters up the tree. This process continues until
the base station receives the last counter summaries and accumulates them over a number
of epochs e. The latter process incurs a communication overhead of e × O(m3) for each
node.
The above two schemes are not effective against compromise behaviors since an adver-
sary may entirely eliminate the detection phase. In addition, our scheme detects anomalies
much faster than these schemes as it relies on samples obtained earlier than the reporting
time.
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6.6 Limitations and Evasions
This section is mostly addressing the limitations and evasion to our framework in case of
a compromised behavior. In identifying events and measurement faults, the only issue is
the scalability limited by the size of the TinyOS packet needed to communicate the feature
vectors during the training phase to the base station. Suppose that each sensor node has 3
sensing modalities and TinyOS is powering the nodes, each node can typically fit 6 statis-
tical features of 4-byte long (2 features for each modality) in a single TinyOS packet with
a 29-byte payload. If the feature vector is longer than a single TinyOS payload, then it has
to be divided into two or more packets and hence increasing the communication overhead
during the training phase. In addition, during the detection phase, energy consumption in-
creases with the increase of the number of sensing modalities (β > 1). If the anomaly is
caused by a compromised node, however, the packet size limits the amount of communi-
cated features during both the training and detection phases. Moreover, in case of training
a network of sensor nodes with a high rate of compromised behaviors/nodes (about 40%
of the total nodes), the compromise node ids cannot fit one single disseminated message if
injection was done through dissemination.
Furthermore, a compromised sensor node may decide not to communicate its feature
vector up the tree. In this case the parent will assume that this child node is misbehaving
and can ignore readings received from that node.
In a normal setting, the base station would launch the learning process. Since the code
of a compromised node is exposed to the adversary, he/she may leverage the employed
configuration dissemination protocol to instruct the network to re-train itself. Thus, we
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may only restrict learning to the initial deployment phase to avoid further injections of
anomalies. Alternatively, we may reprogram the sensor motes to accept injected messages
upon re-training and then reprogram them back using the original operating code. This will
again eliminate the injection phase during the online detection, however, it incurs a high
communication overhead due to frequent OTA reprogramming.
Finally, a compromised node can communicate a falsified feature during the online de-
tection phase. This will mislead the parent node into thinking that the compromised node
(its child) is a legitimate one prior to generating faulty/anomalous readings. To address
compromise nodes common in hostile deployments, a simple detector may run on the base
station to check the current variations in each node’s consecutive readings. If a deviated
behavior is observed, the feature extractor may be performed off-line over the current sen-
sor dataset. The latter assumes that each sensor reading received by the base station every
Tc is stored into a sensor database. This, however, will slow down the detection of the
falsified readings. Alternatively, we can use a more robust approach based on the same
assumption discussed earlier in section 6.3; CTP information can be leveraged to create a
global topology view at the base station. A sensor reading is considered anomalous if its
spatial distance from its neighbors is higher than a certain threshold. Clearly, the benefits of
online detection are entirely vanished when relying on this workaround since the malicious
readings are still communicated all the way up the tree. In future work, we plan to come
up with a robust mechanism that runs on parent nodes which verifies the integrity of the
feature upon receiving the summary from a potentially compromised child node.
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6.7 Discussion And Future Directions
This section discusses contributions and stimulate some thoughts about the future usability
of the proposed POND framework.
Contributions. The contributions of our work are three folds: (i) the design of an online
data-centric anomaly detection mechanism which is fast and highly accurate in identifying
measurement faults and events, utilizes very little memory space, and incurs no commu-
nication overheads (during the detection phase). Taking actions upon detection is not a
critical task in our design. However, we discuss two techniques to act upon the detected
flaws in the sensor data by either entirely discarding the faulty readings or raising an alarm
in case of a detected event. Once again this depends on the application of the sensornet, if
an application administrator is only concerned about an event occurring in a specific region,
delivering every data point to the base station creates an unnecessary overhead. This de-
sign choice is not unique and can be adjusted to different considerations; (ii) the proposed
detection framework can be tailored to sensornets deployed in hostile environments. The
major concern in these environments is the trustworthiness of the collected sensor data. If
we allow each parent node to examine a feature vector sent by its children, the parent node
may take further actions to discard the next reading sent by a misbehaving child node (in
terms of the data it sends). ; (iii) we demonstrate the applicability, adaptability, efficiency,
and effectiveness of our online anomaly detection framework in real-world scenarios. To
the best of our knowledge, our work serves as the first attempt to deploy a practical, rapid,
rather effective online data-centric anomaly detection in a real-world sensor network. An
earlier attempt to construct such a system [15] suffered from high program memory re-
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quirements (see Section 5.1). Furthermore, the system in [15] does not allow re-training
of the detector once deployed. In the future, we may also use a public sensornet testbed to
further justify the effectiveness of POND.
Functional Failures and Attacks. The generality of our framework makes it more
flexible and easily expandable. Besides measurement faults, it can be extended to monitor
and detect functional faults such as network and node failures (see Section 3.1). This may
be achievable by identifying a set of features which capture the behaviors of such failures. It
can also address malicious network behaviors and attacks such as sinkholes and wormholes
[130]. Studying the behavior of the network under attack may help network administrators
determine the appropriate features [76] during the on-line feature extraction phase. For
instance the number of received packets from a child node over the extraction window
may serve as an indicator of a replay attack. Hence, the ultimate goal is to employ the
proposed framework in an existing sensor network deployment to identify a large number
of anomalous activities incorporating a set of suitable features into the online detector. As
a future work, we are planning to measure the relative importance of each feature (ranking)
in identifying the current anomaly and use this to infer the type of anomaly (e.g. if the
highest gradient had the highest ranking, it is most probably an outlier or spike fault).
Distinguishing Among Anomalies. In this work, we considered that all types of data-
centric anomalies involve an anomalous behavior without distinguishing among them. The
distinction between events and measurement faults or faults and compromised behaviors
is outside the scope of this dissertation. In Section 5.2.3, we formulated the problem of
identifying anomalous behaviors as a two-class classification problem in which a node may
either be labeled as anomalous or normal. Although this is adequate to achieve the goals
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in this dissertation, we believe that using multiple labels brings up an additional benefit:
distinguishing among the different types of data-centric anomalies. We are planning to use
multi-label classifiers in the future. Moreover, the detector proposed in this chapter drops a
packet if any of the sensing modalities exhibit an anomalous behavior (other than an event).
For instance, if the sensor node incurs a noise fault in its temperature readings, the other
legitimate light and acoustic readings along the same detection window are wasted. We
understand that this is valuable information and should not be dropped. However, similar
to false positives, we believe that the few number of omitted light and acoustic readings are
well substituted by other spatially correlated readings from its neighboring nodes.
Experimental Evaluation. In Section 6.5.4, we analytically evaluated the performance
of the POND framework in terms of power consumption and communication. In the future,
we wish to calculate the actual number of packet transmissions and measure the true power
dissipation during each state of the sensor node (i.e., computing, sensing, and communi-
cation). The latter leads to a more accurate profiling. We could also rely on simulation
and utilize power profilers such as Quanto [31] to achieve finer-grained profiling (TOSSIM
does not support gathering power measurements).
6.8 Applications
POND mainly targets sensor networks deployed for the purpose of monitoring the environ-
ment, event-driven deployments, and those sensornets deployed in hostile environments.
We discussed a number of such deployments in Chapter 2. In this section, we briefly list
two other potential applications that may benefit from our proposed framework.
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6.8.1 Business Applications
A good number of business applications, which leverage the newly emerged sensor network
technology, could benefit from an anomaly detection scheme like the one we proposed.
For example, in [10], the authors measure the quality of goods (fruits, pharmaceuticals)
in a temperature controlled supply chain during storage and transport in real-time. Our
proposed scheme can be utilized to avoid quality degradation and spoilage by accurately
detecting temperature differences at the sensor level and consequently improving the shelf
life prediction algorithm.
6.8.2 Health-Care
Like other invaluable data sources, medical data should be protected from any quality
degradation whether attempted by faulty health sensors or by user actions [62]. Medi-
cal readings can be easily polluted by various artifacts. As an example, correct heart rates
cannot be determined in presence of motion artifacts. Unlike less sensitive measurements
in different applications, medical measurements can not highly deviate from the expected
reading. As another example, in pulse oximetry applications which measure the amount
of oxygen concentration in blood, sensor readings cannot deviate higher than 4% from the
actual oxygen levels [62]. Our proposed online anomaly detection algorithm may be de-
ployed directly on medical devices to detect artifacts or unexpected deviations and filter
them out before collection. This improves the quality of the collected medical data and
avoids any false alarms for prompt monitoring of patient’s health.
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6.9 Summary
In this chapter, we proposed a supervised online anomaly detection framework that can
be adaptable to a number of sensornet deployments: those that enable event-driven appli-
cations, deployments for environmental monitoring, and deployments in hostile environ-
ments. All deployments share a common challenge: the prevalence of data-centric anoma-
lies. Our framework is able to detect data-centric anomalies rapidly and with low false
positives, while at the same time reducing communication overhead and utilizing a small
amount of memory space. The practicality and low complexity imposed by ‘online’ fea-
ture extraction and detection justify the use of our framework in real-world existing sensor
network deployments.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions
Existing sensor data acquisition schemes blindly collect raw sensory data without examin-
ing its quality. Studying a number of past, existing, and futuristic sensor network deploy-
ments in this dissertation have emphasized the need for building a system that ensures the
fidelity, integrity, and/or trustworthiness of the collected sensor data. Usually, there are two
design choices whenever deciding to build such a system. The first would come up with a
detection mechanism which runs at the centralized base station and may identify abnormal
readings and filter them accordingly. Given the fact that sensor nodes in a sensor network
deployment are highly resource-constrained, transmitting anomalous readings all the way
to the base station consumes the node’s scarcest resource (i.e., energy) at an order of mag-
nitude greater than simply discarding it. To this end, online detection mechanisms that
run directly at the sensor level are more preferable especially if the number of anomalous
readings is non-negligible.
This dissertation proposed both a centralized and an online data-centric anomaly detec-
tion frameworks which were capable of identifying measurement faults as well as compro-
mise data behaviors. These frameworks are rooted in machine learning and require a highly
expressive ground truth. In the dissertation, we also proposed and designed a number of
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anomaly models that proved to be significantly representative of the anomalous behaviors
in a real-world setting. Using a tool we develop at our lab, we used such models to inject
anomalous behaviors into a sensor network deployment in real-time, extract simple statisti-
cal features, and evaluate the accuracy of a number of supervised learners. We have shown
that, in some cases, both frameworks identified data-centric anomalies with negligible or
non-existent false positives and false negatives. Finally, to prove the practicality of the
online framework, it was entirely implemented using the TinyOS programming language
which operates a large number of today’s sensor motes.
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